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Abstract
The asset pricing anomalies have existed in the UK stock market for a long time.
This thesis aims to study different liquidity measures, liquidity commonality, sys-
tematic liquidity risk, different momentum trading strategies, asset pricing risks
with momentum, investor behaviours with momentum and the causal link between
financial crisis and asset pricing anomalies using various methods and tests.
The first empirical chapter examines the performance of the standard Sharpe-
Lintner CAPM, the Fama-French three factor model, and the four factor model of
Carhart (1997) both with, and without, the first component of multiple illiquidity
measures. The results show that no individual illiquidity proxy outperforms the
others, and further that the illiquidity proxies have a systematic common illiquid-
ity component. The results also reveal that the inclusion of the illiquidity factor
in the capital asset pricing model plays a significant role in explaining the cross-
sectional variation in stock returns. The second empirical chapter analyses the
relationship between momentum profits and stock market illiquidity. This study
finds negative and significant relationship between aggregate market illiquidity
and momentum profits. The model applied in this chapter captures significant
bounce in varying beta coefficients changing over time. The analysis also indi-
cates that the stocks associated with high liquidity performs better relative to
illiquid stocks under systemic shocks. The final empirical chapter investigated
momentum anomaly and the hypothesis that individual investors trade differ-
ently from institutional investors and significantly overreact to economic shocks,
creating destabilising effect in the stock market. The results reveal that stock
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market inefficiency is driven and dominated by individual investors’ anchoring
and adjustment biases as well as institutional investors’ cognitive biases.
There are several implications for this work. The findings may be useful for both
individual and institutional investors and regulators in similar markets beyond the
UK, for example, the other European markets. In this study, we show that abnor-
mal stock performance during liquidity crisis is, in part, predictable, and investors
can construct portfolios of stocks that better withstand liquidity shocks. For indi-
vidual investors, they can maximise their profits by holding momentum portfolios
at a short horizon. For institutional investors, they might take advantage of pro-
fessional expertise in making abnormal profits. Policy makers are expected to
pay special attention to the differences in trading by financial institutions and
individual investors.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Background
The dot.com bubble in the 1990s and recent 2007-2009 global financial crisis have
made the price bubble phenomena hard to ignore. Typically, the equity premium
puzzle has attracted lots of attention in literature in the context of asset pricing
models (e.g. (Carhart, 1997; Fama and French, 1993, 2015; Sharpe, 1964)). Al-
though the literature have proposed several possible explanations for the puzzle,
researchers haven’t reached into consensus regarding a satisfactory explanation.
This work therefore focuses on exploring and explaining the two most common
market anomalies: liquidity and momentum. These two anomalies are often re-
garded as the contributing components of excess equity returns (Fama and French,
2015).
The role of liquidity in asset pricing has grown rapidly over the past few years.
Liquidity is often viewed as an important feature of the investment environment
and the macro economy. Recent studies find that fluctuations in various mea-
sures of liquidity are correlated across assets (e.g. (Gissler, 2016; Korajczyk and
Sadka, 2008; Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer, 2013)). Furthermore, the
9
importance of liquidity on security returns has been confirmed by numerous pre-
vious empirical studies, which have thus established liquidity as a key considera-
tion in investment decisions. However, using liquidity-based explanations are not
straightforward. A difficulty in testing the liquidity-based explanation lies in the
fact that stock liquidity is a subjective concept and is very hard to measure. How-
ever, whilst liquidity is an elusive concept, most market participants agree that
liquidity generally reflects the ability to buy or sell sufficient quantities quickly,
at low trading cost, and without impacting the market price too much. Conse-
quently, a vast number of measures have been used to approximate the extent to
which a stock is illiquid or liquid.
Despite the increasing interest in the role of liquidity in equity markets in general,
and asset pricing in particular, a universal definition for liquidity remains elusive,
and the basic question of how to measure liquidity remains unsolved. For exam-
ple, Hasbrouck (2002) and Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) find that the
measures are of a different quality themselves. They find that different measures
have conflicting impact on stock returns: Amihud’s price to volume measure is
reported to have significant impact on stock returns but Pastor and Stambaugh’s
γ is tested to have very little impact. In fact, if the empirical results are based
solely on one particular measure, it is difficult to ascertain whether the results
are driven by measure-specific components or by some common components of
the measured illiquidity. Therefore, it is important to reconcile the conflict by
collapsing all existing measures into one measure. This thesis therefore focuses
on solving the liquidity measure puzzle and the pricing power of illiquidity in
traditional asset pricing models.
Momentum effect, on the other hand, is another puzzling equity anomaly in the fi-
nance literature since it was first documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). A
number of studies have been carried out to attempt to clarify whether this anomaly
is global and where exactly the underlying factors may derive from (e.g., (George
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and Hwang, 2004; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Lewellen, 2002; Moskowitz and
Grinblatt, 1999; Novy-Marx, 2012)).
There are many different sources of momentum profits, including risk related
explanations, data snooping and flawed methodology, and behavioural expla-
nations. The debate initially focused on the risk-side of explanations, specify-
ing that macroeconomic risks cause momentum (Avramov and Chordia, 2006;
Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad, 2005; Conrad and Kaul, 1998; Fama and French,
1996; Griffin, Ji, and Martin, 2003; Liu and Zhang, 2008; Pa´stor and Stambaugh,
2003). Yet, this debate soon shifted to broader topics, the behavioural side to
explain momentum profits by revisiting the investors’ self-attributive overconfi-
dence (Avramov, Cheng, and Hameed, 2014; Baker and Stein, 2004; Barberis,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000). The reason as to why
researchers are yet to reach into consensus is arguably because on the one hand,
psychological explanations tend to ignore the risks that drive momentum patterns.
On the other hand, it is arguably challenging to make conclusions about rational
risk-based explanations because it is difficult to interpret why a recent rise in a
stock’s price transpires to be more risky. In fact, much research fails to find di-
rect evidence to suggest that risk drives momentum. Consequently, behavioural
finance provides several possible explanations through psychological models, for
example, signal model for the observed momentum profits (Daniel and Hirsh-
leifer, 2015). Models are constructed according to how people behave: some are
based on psychological biases of investors that make systematic errors in forming
beliefs and preferences, while other models are built on the interactions among
various investor types. Models can be generally divided into two groups: one is
based on investors’ under-reaction to new information and the other is based on
people’s overreaction to sudden news. For under-reaction, stock prices react less
than they should do according to the EMH. In contrast, overreaction causes stock
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prices to react much stronger than they should be according to the EMH. There-
fore, both of the two biases are reflected in the models as the stock prices move
gradually to the equilibrium point. This thesis therefore discusses both risk-side
and behavioural-side explanations of momentum anomaly and also explores the
possible link between illiquidity and momentum anomaly.
When interpreting momentum returns, the literature tend to ignore the differences
between individual and institutional investors. In fact, individual investors were
reported to hold 10.7% of shares listed on the London Stock Exchange by the
end of 2012 (NationalStatistics, 2013). These investors are often criticised for
their irrational investment decisions. For example, Barber and Odean (2011)
reported that individual investors tend to excessively trade stocks, which resulting
in higher transaction costs. It is also argued that due to their limited capital,
individual investors are more likely to hold non-diversified portfolios (Statman,
2004). Indeed, individual investors have been treated as noise traders because
of their constant decision-making errors (De Bondt, 1998). This is in line with
Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2009), who documented that individual investors
have lost an annual average of 3.8% points in portfolio performances in Taiwan in
general.
Yet, although individual investors are documented to be at a disadvantage in trad-
ing against professionals in terms of skills (Barber et al., 2009; Gao and Lin, 2015;
Li, Wang, and Rhee, 2015; Tekc¸e, Yılmaz, and Bildik, 2016), the literature tends
to neglect the fact that individuals do indeed make profits. In addition, the dis-
tinct characteristics of individual investors suggest that momentum trading can
benefit this group more because such strategies do not require extensive finan-
cial knowledge. Investors only need to buy and sell based on a typical strategy.
Hence, individual stocks are recommended for them to follow momentum trading
patterns. The existing research mostly focuses on institutional traders who select
a large amount of stocks in portfolios. Clearly, small investors are not in these
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financial positions for such large portfolios. In this line, Goetzmann and Kumar
(2008) document that US individual investors hold an average of only three or four
shares in each portfolio. This thesis investigates the behaviours of the two types
of the investors in the UK stock market and explores further on the momentum
anomaly. The following section presents the background of the UK stock market.
1.2 The UK Stock Market Background
This research specifically focuses on the UK market. This section provides in-
formation about the UK stock market characteristics and briefly discusses the
differences between the UK and the US stock market.
The London Stock Exchange (LSE) is home to about 2,500 companies. The Ex-
change is the largest stock exchange in Europe ahead of the Euronext. It consists
of four markets: the Main Market, the Professional Securities Market (PSM), the
Specialist Fund Market and Alternative Investment Market (AIM). This thesis
mainly deals with the stocks listed in the Main Market, which includes flagship
companies that are larger and more established. The Main Market represents a
badge of quality for every company admitted and traded on it. It is therefore a
reliable source to conduct the research. Specifically, this thesis studies the compa-
nies listed on the FTSE All-Share Index, which is a capitalisation-weighted index
that include companies traded on the London Stock Exchange. The constituents
of this index involves 627 companies that represent at least 98% of the full capital
value of all qualified UK companies. To be qualified for FTSE All-Share Index,
companies must have a full listing on the LSE with a pound sterling or Euro
denominated price on SETS or SETSmm or a firm quotation on SEAQ or seats.
It therefore represents the UK stock market characteristics (Opong, Mulholland,
Fox, and Farahmand, 1999). Figure 1.1 shows the number of companies listed on
the UK Main Market by equity market value by June 2016.
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Figure 1.1: UK Main Market Statistics: June 2016
London has acquired an enviable level of global reach over the past decades and
has gained significant financial influences. Therefore, it is important to conduct
local research in terms of liquidity and momentum in capital market. Interestingly,
although the UK equity market uniquely stands out in the global market, it is
reported to have suffered from infrequent and non-synchronous trading (Hon and
Tonks, 2003). This has caused biased results in efficient market researches (Barnes,
2016). It is therefore important to study equity puzzle in this market in particular.
There are indeed differences between the UK and the US environment in terms of
trading and market structure. In the UK, all trading takes place on the London
Stock Exchange (LSE), whereas in the US stocks are traded primarily on the
Nasdaq and NYSE. In the US, trading on Nasdaq is based on order book driven
while the NYSE uses a hybrid system. In the case of the UK, trading on the
LSE is a mix of order book driven (SETS) and a hybrid quote/order book driven
system. Furthermore, the UK is a bank-based system, which is more vulnerable
to liquidity crunches than capital market-based system (US) because the first-
order risk is bank solvency and the level of risk lies with financial institutions
(Hardie and Maxfield, 2010). Since most studies on liquidity and momentum are
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predominantly based on US data, in this thesis, the author seeks to investigate if
differences in market structure and liquidity characteristics of a country will lead
to different results (Foran, Hutchinson, and O’Sullivan, 2014; Huang and Stoll,
2001).
1.3 Aims, Motivations and Contributions
The thesis is composed of three empirical chapters focusing on asset pricing
anomalies in the UK market. They are illiquidity premium, momentum premium
with illiquidity, and momentum premium with behavioural biases, representing
chapters 2, 3, and 4 respectively. Each chapter has its own literature review,
methodology and empirical findings.
Chapter 2 aims to provide answers to a number of questions. Firstly, based on ex-
isting illiquidity measures, is there a single illiquidity proxy that can significantly
outperform other proxies with robust illiquidity premiums in asset pricing mod-
els in the UK? Secondly, does liquidity commonality exist in the UK? Thirdly,
which liquidity-adjusted asset pricing model explains stock returns in the UK?
Finally, do the results vary between parametric and non-parametric tests? This
study reviews the effects of illiquidity on asset pricing in the UK stock market
and contributes to the asset pricing literature in several ways. In contrast to the
Fama and French (2015)’s indirect liquidity, the author uses UK data and exam-
ines the price of the common systematic components of illiquidity. The author
defines ‘illiquidity factor’ as the spread return of equal-weighted portfolios. These
portfolios are constructed on the basis of the first principal component of the
first seven illiquidity measures. Further, rather than the conventional parametric
tests of asset pricing models, the Hansen-Jagannathan distance is used to examine
non-parametrically the level of errors associated with the liquidity capital asset
pricing model (LCAPM). This helps shed light on these errors as an indication
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on the efficiency of the models.
Chapter 3 aims to investigate the explanations on liquidity risks, by examining
how market liquidity affects momentum payoffs. It deals with the momentum
anomaly and its behavioural and risk-side explanations from the UK stock mar-
ket. This chapter contributes to the seemingly contradictory impacts of illiquidity
on momentum returns in several ways. First, this chapter provides empirical ev-
idence that is consistent with recent theoretical work on the behavioural-side of
explanations about momentum phenomenon, helping bolster a fairly thin research
base. For example, Avramov et al. (2014) show that periods of high market illiq-
uidity are followed by low and negative momentum returns. They argue that
during market recession, overconfident investors decide to opt out of the market
due to short-sale constraints and this reduces market liquidity and the momentum
effect thereby becomes less powerful. The measure of illiquidity adopted in this
chapter, on the other hand, combines not only liquidity impact features but also
liquidity risk features. In addition to the behavioural-side of explanations, the
author provides new evidence suggesting that liquidity risk provides momentum
profits. Second, this study contributes to the emerging body of empirical litera-
ture on applying varying coefficient models. For momentum payoffs, the existing
literature has to date not yet considered the effect during financial crisis. The
semi-parametric approach is different from existing literature that mostly assumes
linearity and constant beta coefficients. The results present a high heterogeneity,
and as such this work increases the accuracy and flexibility of estimations. Third,
this chapter contributes specifically to the UK empirical literature by exploiting
local shock in 2007. The sudden bank run event of Northern Rock is market spe-
cific. The author uses the ‘difference-in-differences’ estimation method, as well as
both the in- and out-of-sample experiments so as to find the predictive power of
market illiquidity on momentum profits.
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Chapter 4 explores the role of institutional and individual investors in momen-
tum tradings and aims to examine both anchored and unanchored momentum
strategies for each type of investors. The author uses the 52-week-high momen-
tum strategy as a proxy for information uncertainty to investigate the behavioural
differences of the two types of investors. Furthermore, by applying ‘difference in
differences’ methodology, this empirical study tends to identify the causal link of
momentum crash and negative economic shock and the corresponding selection
bias for both institutional and individual investors. This third empirical chap-
ter contributes to the momentum literature in the following ways. Firstly, the
author examines various holding horizons of GH momentum returns for both in-
dividual and institutional investors in the UK. Although momentum pattern has
been documented to have generated significant returns for investors, the existing
studies mostly demonstrated the institutional investors. Notably, retail investors
are often neglected because of barriers such as the relatively small amounts of
capital they have invested, trading frictions and nonstandard trading horizons.
However, momentum trading can be applicable to individual investors because
it does not require profound investing expertise and is easy to conduct (Siganos,
2010). Therefore, in addition to conventional momentum strategies that applies to
institutional investors, this study investigates the profitability of the momentum
trading when only small numbers of firms are selected to construct winner and
loser portfolios. Secondly, this study examines the rolling holding horizons from 3
months to 5 years of momentum profits in a 26-year sample period. The findings
show significant and positive GH momentum returns for both institutional and
individual investors in the UK. In particular, individual investors can profit more
from the sell side loser portfolios. The momentum profits do not revert even in the
long run. Thirdly, this study links the 52-week-high momentum with information
uncertainty and finds that price momentum is partly driven by individual traders
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who suffer from initial under-reaction to new information due to ‘anchoring bi-
ases’. During times of greater information uncertainty, individual investors tend
to apply the 52-week-high price as an anchor more than institutional investors
do, in particular from the sell-side. Fourthly, this study further links analysts’
forecasts with the 52-week-high momentum and find that institutional investors
who have access to analysts’ earnings forecasts revisions are more likely to facili-
tate market efficiency. This further demonstrates that stock market inefficiency is
partly driven by individual investors. Finally, this study examines the causal link
between investor behaviours and momentum crashes. Importantly, the study ex-
ploits the sudden financial crisis as a negative shock. The difference-in-differences
(DID) model suggests that large negative economic shock significantly affects in-
stitutional portfolio returns. In addition, this chapter confirms the presence of
cognitive bias of institutional investors as evidenced by their use of ‘unanchored
momentum strategy’.
1.4 Main Findings
This thesis has three empirical dimensions including illiquidity premiums and
expected stock returns, semi-varying momentum payoffs and illiquidity, and the
52-week high momentum strategy and information uncertainty. The main findings
of each chapter is summarized below.
1.4.1 Main Findings From the First Empirical Study (Chap-
ter 2)
This study examined the relative importance of liquidity risk for the time-series
and cross-section of stock returns in the UK. The initial investigation suggested
that no individual ililquidity proxy outperforms the others, and further that the
illiquidity proxies have a systematic common illiquidity component. Hence, the
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author proposed a simple way to capture the multidimensionality of illiquidity.
The analysis indicated that existing illiquidity measures have considerable as-
set specific components, which justifies this new approach. Further, the author
used an alternative test of the Amihud (2002) measure and parametric and non-
parametric methods to investigate whether liquidity risk is priced in the UK. The
study found that the inclusion of the illiquidity factor in the capital asset pricing
model plays a significant role in explaining the cross-sectional variation in stock
returns, in particular with the Fama-French three-factor model. Further, using
Hansen-Jagannathan non-parametric bounds, the study demonstrated that the
illiquidity-augmented capital asset pricing models yield a small distance error,
other non-liquidity based models failed to yield economically plausible distance
values.
1.4.2 Main Findings From the Second Empirical Study
(Chapter 3)
Marketwide liquidity appears to be a state variable that is important for pricing
common stocks and explaining momentum profits. The study analysed the re-
lationship between momentum profits and stock market illiquidity. The findings
show that the periods of high market illiquidity are followed by low momentum
profits, and very often negative returns. In the presence of aggregate illiquidity,
the power of the competing state variables (for example, the down market condi-
tion) has disappeared. Furthermore, the semi-parametric tests, the time varying
coefficient models and out-of-sample performance have been used to analyse the
ability of the state of market illiquidity to explain and predict momentum payoffs
at both the portfolio and individual levels. The study found significant bounce
in varying beta coefficients changing over time. Consequently, the models cap-
tured more precise beta coefficients in the estimation compared to those linear
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parametric tests, which assume linearity and smooth the line of slope coefficients.
Furthermore, this study captured the significant momentum crash and the increase
of liquidity risks during the financial crisis. The analysis also indicated that the
stocks associated with high illiquidity are more sensitive to systemic shocks.
1.4.3 Main Findings From the Third Empirical Study (Chap-
ter 4)
This study examined the driver of the 52-week high momentum strategy and
whether this strategy’s profitability can be explained by anchoring, which is a
behavioral bias of both individual and institutional investors. The study demon-
strated that individual investors trade differently from institutional investors and
significantly overreacted to economic shocks, providing destabilising effect in the
stock market due to inexperience. Institutional investors, on the other hand,
are more experienced. Using analysts’ earnings forecast revision ratio, the find-
ings suggested that experienced institutional investors are more likely to incorpo-
rate momentum signals and eventually translate their forecast revisions as news.
The additional tests of an unanchored strategy confirmed that the 52-week-high
momentum is significantly correlated with semi-strong efficient market because
unanchored strategies tend to crash and revert during periods of crowded trading
caused by institutional investors. The contradictory effect of information un-
certainty on winner and loser stocks implied that the 52-week-high profits are
increasing with uncertainty measures. Importantly, the study found that stock
market inefficiency is driven and dominated by individual investors’ anchoring and
adjustment biases as well as institutional investors’ cognitive biases.
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1.5 Outline of the Study
The thesis is organised in the following ways. Chapter 1 presents an introduction
of the whole thesis. Chapter 2 details the illiquidity anomaly in asset pricing
models applied in the UK. Chapter 3 details the liquidity risk in explaining mo-
mentum anomaly. The behavioural explanations of momentum is presented in
chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Illiquidity Premium and
Expected Stock Returns: A new
Approach
2.1 Introduction
The role of liquidity in asset pricing has grown rapidly over the past few years.
A variety of studies have proposed different illiquidity measures as proxies for
illiquidity by investors. However, although researchers are able to test whether
the stock returns are statistically related to their illiquidity measures, their re-
sults generate conflicting impacts over stock returns. In other words, despite the
increasing interest in the role of liquidity in equity markets in general, and asset
pricing in particular, a universal definition for liquidity remains elusive, and the
basic question of how to measure liquidity remains unsolved.1 For example, Has-
brouck (2002) and Goyenko et al. (2009) find that the measures are of a different
quality themselves. They find that different measures have conflicting impact on
1Liquidity is a broad and elusive concept that generally denotes the ability to trade large
quantities quickly, at low cost, and without moving the price. Financial literature indicates that
rational investors who think they hold shares in exchange for lower returns with higher degree
of liquidity they claim.
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stock returns: Amihud’s price to volume measure is reported to have significant
impact on stock returns but Pastor and Stambaugh’s gamma is tested to have very
little impact. In fact, if the empirical results are based solely on one particular
measure, it is difficult to ascertain whether the results are driven by measure-
specific components or by some common components of the measured illiquidity.
Therefore, it is important to reconcile the conflict by collapsing all existing mea-
sures into one measure. Given the fact that strong evidence against the reliability
of a single illiquidity measure exists, in this chapter, the author adopts not only
individual measures, but also constructs a comprehensive illiquidity proxy. This
illiquidity proxy is used across seven different measures and examines whether the
pricing of liquidity risks varies amongst these measures. In particular, the author
adopts illiquidity measures introduced by Amihud (2002), Pa´stor and Stambaugh
(2003), zero-return measures proposed by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999)
and Liu (2006), Roll’s (1984) effective bid-ask spread measure (Roll, 1984), the
price-based spread measure of Corwin and Schultz (2012) and the effective tick
measure from Goyenko et al. (2009). Consistent with Korajczyk and Sadka (2008)
and Kim and Lee (2014), the author finds around 33% of the variation in illiquid-
ity proxies is explained by the first principal component, which further suggests
that systematic common components exist in illiquidity measures.
This chapter contributes to understanding of the seemingly contradictory effects
of illiquidity on asset pricing in several ways. It is generally the case that re-
cent researchers have focused on new factors that contribute to traditional asset
pricing models. Indeed, Fama and French (2015) propose a brand new five-factor
model while adopting indirect factor to denote liquidity. In contrast, the author
uses UK data and examines the price of the common systematic components of
illiquidity. There are indeed differences between the UK and the US environment
in terms of trading and market structure. In the UK, all trading takes place on
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) whereas in the US stocks are traded primarily
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on the Nasdaq and NYSE. In the US, trading on Nasdaq is based on order book
driven while the NYSE uses a hybrid system. In the case of the UK, trading on
the LSE is a mix of order book driven (SETS) and a hybrid quote/order book
driven system. Furthermore, the UK is a bank-based system, which is more vul-
nerable to liquidity crunches than capital market-based system (US) because the
first-order risk is bank solvency and the level of risk lies with financial institu-
tions (Hardie and Maxfield, 2010). Since most studies on illiquidity premium and
expected stock returns are predominantly based on US data, in this chapter the
author seeks to investigate if differences in market structure and liquidity charac-
teristics of a country will lead to different results (Foran et al., 2014; Huang and
Stoll, 2001). This thesis defines ‘illiquidity factor’ as the spread return of equal-
weighted portfolios P10-P1. These portfolios are constructed on the basis of the
first principal component of the first seven illiquidity measures. Further, rather
than the conventional parametric tests of asset pricing models, the author uses
Hansen-Jagannathan distance to examine non-parametrically the level of errors
associated with the liquidity capital asset pricing model (LCAPM). This helps
shed light on these errors as an indication on the efficiency of the models.
This chapter aims to provide answers to a number of questions. Firstly, based on
existing illiquidity measures, is there a single illiquidity proxy that can significantly
outperform other proxies with robust illiquidity premiums in asset pricing models
in the UK? Secondly, does liquidity commonality exist in the UK? Thirdly, which
liquidity-adjusted asset pricing model explains stock returns in the UK? Finally,
do the results vary between parametric and non-parametric tests?
The remainder of the chapter is set out as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief
review of the literature on the illiquidity framework. Section 2.3 provides details
of the methodology and models the author used to answer all questions. Section
2.4 presents the data and variable construction. Section 2.5 presents the empirical
results and section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
What kinds of risk systematically drive stock prices? This question has prompted
vast amounts of research and continues to exist as one of the main challenges in
finance. The Sharpe-Lintner CAPM (1964) was the first attempt to answer this
question by quantifying the risk which is attributable to general market fluctua-
tions (Sharpe, 1964).
Yet, although the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM provides a theoretical framework to
explain stock returns, the ability of the model to describe asset returns is weak.
Indeed doubts regarding the empirical validity of the model are well established
and it is both frequently rejected by data and also known to ignore some well
documented anomalies, see inter alia (Black, 1972; Fama and MacBeth, 1973;
Gibbons, 1982; Hyde and Sherif, 2005; Stambaugh, 1982). Traditional tests of
the CAPM assume that the market portfolio is observable, expected returns are
constant, and that assets’ betas are stationary over a fixed period. Further, it
measures risk by beta, which is a consequence of its questionable assumption of
the existence of an equilibrium in which investors display mean-variance behaviour
and requires the distribution of stock returns to be symmetrical.
The failure of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM to capture the behaviour of the data
and to measure a stock’s or a portfolio’s volatility has led to a number of different
approaches that have attempted to address the limitations of the model. For
instance, the three-factor model Fama and French (1993) and the Carhart (1997)
model have received significant attention in empirical research. Whilst Fama and
French (1993) demonstrate that asset prices are influenced not only by market
systematic risk, but also the size and value factors, Carhart (1997) argues that
momentum is an important risk factor which has not been priced in assets.
Recently, much attention has been given to market friction and in particular it has
been widely argued that liquidity, see inter alia (Amihud, 2002; Bekaert, Harvey,
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and Lundblad, 2007; Chan and Faff, 2005; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam,
2001; Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009; Hasbrouck, 2002; Liu, 2006; Pa´stor
and Stambaugh, 2003), appears to be a suitable candidate for a priced state vari-
able. For example, Lillo, Farmer, and Mantegna (2002) suggest that liquidity
fluctuation is a permanent market impact. However, Bouchaud, Kockelkoren,
and Potters (2006) argue that the impact power is transient and will decay in
time. In fact, liquidity is often viewed as an important feature of the investment
environment and the macro economy, and recent studies find that fluctuations in
various measures of liquidity are correlated across assets. Furthermore, the im-
portance of liquidity on security returns has been confirmed by numerous previous
empirical studies, which have thus established liquidity as a key consideration in
investment decisions.
Nevertheless, using liquidity-based explanations are not straightforward. A diffi-
culty in testing the liquidity-based explanation lies in the fact that stock liquidity
is a subjective concept and is very hard to measure. However, whilst liquidity
is an elusive concept, most market participants agree that liquidity generally re-
flects the ability to buy or sell sufficient quantities quickly, at low trading cost,
and without impacting the market price too much. Consequently, a vast num-
ber of measures have been used to approximate the extent to which a stock is
illiquid or liquid. The first set of illiquidity measures have been based on stock
daily returns or trading volume. Amihud (2002) proposes a simple and intuitive
illiquidity measure, which is defined as the absolute daily return divided by daily
trading volume. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) use the illiquidity proxy of Amihud
(2002) and find evidence to support the model in the US market over the period
1962-1999. Elsewhere, Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) have proposed an illiquidity
measure called ’price sensitivity to order flow’, which is based on return reversal
due to heavy trading volume. Another illiquidity proxy is the turnover measured
by daily share trading volume divided by the number of total shares outstanding.
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The second set of illiquidity indicators are based exclusively on returns and provide
a simple way of obtaining illiquidity proxy. For example, Liu (2006) proposes
a trading volume-adjusted zero return measure and shows that the illiquidity
measured by the proposed indicator is in fact priced in as far as the US market
is concerned. It is worth noting that the zero return indicator is a number of
zero return days scaled by the total available trading days in a given period. This
measure indicates that on a day when trading cost is high, informed traders would
not trade, resulting in zero return on that day. This measure is especially reliable
in international finance research, as a high quality daily trading volume is not
guaranteed (Bekaert et al., 2007; Lee, 2011). In addition, Lesmond et al. (1999)
also propose an illiquidity measure based solely on daily returns. It was shown to
be significantly correlated with the spread data and is used to show the illusionary
aspect of momentum trading (Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou, 2004).
The third set of measures is based on return correlation, effective tick, and effective
spread. Roll (1984) and Goyenko et al. (2009) suggest a proxy of spread based on
the serial correlation of daily returns and effective spread. Also, in a recent study,
Das and Hanouna (2010) create a measure of illiquidity based on ‘run length’,
which totals the consecutive series of positive and negative daily returns before
the sign reverses. The authors further highlight that this particular illiquidity
measure acts as a proxy for price impact.
2.2.1 Illiquidity Measures
Much literature suggests a number of proxies for illiquidity that are used as time-
series conditioning variables. However, there are no agreed or final measures, and
researchers have not yet reached an agreement regarding the optimal illiquidity
proxy. In recent studies, Liu (2009) examine seven individual illiquidity mea-
sures. According to their findings, some proxies perform better than others in
asset pricing models, which shows a more significant and robust illiquid premium.
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However, their results remain inconclusive regarding the most suitable illiquid-
ity proxy. Arguably, a possible solution to find a suitable illiquidity proxy is an
alternative method that extracts commonality of illiquidity risk. Indeed, recent
researchers have implemented multiple illiquidity measures to gauge the robust-
ness of their results. For example, Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) adopted multiple
proxies and found that the illiquidity commonality exists among their measures.
Similarly, Kim and Lee (2014) further found that the systematic common compo-
nent of illiquidity measures risk in the US.
In this chapter, the author complements such approaches and adds to the field by
testing illiquidity individually. This study forms a composite index of illiquidity
based on the common variation of a number of proxies for illiquidity, including
turnover ratio, reversal measure of illiquidity, trading volume, bid-ask spread,
effective spread, and number of zero return days.
1 Return/Value Ratio (Amihud, 2002)
The first illiquidity measure is the return to volume ratio proposed by Amihud
(2002) to estimate illiquidity of stocks. This measure has been widely used in
empirical literature because of its easiness of construction (Acharya and Pedersen,
2005). However, it is so far not clear that Amihud’s measure would be priced,
due to the compensation for price impact in comparison to other proxies which is
something that requires further investigation.
Amihud defines illiquidity of stock i in time t as:
RVi ≡ ILLIQit =
1
Daysit
Daysit∑
d=1
|Rit|
V it
(2.2.1)
where Rit is the return on day d in month t, V
i
t is the dollar volume (in millions) on
day d in month t, and Daysit is the number of valid observation days in month t for
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stock i. In particular, V it in this chapter represents GB pound sterling (hereafter
referred to as pound) volume (in millions) for the UK.
2 Reversal Measure of illiquidity (Pa´stor and Stambaugh,
2003)
The reversal measure of illiquidity has been advocated by Pa´stor and Stambaugh
(2003). This measure reflects the return reversal after trading: the larger the
volume, the larger the return reversal, and the larger the cost. Yet, one drawback
of this measure is that it is time consuming in a real-time estimation. The measure
is identified as:
ri,d+1,t − rM,d+1,t = αi,t + βi,tri,d,t + γi,tsign(ri,d,t − rM,d,t)dvoli,d,t + i,d,t. (2.2.2)
where ri,d+1,t is the return on stock i of day d at month t, rM,d+1,t is the market
return (FTSE-All share value-weighted index return) on day d at month t, and
dvoli,d,t is the pound trading volume (in million-pound unit). γi,t is the coefficient
of signed pound trading volume.
3 Zero Return (Lesmond et al., 1999)
Intuitively, when trading cost is higher than the benefit of trading, rational in-
vestors would choose not to trade (Lesmond et al., 1999). Therefore, people
observe zero return for such days in this case. This measure is reported to be
popular in international finance research, especially in emerging markets, where
high-quality daily trading volume data are not available.
Lesmond et al. (1999) propose the zero return (ZR) illiquidity measure:
ZRi,t =
Ni,t
Tt
(2.2.3)
where Tt is the number of trading days at time t ; Ni,t is the number of zero-return
days of stock i in time t.
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4 Turnover-Adjusted Zero-Return (Liu, 2006)
ZR measures can potentially lead to the same level of illiquidity for several stocks
in multiple periods. In this case, Liu (2006) further proposed a turnover-adjusted
zero-return measure, which is identified as:
LMxi,t =
{
NZ +
1
TVx
DF
}
× 21x
Nx
(2.2.4)
where NZ is the number of zero-volume days in the previous x month; TVx is
the turnover over the previous x month, which is calculated as the sum of daily
trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding; Nx is the number of
trading days in previous x months and DF is a deflator. Based on Liu (2006), the
author adopts the LM12 measure, which is based on the previous twelve months’
data. Therefore, x is equal to twelve and this study uses the deflator of 11,000 as
proposed by Liu (2006).
5 Bid-Ask Spread (Corwin and Schultz, 2012)
Amongst all of the proxies mentioned above, the bid-ask spread measure, in par-
ticular, has received extensive recognition by researchers. The data are widely
available in real time and this measure can be calculated very quickly. However,
the bid and ask quotes remain current only for a limited time periods. This is
because the spread only measures the cost of executing a single trade of a certain
size which requires complementary studies of other measures.
In a recent study, Corwin and Schultz (2012) developed the illiquidity measure
from the ratio of daily high and low prices, excluding the volatility component.
They define the spread estimator as:
S =
2(ek − 1)
1 + ek
(2.2.5)
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where K is identified as:
K =
(√
2E{∑1j=0[ln(PHt+jPLt+j )]2} −
√
E{∑1j=0[ln(PHt+jPLt+j )]2})
(3− 2√2) −
√√√√ [ln(PHt,t+1PLt,t+1 )]2
(3− 2√2) (2.2.6)
where PHt and P
L
t are the high and low stock price at day t. The monthly illiquidity
measure CS is identified as the average daily estimated spread s in time t.
6 Bid-Ask Spread (Roll, 1984)
Roll (1984) proposes the effective spread based on the bid-ask spread:
ROi,t = 2
√
−COV (Ri,d, Ri,d−1,t) (2.2.7)
where Ri,d is the return of trading day d in month t and Ri,d−1,t is the return of
the previous trading day in the same month.
To make the possibility of positive covariance, the author imposes absolute values
as suggested by (Lesmond, 2005). Consequently, in this chapter, Roll’s measure
is defined as:
ROi,t = 2
√
|COV (Ri,d, Ri,d−1,t)| (2.2.8)
7 Effective Tick (ET)(Goyenko et al., 2009)
Finally, this study employs the effective tick (ET) measure advocated by Goyenko
et al. (2009). This measure is argued to be the simplest measure for all effective
spreads. It is identified as:
ET =
∑1
j=1 γjSj
P¯k
(2.2.9)
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The author obtains Sj by using the decimal grid, which is an approach similar
to that of the dollar grid proposed by Goyenko et al. (2009). In this case, the
possible spreads are at £0.01, £0.05, £0.1, £0.2, £0.5 and £1. P¯k is the average
daily price in month k, and γj is defined as:
γˆj =
 Min[Max{Uj, 0}, 1] j = 1Min[Max{Uj, 0}, 1−∑j−1k=1 γˆk], j = 2, 3, ..., j
 (2.2.10)
Based on
Uj =

2Fj j = 1
2Fj − Fj−1, j = 2, 3, ..., j − 1
Fj − Fj−1 j = j
 (2.2.11)
where
FJ =
Nj∑j
j=1Nj
for j = 1, 2, J.
Nj is the number of trades on prices to the j spread using positive volume days.
2.3 Models & Methodology
2.3.1 Models
The analysis in this chapter is based on the following standard capital asset pricing
model:
Rpt −Rft = αp + βp,MKTMKTt + εpt (2.3.12)
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where Rpt is the return of portfolio p in month t, R
f
t is the risk-free rate for month
t, MKTt, calculated as (R
M
t −Rft ) is the excess market portfolio return in month
t and εpt is the error term.
This study also bases the calculations in light of the fact that the Fama and French
(1993) three-factor model is identified as:
Rpt −Rft = αp + βp,MKTMKTt + βp,SMBSMBt
+βp,HMLHMLt + ε
p
t
(2.3.13)
where SMBt stands for size factor and HMLt is the value factor for time t.
Carhart (1997) further incorporated the momentum factor into the model as:
Rpt −Rft = αp + βp,MKTMKTt + βp,SMBSMBt
+βp,HMLHMLt + βp,MOMMOMt + ε
p
t
(2.3.14)
where MOMt is the momentum factor.
In this chapter, the author incorporates illiquidity risk factor and apply the five
factor model as:
Rpt −Rft = αp + βp,MKTMKTt + βp,SMBSMBt
+βp,HMLHMLt + βp,MOMMOMt + βp,LLt + ε
p
t
(2.3.15)
where Lt is the illiquidity factor.
2.3.2 Methodology
Principal Components Analysis (PCA)
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a powerful tool for analysing data as it
has the ability when the data is in the form of a linear combination of optimally-
weighted observed variables (Abdi and Williams, 2010). For a given stock, the
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author constructs a correlation matrix of seven illiquidity measures and calculate
the eigenvalue and eigen vector of the matrix. To compute scores on the first
component extracted in a principal component analysis, the following model is
employed:
COMP1 = β1(X1) + β2(X2) + β1P (XP ) (2.3.16)
Or, in matrix notation:
COMP1 = β
T
1 X
where COMP1 is the subject’s score on principal component 1; β1(X1) is the
regression coefficient for the observed variable p, as used in creating the principal
component 1; and Xp is the subject’s score on the observed variable p.
The first principal component is calculated such that it accounts for the greatest
possible variance in the data set. Clearly, it would be possible to make the variance
of COMP1 as wide as possible by choosing large values for the weights β11, β12,
... β1p. To prevent this, weights are calculated with the constraint that their sum
of squares is 1.
β211 + β
2
12 + β
2
13 + ...+ β
2
1p = 1 (2.3.17)
The second principal component is calculated in the same way, with the condition
that it is uncorrelated with the first principal component and that it accounts for
the next highest possible variance.
COMP2 = β21(X1) + β22(X2) + β2P (XP ) (2.3.18)
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The calculation continues until a total of p principal components equal to the
original number of variables has been generated. At this point, the sum of the
variances of all of the principal components will equal the sum of the variances of
all of the variables: that is, all of the original information has been explained.
Generalized Method OF Moment (GMM) & Fama and MacBeth (1973)
This study constructs ten portfolios on the basis of common illiquidity and then
tests the joint significance of the ten portfolios’ α(s). To reduce heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation problems, this chapter estimates the α(s) using the
systematic GMM.
For CAPM, the author defines rxt to be the 10 × 1 vector that contains excess
returns of the ten portfolios, β0 is the 10×1 vector for the constants, B = [βMKT ]
is the 10× 1 matrix of portfolios’ return sensitivities to market and Ft = [MKT t]
is the 1× 1 vector containing realisations of the factor. The standard CAPM can
be identified as:
rxt = β0 +BFt + εt (2.3.19)
To evaluate the model fit the author uses Hansen’s J-test for over-identifying
restrictions. The J-test provides a statistical test in cases where the moment
conditions for a given model are significantly different from zero.
For the Fama-French three-factor model, B = [βMKT ; βSMB; βHML] is the 10 ×
3 matrix of portfolios’ return sensitivities to market, size and value factor and
Ft = [MKTt;SMBt;HMLt] is the 3 × 1 vector. Similarly, in the Carhart four-
factor model, B = [βMKT ; βSMB; βHML; βMOM ] is the 10 × 4 matrix and Ft =
[MKTt;SMBt;HMLt,MOMt] is the 4× 1 vector.
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This study next performs the Fama and MacBeth (1973) two framework regres-
sions to test the cross-sectional evidence of illiquidity factor in asset pricing mod-
els. When analysing cross-sectional data, the use of Fama-MacBeth regression has
a number of advantages. First, it accommodates the dynamic explanatory vari-
ables. For the Fama-MacBeth regression the betas are estimated for a time period
preceding the cross-section date which allows for time varying differences in the
explanatory variables, whereas in other regressions, these variables are averaged
out over the sample period and may lead to the loss of valuable information. Sec-
ond, by running the cross-sectional regression and calculating what the standard
errors are, they will then correct for cross-sectional correlations within the panel
(Cochrane, 2001). Finally, the regression can also be extended to accommodate
for additional risk features, beyond the beta (Campbell, Lo, MacKinlay et al.,
1997), and this is often useful if there are more risk factors to adhere to.
The first step of the Fama-MacBeth regression involves the estimation of be-
tas after time-series regressions of the excess returns. Therefore, the illiquidity-
augmented five-factor model becomes:
Rpt −Rft = αp + βp,MKTMKTt + βp,SMBSMBt+
βp,HMLHMLt + βp,MOMMOMt + βp,LLt + ε
p
t
(2.3.20)
where Rpt is the portfolio return p at time t, R
f
t is the monthly risk-free rate in
month t, and MKT, SMB, HML, MOM and L are market return, size, value,
momentum and illiquidity factors.
According to the same steps as previous studies, the first step of the regression
estimates the time-series factors for each of the ten portfolios using 36 months
rolling windows of 240 monthly observations. The second step estimates monthly
cross-sectional regressions of the ten portfolio’s excess returns on the betas that
are estimated in the first step. Thus the model is identified as:
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Rpt −Rft = λ0 + λMKT βˆp,MKT + λSMBβˆp,SMB+
λHMLβˆp,HML + λMOM βˆp,MOM + λLβˆp,L + ω
p
t
(2.3.21)
where λ are the risk premium parameters with each beta. The hypothesis here
is that the time-series average of the estimated coefficient λL is positive and sta-
tistically significant. This can be interpreted as showing the evidence that the
illiquidity risk factor is priced.
Hansen-Jagannathan Distance
Rather than using formal statistical tests of identification and over-identification
restrictions (statistical importance), it is possible to examine the model perfor-
mance (economic importance) instead. The HJ distance measure is the mean
square distance between the fitted values (mˆ) and the actual value m∗. The HJ
minimum distance can then be presented as: E(mˆ−m∗), where the expectations
are estimated in practice using the sample averages. Since
m−m∗ = E[m(pi)X − 1]′E(XX ′)−1X
The minimum distance is given by:
[
E
(
m
(
pi
)
X
)
− 1
]′
E
(
XX
′
)−1[
E
(
m
(
pi
)
X
)
− 1
]
(2.3.22)
Let
g =
[
E(m(pi)X)− 1]
and
W = E(XX
′
)−1
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Then the minimum distance equals
g′Wg
which is the Hansen J -test with a particular W.
Hansen and Jagannathan suggest comparing the pricing errors associated with
the models in question by choosing each model’s parameters θ to minimise the
quadratic form:
hHJt ≡ g
′
T
(
θ
)
W−1T gT
(
θ
)
(2.3.23)
where gT (θ) is the sample average of pricing errors and W
−1 is the sample second
moment matrix of the N asset returns upon which the models are evaluated.
2.4 Data and Variable Construction
The data adopted in this study is monthly data and spans the period 1990-2012.
The initial sample comprises the whole population of firms listed on the FTSE
All-Share obtained from Thomson DataStream.2
For each index, the author extracts data including trading volume (turnover by
volume); market value (share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares
in issue); return index (a theoretical growth in value of a share-holding over a
specified period); and closing price. At the end of each month, the total number of
shares outstanding, the return index, and the market value are obtained. Market
to book value (market value of common equity divided by the balance sheet value
of common equity in the company) is collected on an annual basis. This study
uses the UK treasury bills 3-month yield rate as the risk free rate. Stocks are kept
2To avoid survivor-ship bias, this analysis covers not only presently listed stocks but also
dead stocks. Dead stocks refer to those of firms that were de-listed at some point during the
sample period.
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if they existed for at least three years prior to the year start.
For the estimation of factor-asset pricing models, the author constructs size, value,
and momentum risk factors. As for size, the author sorts all stocks based on their
market capitalizations at month t-1 with a filter rule of 30% for portfolio forma-
tion. In other words, the value-weighted top 30% of stocks are allocated to the
big-size portfolio, whereas the value-weighted bottom 30% stocks are assigned to
the small-size portfolio. Therefore, the size (SMB) return is the difference be-
tween the returns of the small-size portfolio and the big-size portfolios at time t.
Similarly to traditional empirical studies applied in the UK market, this study
identifies the value factor (HML) by obtaining the spread between monthly re-
turns of the MSCI Value and MSCI Growth indices (Cuthbertson, Nitzsche, and
O’Sullivan, 2008; Florackis, Gregoriou, and Kostakis, 2011).
For the momentum factor, the author ranks all stocks at month t-1 based on
their returns from month t-13 to t-2. The equally-weighted top 30% of stocks
are winners and the bottom 30% are losers. Thus the difference between monthly
returns of winner and loser portfolios at time t is taken as the momentum factor
(MOM)(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).
2.5 Empirical Results
To begin with, the author analyses the persistence of market illiquidity, as in-
vestors request a premium for bearing illiquidity only when the illiquidity shock is
systematic and persistent (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Korajczyk and Sadka,
2008; Lee, 2011; Pa´stor and Stambaugh, 2003). Table 1 reports the average
monthly percentage returns, illiquidity, and other features for ten equally-weighted
size portfolios. These are rebalanced each year based on the total market value of
each stock at the end of the previous year. The existing literature reports a higher
illiquidity with smaller stocks (Amihud, 2002; Amihud and Mendelson, 1986).
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As seen in Table 2.1, illiquidity is generally higher for small stocks (RV=4.6209;
PS=0.1118) than it is for large stocks (RV=0.0012; PS=0.0001). A similar pattern
is also shown for LM, RO, and ET. The returns are higher for small stocks and
the results reveal higher volatility for small stocks based on standard deviation.
In line with Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and
Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), this study finds that the equally-weighted average
of stock illiquidity is highly persistent. Given the persistence of market illiquidity,
similarly to Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003)and Acharya and Pedersen (2005), this
study constructs the illiquidity innovations through AR(2) as follows:
CM,t
MVM,t−1
MVM,1
= α0 + α1CM,t−1
MVM,t−1
MVM,1
+ α2CM,t−2
MVM,t−1
MVM,1
+ µm,t (2.5.24)
where CM,t is the market aggregate illiquidity at month t ; and the residual µm,t
is the illiquidity innovation. Notably, the author scales PS and RV by the ratio
of the total market value by the end of the month t-1 to that in January 1990.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Average Illiquidity by Size Portfolios
Note: This table presents the average monthly percentage returns and illiquidity measures for 10 equally-weighted size UK portfolios.
Portfolio’s size is recalculated each year based on market value of shares at the end of the previous year. The illiquidity proxies are
Amihud’s illiquidity (RV), Pastor and Stambaugh’s measure (PS), zero return (ZR), Liu’s measure (LM12), Roll’s measure (RO), the
spread measure of Corwin and Schultz (CS) and effective tick (ET). Market cap is the market capitalization at the end of the previous
year; BTMV is the book to market ratio; and St.Dev. is the standard deviation of portfolio return in the sample period.
Portfolio Return RV PS ZR LM12 RO CS ET MarketCap BTMV St.Dev.
small 2.0939 4.6209 0.1118 0.0019 0.1332 0.0306 -0.0732 0.0042 1644.0017 1.1686 6.0109
2 1.4866 1.3653 0.0204 0.0013 0.1127 0.0268 -0.0624 0.0030 3145.8235 1.0700 5.5025
3 1.3134 0.9389 -0.0063 0.0012 0.1207 0.0282 -0.0627 0.0024 4731.2061 0.8846 5.4383
4 1.2193 0.5984 0.1049 0.0009 0.1116 0.0299 -0.0623 0.0018 6970.9691 0.8748 5.4623
5 1.2157 0.3619 0.0038 0.0009 0.1378 0.0285 -0.0620 0.0015 10570.0883 0.7935 5.2049
6 1.1545 0.1667 0.0032 0.0008 0.1403 0.0304 -0.0671 0.0013 15680.0039 0.7493 5.1954
7 0.8896 0.0832 0.0012 0.0006 0.1039 0.0325 -0.0707 0.0012 24416.1204 0.6775 5.5819
8 1.0252 0.0423 0.0072 0.0006 0.1154 0.0353 -0.0792 0.0008 42965.3213 0.6416 5.5332
9 0.9650 0.0058 0.0000 0.0005 0.1036 0.0374 -0.0889 0.0005 101928.4865 0.5394 5.2035
large 0.9222 0.0012 0.0000 0.0003 0.0783 0.0363 -0.0896 0.0003 781616.5530 0.4398 4.8251
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This is in order to include only innovations in illiquidity, not the changes in time
value of money. For other illiquidity measures, however, this study applies the
general AR(2) regressions to find innovations:
CM,t = α0 + α1CM,t−1 + α2CM,t−2 + µm,t (2.5.25)
The coefficients α1 and α2 are both significant. Further, the residuals do not
display any serial correlation. Hence, it can be claimed that µm,t accurately rep-
resents market illiquidity.
Figure 2.1 shows the time-series plots of market aggregate illiquidity innovations
for each measure and provides evidence that illiquidity innovations generally co-
incide with liquidity events in the timeline such as the Iraq invasion of Kuwait
in 1990, the Asian crisis in 1997, the long term capital management crisis in
1998, and the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009. The fact that all seven mea-
sures jointly constitute liquidity-related events suggests the possibility that the
individual proxy shares a common component of illiquidity.
Table 2.2 reports the correlations between market illiquidity proxies to examine
whether illiquidity measures have a common component. The author observes
significant Pearson correlation tests in many cases. It measures the strength
of the linear relationship between normally distributed variables. The highest
correlation of 0.356 is shown between RV and RO and the lowest value among
positive and significant correlations is 0.113 between ET and RV. However, RO
is negatively correlated with most of the other measures in Table 2.2. The results
imply that the illiquidity proxies, somehow, have systematic common components
of illiquidity and this in turn justifies the use of the principal component analysis.
Next this study uses the principal component analysis to extract the common
components of the seven illiquidity measures. As shown in Figure 4.3, the bar
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 Figure 2.1: Innovations of Illiquidity Measures
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graph indicates the plot of the average eigenvalue proportions of seven principal
components, as well as the plot of the cumulative proportions in the corresponding
line graph. This study finds that the first principal component explains 33% of the
whole variation over the seven illiquidity measures, which is coincidentally similar
to findings reported in Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) and Kim and Lee (2014).
Table 2.2: Pearson Correlation of Illiquidity Proxies
RV ZR RO PS LM CS ET
RV 1
ZR 0.060 1
RO 0.356 *** -0.048 1
PS 0.042 0.082 -0.025 1
LM 0.097 0.242 *** 0.064 0.047 1
CS -0.329*** 0.093 -0.937*** 0.037 0.052 1
ET 0.113* 0.196*** -0.380 *** 0.117* 0.170 *** 0.297*** 1
Table 2.3 reports the descriptive statistics of illiquid portfolio performances from
February 1990 to December 2012. The study constructs decile portfolios using
the first principal component of illiquidity. In particular, at the end of month t-1,
stocks are organised according to their first principal component extracted from
the seven illiquid measures. Portfolio 1 (P1 ) includes stocks with the smallest ra-
tio, whilst Portfolio 10 (P10 ) contains stocks with the highest values of illiquidity
ratio and this excess return is only calculated for for both P1 and P10. Portfolios
are rebalanced on a monthly basis. This empirical findings suggest that the av-
erage portfolio return increases from P1 to P10, though not monotonically. This
pattern holds for equally weighted portfolios’ returns but not for value weighted
portfolios’ returns. The level of this differential is about 16% per annum (t=2.896)
for equally weighted portfolio returns. The author also finds no strong relation-
ship between common illiquidity and market capitalization, nor does she find a
clear correlation between common illiquidity and book to market ratio. Such
results may have occurred due to the author’s focus exclusively on the first prin-
cipal component of the illiquidity measures. Nevertheless, certain features may
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Figure 2.2: Eigenvalue proportion of principal components
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continue to appear as measure-specific.3 However, this study’s common illiquid-
ity component clearly captures the change of the average βCAPM associated with
stocks, calculated by using a 36-month rolling window. The higher the illiquidity
of the portfolio, the higher the beta the author observes. The differential between
P10 versus P1 beta is 0.287 (t=8.933).
3Individual measure results are not reported but may be obtained upon request.
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Table 2.3: Illiquid Portfolio Performances
Decile portfolios P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P10-P1 t-test
EWReturns(%p.a.) 1.055 -0.034 -0.233 -2.146 -1.872 8.487 8.040 9.848 9.907 17.122 16.067 2.896
VWReturns(%p.a.) 15.263 7.405 28.979 19.866 4.434 9.891 4.365 6.261 4.380 9.714 -5.549 -0.598
ILLIQ Ratio -0.520 -0.337 -0.174 -0.025 0.096 0.316 0.629 0.932 1.244 1.987 2.507 17.313
MV(£m)* 64657.93 62875.07 68135.25 34739.21 40886.83 82550.36 90848.25 92813.58 91646.32 70198.99 5541.064 0.89
BTMV 0.398 0.294 0.254 0.155 0.193 0.617 0.731 0.712 0.702 0.684 0.286 9.017
βCAPM 0.856 0.664 0.630 0.721 1.010 0.987 1.020 1.033 1.060 1.144 0.287 8.933
Note:. P1 is the decile portfolio which has stocks with the lowest illiquidity ratio whereas P10 has the stocks with the highest
illiquidity ratio. P10-P1 is the spread between P10 and P1. EW returns are the annualized average monthly returns of equal
weighted portfolios and VW returns account for the annualized monthly returns of value weighted portfolios. MV is the average
market value of stocks in each of the portfolios in millions measured as the average of the share price times the number of shares
outstanding. BTMV is the average ratio of the book value of shares divided by the market value in each portfolio. βCAPM is the
average stock beta in each portfolio using a 36-month sliding window. The t-test in the last column is the null hypothesis that the
means are the same between P10 and P1.
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Time-series Evidence of Risk-adjusted Returns
Table 2.4 presents the alphas of the value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios
sorted by the common component of the seven illiquidity ratios. For the principal
component sorted equally-weighted portfolios, The author finds that Jensen’s al-
pha has generally increased across portfolios. Notably, most of the alphas across
the portfolios (P1-P5) are with negative signs. Interestingly, P10 has the highest
and most significant alpha (CAPM) of 12.408%. Similar patterns hold for the
Fama-French three-factor model and the Carhart four-factor model (α = 6.703%
and 8.480%) respectively. This suggests that portfolio returns increase with illiq-
uidity. The last column presents the χ2 statistic of the Wald test. The null
hypothesis is that the alphas of the ten portfolios are jointly equal to zero. The
author fails to reject the null hypothesis. It is also worth noting that there is
no certain pattern when moving from P1 to P10 and there are also insignificant
premiums for value-weighted portfolios. This suggests that illiquidity premiums
may be subject to the size factor. However, the χ2 of the Wald test provides
strong evidence against the null hypothesis.
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Table 2.4: Alphas Estimates of Value and Equally-Weighted Illiquid Portfolios
Decile portfolios P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 χ2
Panel A:PCA Value-Weighted Portfolios
αCAPM (% p.a.) 11.400 4.564 25.888 16.360 0.857 6.009 0.599 2.138 0.337 4.931 7.182
(1.839) (0.472) (2.480) (2.471) (0.101) (2.431) (0.261) (0.879) (0.177) (1.848) (0.007)
αFF (% p.a.) 5.409 -2.658 21.106 11.578 -1.918 6.450 0.257 2.345 -0.109 3.496 4.526
(0.901) (-0.358) (1.949) (2.041) (-0.238) (2.453) (0.107) (1.039) (-0.053) (1.254) (0.033)
αCarhart(% p.a.) 4.575 -5.115 18.749 9.927 -2.652 6.692 0.461 3.443 0.464 5.407 3.993
(0.766) (-0.765) (1.689) (1.745) (-0.332) (2.218) (0.179) (1.322) (0.220) (1.987) (0.046)
Panel B:PCA Equally-Weighted Portfolios
αCAPM (% p.a.) -0.960 -2.409 -1.695 -2.905 -3.527 4.786 4.114 5.748 5.761 12.408 1.372
(-0.344) (-0.787) (-0.684) (-2.115) (-1.935) (2.210) (1.776) (2.744) (2.515) (3.677) (0.241)
αFF (% p.a.) -2.883 -4.337 -2.901 -3.471 -5.276 1.727 0.424 2.046 1.772 6.703 0.393
(-1.078) (-1.425) (-1.138) (-2.564) (-2.945) (1.076) (0.374) (1.734) (1.487) (3.405) (0.531)
αCarhart(% p.a.) -1.761 -3.071 -2.282 -3.511 -4.080 2.110 0.331 2.483 2.077 8.480 0.001
(-0.710) (-1.095) (-0.940) (-2.528) (-2.370) (1.312) (0.271) (2.053) (1.655) (4.333) (0.986)
Note: P1 is the decile portfolio of stocks with the lowest illiquidity ratios; P10 is the portfolio of stocks with the highest illiquidity ratios.
α is the annualized alpha estimated using the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-factor models. T-statistics are reported
in parentheses. The last column presents the χ2 statistic of the Wald test. The null hypothesis is that the alphas of the ten portfolios
are jointly equal to zero. The p-values are reported in the parentheses.
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Cross-sectional Evidences
As a robustness test, the author further investigates the performance of the
LCAPM in explaining the cross-section variations in stock returns.
Table 2.5 presents the estimated λ coefficients for the ten equally-weighted port-
folios, and sorting is done based on the common component of illiquidity ratio in
the UK. Panel A of Table 2.5 reports the unrestricted model with any value of λ0.
The augmented illiquidity in Panel A is based on the first principal component.
The findings are supportive of the illiquidity augmented CAPM and the Fama-
French model, as these specifications produce statistically positive, significant and
economically sensible coefficients (premium λL), thereby offering a more valuable
explanation of the data.
The estimated coefficient λL associated with CAPM and Fama-French (FF) mod-
els are significantly positive (λLCAPM=5.76 and λLFF=5.19) respectively, but
the coefficient λL is insignificantly positive at (λLCARH=10.4) for the liquidity-
augmented Carhart model. The penultimate column in Panel A reports the R2
coefficients, and the last column reports the increase in R2 coefficients after adding
the illiquidity factor to the original models. The results show a good explanatory
power, as the 4R2 has increased across all models, 4R2= 0.041, 0.021 and 0.035
for CAPM, FF and Carhart models respectively. The high R2 is consistent with
the result reported by Acharya and Pedersen (2005) from the US (R2 =0.942). In
PanelB of Table 2.5, the author presents the estimated λ coefficients from the sec-
ond framework cross-sectional regression of Fama-MacBeth. This study restricts
λ0 to be zero. The results yield similar findings as those in Panel A of Table 2.5, in-
dicating strong and statistically significant coefficients for the liquidity-augmented
CAPM and Fama-French model.
As mentioned above (section 2.3), there are many reasonable measures that can
be used to test the model specification. In section 2.3 the author studied one
of these measures which depends on a non-parametric function, the Hansen J
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Figure 2.3: Fit of Illiquidity-augmented CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart Model
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Table 2.5: Fama/MacBeth Estimates and Hansen-Jagannathan Distance
Note: λi is the mean of risk premium coefficients λi using Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. The monthly
cross-sectional regressions of ten equally-weighted portfolio return premiums are estimated using the risk factors of
Fama and MacBeth (1973). ILLIQ is illiquidity factor of the CAPMs models. Panel A and B report systematic
illiquidity factor augmented asset pricing models. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The last column reports
the increase in R-squared coefficient due to the addition of the illiquidity factor. Panel C reports the Hansen-
Jagannathan distance. δ measures the distance error.
λ0 λmkt λsmb λhml λmom λL R
2 ∆R2
Panel A: PCA Unrestricted Model
CAPMILLIQ -0.434 1.363 5.758 0.945 0.041
(-2.729) (4.338) (3.015)
FFILLIQ -0.354 0.968 0.316 2.025 5.196 0.953 0.021
(-2.622) (1.434) (0.267) (1.608) (1.976)
CARHARTILLIQ -0.131 2.077 -2.155 3.094 -5.263 10.455 0.977 0.035
(-0.916) (1.948) (-1.018) (2.716) (-2.492) (1.077)
Panel B: PCA Restricted Model λ = 0
CAPMILLIQ -0.927 9.338
(-3.034) (4.678)
FFILLIQ 1.406 -0.1.168 2.739 10.973
(1.968) (-0.900) (2.336) (3.491)
CARHARTILLIQ 2.469 -3.149 3.368 -6.031 13.178
(2.603) (-1.759) (2.929) (-3.358) (1.537)
Panel C: Hansen-Jagannathan Distance
CAPM CAPMILLIQ FF FFILLIQ Carhart CarhartILLIQ
δ 0.304 0.198 0.33 0.177 0.407 0.581
test. However, Summers (1991) and Cochrane and Hansen (1992) claim that the
GMM approach J test focuses too much on the specification of the model, and has
too little focus on evaluating the accuracy of the underlying model. They argue
that an increased focus on the accuracy of the model would help both reflect the
purpose of understanding different types of behaviour and improve the ability of
the model to make different types of predictions. To account for this criticism,
the author implements two alternatives advocated by Hansen and Jagannathan
(1997) to assess the performance of the models.
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Panel C of table 2.5 shows the robustness results of the Hansen-Jagannathan dis-
tance tests both with and without the illiquidity factor. The author reports both
the principal component as of illiquidity. With the principal component illiquid-
ity factor, this study finds that the error decreases from 0.304 to 0.198 and from
0.330 to 0.177 for the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model respectively.
Figure 2.4 also details the distance on the Hansen-Jaganthan bound, suggesting a
significant empirical improvement for the liquidity Capital asset pricing models.
Robustness Tests
In table 2.2, the author reports negative correlations of the RO measure with
many other illiquidity measures, i.e. ‘Pastor and Stambaugh’s gamma’, ‘Corwin
and Schultz’s spread’ and the ‘effective tick’. Such results indicate that the RO
measure might differ more from other existing proxies. Therefore, this study
applies the robustness tests by removing the RO and estimate the new single
illiquidity measure constructed by the principal component analysis. The author
reports both parametric and non-parametric results in table 2.6.
Similar to the main findings, the new single illiquidity measure that is constructed
by using the common component of the six illiquidity measures excluding RO
proxy performs meaningful results. As for the parametric Fama-MacBeth esti-
mations, the author reports positive and significant coefficient λL for CAPM and
Fama-French models (λLCAPM=6.423 and λLFF=7.331). The coefficient λL is still
insignificantly positive at (λLCARH=5.657 for the illiquidity-augmented Carhart
model. The results show a slightly better explanatory power, but not a significant
change in results as the 4R2 has increased across all models, 4R2= 0.071, 0.075
and 0.042 for CAPM, FF and Carhart models respectively. Panel C reports the
results of Hansen-Jagannathan Distance using the new illiquidity measure gener-
ated from six illiquidity measures. The error decreases from 0.142 to 0.139, from
0.604 to 0.073, and from 0.619 to 0.168 for the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor
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Figure 2.4: Hansen-Jagannathan Bound of Capital Asset Pricing Models
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Table 2.6: Robustness Tests on Illiquidity Without RO
Note: This table reports the robustness test results of both parametric and non-parametric estimations. The
illiquidity factor is constructed without RO proxy proposed by Roll (1984).
λ0 λmkt λsmb λhml λmom λL R
2 ∆R2
Panel A: PCA Unrestricted Model
CAPMILLIQ -0.357 0.818 6.423 0.957 0.071
(-2.090) (2.291) (4.057)
FFILLIQ -0.138 -0.565 2.27 2.365 7.331 0.977 0.075
(-0.69) (-0.806) (2.656) (2.445) (3.677)
CARHARTILLIQ -0.119 -0.414 2.052 2.059 -2.098 5.657 0.972 0.042
(-0.576) (-0.583) (2.506) (2.266) (-1.918) (1.003)
Panel B: PCA Restricted Model λ = 0
λ0 λmkt λsmb λhml λmom λL
CAPMILLIQ 0.173 9.742
(0.493) (4.922)
FFILLIQ -1.135 2.953 2.815 8.155
(-1.656) (3.347) (3.382) (3.372)
CARHARTILLIQ -0.859 2.572 2.412 -1.803 6.303
(-1.232) (3.061) (3.127) (-1.611) (0.750)
Panel C: Hansen-Jagannathan Distance
CAPM CAPMILLIQ FF FFILLIQ Carhart CarhartILLIQ
δ 0.142 0.139 0.604 0.073 0.619 0.168
model and Carhart four-factor model respectively. This implies that after they are
augmented with illiquidity factor, the empirical asset pricing models significantly
improve their pricing powers.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter examined the performance of the standard Sharpe-Lintner CAPM,
the Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French, 1993), and the four factor
model of Carhart (1997)both with, and without, the first component of multi-
ple illiquidity measures. Further, the ability of the capital asset pricing models
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(CAPMs) to explain asset returns using solely individual illiquidity measures was
also analysed. The author used monthly UK data between 1990 and 2012.
The initial investigation suggests that no individual ililquidity proxy outperforms
the others, and further that the illiquidity proxies have a systematic common
illiquidity component. Hence, the author used the principal component analysis.
According to the results of this analysis, the fact that seven measures jointly in-
dicate liquidity-related events further suggests the possibility that the individual
proxies share a common component of illiquidity. In addition, the correlations
between market illiquidity proxies were considered in order to examine whether
illiquidity measures share a common component. Similarly to studies by Kora-
jczyk and Sadka (2008) and Kim and Lee (2014), the findings indicate that the
first principal component explains 33% of the whole variation over the seven illiq-
uidity measures in the UK. For illiquid portfolio and model performance, this
chapter’s findings are supportive of the illiquidity augmented CAPM and Fama-
French model particularly with the portfolio of stocks with the highest illiquidity
ratios P10. These specifications produce statistically positive, significant and eco-
nomically coefficient estimates. For the non-parametric tests, the author finds
that the illiquidity-augmented CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model yield
a very small distance. These findings are supportive of the liquidity specification
of the capital asset pricing models. Other non-liquidity CAPM models fail to
yield economically plausible parameter values.
These findings have important implications for academic research into liquidity
risk and for practical liquidity risk management alike. This chapter contributes to
the literature on liquidity risk by investigating the determinants of cross-sectional
stock returns during liquidity crises. In addition, this chapter analyses liquidity
risk from a practical risk management standpoint. This empirical work shows that
abnormal stock performance during liquidity crises is, in part, predictable, and
investors can construct portfolios of stocks that better withstand liquidity shocks.
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However, the results suggest that liquidity risk management comes at a cost of
lower average returns during periods of relatively stable liquidity conditions.
Future research could investigate whether expected returns are related to stocks’
sensitivities to fluctuations in other aspects of aggregate liquidity. It would also be
useful to explore whether some form of systematic liquidity risk is priced in other
financial markets, such as fixed income markets or international equity markets.
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Chapter 3
Semi-varying Momentum Payoffs
and Illiquidity
3.1 Introduction
Understanding and predicting the behaviour of stock markets and stock prices is
a key theme in the theory of financial economics. It has received much attention
from corporate financial economists and has been the basis of intense debate. One
of the most intensely and widely debated subjects in financial markets has been
whether markets are efficient. Malkiel and Fama (1970) argued that when markets
are efficient, stock prices follow the pattern of a random walk. Therefore, it is not
possible to predict future returns under an efficient environment. This means that
investment strategies of past information on stock prices will not correspondingly
generate abnormal returns. However, many studies have recently documented that
such strategies do in fact generate significant profits (see for example, (Asness,
Moskowitz, and Pedersen, 2013; Chou, Chen, and Hsieh, 2014; Hirshleifer, 2014;
Vidal-Garc´ıa, 2013)).
Indeed, such investment strategies and their momentum effect remain one of the
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most puzzling equity anomalies in the finance literature since they were first doc-
umented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Since then, several studies have been
carried out to attempt to clarify whether this anomaly is global and where exactly
the underlying factors may derive from (e.g., (George and Hwang, 2004; Jegadeesh
and Titman, 1993; Lewellen, 2002; Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999; Novy-Marx,
2012)).1
As empirical evidence associated with previous momentum studies have provided
different explanations to question fundamental financial theories, it might there-
fore be of value to further examine whether other assumptions underlying the
EMH might be rejected in order to generate an even higher abnormal return.
Moreover, different variables may affect the profitability of the momentum strat-
egy, the importance of which has been proven in many finance literature (e.g.,
(Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov, 2007; Lee and Swaminathan, 2000;
Sadka, 2006). One of these assumptions and variables is that of liquidity and
trading volume. For example, poor liquidity is therefore associated with higher
bid-ask spread and risk for an investor. In addition, the EMH assumes liquidity
to be perfect, implying that there is never a bid-ask spread. Thus, no participants
on the market can push prices by blocking trades. It might therefore be of value
to further clarify whether a relationship exists between momentum and liquidity,
and if the addition of any liquidity strategy can generate even higher abnormal
return than a plain momentum strategy.
To date, the momentum effect has been researched in many stock markets. How-
ever, none of the previous literature is able to explain why such an effect occurs.
Instead, many different sources of momentum profits are suggested by different
researchers, including risk related explanations, data snooping and flawed method-
ology, and behavioural explanations. The debate initially focused on the risk-side
1Momentum strategies by definition involve buying stocks with a recent history of over per-
formance and selling stocks that have fallen values.
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of explanations, specifying that macroeconomic risks cause momentum (Avramov
and Chordia, 2006; Bansal et al., 2005; Conrad and Kaul, 1998; Fama and French,
1996; Griffin et al., 2003; Liu and Zhang, 2008; Pa´stor and Stambaugh, 2003). Yet,
this debate soon shifted to broader topics, the behavioural side attempted to ex-
plain momentum profits by revisiting the investors’ self-attributive overconfidence
(Avramov et al., 2014; Baker and Stein, 2004; Barberis et al., 1998; Hong et al.,
2000). The reason as to why researchers are yet to reach into consensus is arguably
because on the one hand, psychological explanations tend to ignore the risks that
drive momentum patterns. On the other hand, it is arguably challenging to make
conclusions about rational risk-based explanations because it is difficult to inter-
pret why a recent rise in a stock’s price transpires to be more risky. In fact,
much research fails to find direct evidence to suggest that risk drives momen-
tum. Consequently, behavioural finance provides several possible explanations
through psychological models for the observed return continuation effect. Models
are constructed according to how market participants behave: some are based on
psychological biases of investors that make systematic errors in forming beliefs
and preferences while some are built on the interactions among various investor
types. Models can be generally divided into two groups: one based on investors’
under-reaction to new information and the other based on people’s overreaction
to sudden news. In the case of the investor under-reaction, stock prices react less
than they should do according to the EMH. In contrast, overreaction causes stock
prices to react much stronger than they should be according to the EMH. There-
fore, both of the two biases reflect in models as the stock prices move gradually
to the equilibrium point.
In this chapter, the author aims to investigate both the behavioural explanations
of investors’ expectations and the risk-side explanations on liquidity risks, by ex-
amining how market liquidity affects momentum payoffs. To do so, this study
revisits the definition of momentum in classical mechanics. Linear momentum is
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defined as the product of the mass and velocity of an object (Callister and Reth-
wisch, 2007), where mass is equal to volume times density. In other words, linear
momentum is equal to volume times density times velocity. Analogously, stock
momentum is affected by market volume (volume), market liquidity (density) and
the holding horizons (velocity) of momentum portfolios. At the investment level,
this chapter finds that more market liquidity exhibit higher momentum profitabil-
ity. The intuition behind this result is that under a liquid market condition (when
density is high), given the size of stock market remains unchanged (assuming vol-
ume to be constant), the overall momentum yields and shows higher profits.
The assumption that market liquidity affects momentum payoffs, however, does
not necessarily specify their linear relationship. In fact, if the actual relationship
deviates from the model’s specification, the estimates and inferences based on
the linear regression will be highly misleading. To alleviate any potential spec-
ification error and capture partial nonlinearity, this study applies semi-varying
coefficient models that allow for the coefficients propensity to change over time.
This chapter’s results indicate a clear heterogeneity in the UK sample, and the
models exhibit a significant illiquidity bounce during the financial crisis from 2007
to 2009. This study exploits the sudden bank run event of Northern Rock in 2007
as an exogenous liquidity shock. The choice of shock is inspired by the semi-
parametric coefficients, which show a dramatic drop in late 2007. This chapter’s
identification strategy relies on the hypothesis that this event affected more to
relatively illiquid stocks prior to the bank run.
This study thus goes to the heart of the ongoing debate on the profitability of
momentum strategies. The study contributes to the seemingly contradictory im-
pacts of illiquidity on momentum returns in several ways. First, this study pro-
vides empirical evidence that is consistent with recent theoretical work on the
behavioural-side of explanations about momentum phenomenon, helping bolster
a fairly thin research base. Avramov et al. (2014) show that periods of high market
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illiquidity are followed by low and negative momentum returns. They argue that
during market recession, overconfident investors decide to opt out of the market
due to short-sale constraints and this reduces market liquidity and the momentum
effect thereby becomes less powerful. This study’s measure of illiquidity, on the
other hand, combines not only liquidity impact features but also liquidity risk
features. In addition to the behavioural-side of explanations, this study provides
new evidence suggesting that liquidity risk provides momentum profits. Second,
this chapter contributes to the emerging body of empirical literature on applying
varying coefficient models. For momentum payoffs, the existing literature has to
date not yet considered the effect during financial crisis. The semi-parametric
approach is different from existing literature that mostly assumes linearity and
constant beta coefficients. The results present a high heterogeneity, and as such
this study increases the accuracy and flexibility of estimations. Third, this chapter
contributes specifically to the UK empirical literature by exploiting local shock
in 2007. The sudden bank run event of Northern Rock is market specific. This
study uses the ‘difference-in-differences’ estimation method, as well as both the
in sample and out-of-sample experiments so as to find the predictive power of
market illiquidity on momentum profits.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 provides a
review of some of the key literature. Section 3.3 provides details of the data,
models and methodology. Section 3.4 presents the empirical findings and section
3.5 concludes and draws together the main contributions of this chapter’s data to
the literature on momentum payoffs and suggests avenues for future research.
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3.2 Literature Review
This section provides a detailed review of the momentum and liquidity literature.
It first discusses the momentum profits found by using various momentum strate-
gies and in many financial markets. These are followed by a detailed review of the
existing explanations regarding the abnormal profits. Furthermore, it presents
the possible link between momentum returns and liquidity risk. This is followed
by a review of different liquidity measures. Finally, the gap in existing literature
is discussed and highlighted.
Momentum trading was first brought to the attention to finance literature by
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), indicating that individual stocks with high past
medium-term returns will continue to earn high average percentage returns over
the following three to twelve months. Following the seminal work of Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993), numerous studies in different markets around the world have pro-
vided evidence for the profitability of momentum trading. For example, significant
momentum profits are discovered by Foerster, Prihar, and Schmitz (1996) and Ko-
rkie and Plas (1995) in the Canadian stock market; by Rouwenhorst (1998) in 12
European markets; by Chui, Wei, and Titman (2000) in 8 Asian stock markets ex-
cept Japan and Korea; by Hameed and Mian (2015) in international stocks indices;
by Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) in NYSE and AMEX stocks; by Hameed and
Kusnadi (2002) in 6 emerging Asian stock markets; by Demir, Muthuswamy, and
Walter (2004) in Australian market; and by Gunasekarage and Wan Kot (2007)
in the New Zealand stocks market. Further, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) sug-
gested a strong medium-term momentum payoff in industry selected momentum
portfolios. Lewellen (2002) found similar profits in size and book-to-market port-
folios. George and Hwang (2004) proposed an investing strategy that ranks stocks
based on their nearness to past 52-week high and find momentum profits in both
individual and industry portfolios.
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Although the return continuation phenomenon has been well documented, the
sources of these profits and the interpretation of the evidence are widely debated
in literature. Researchers present different explanations about the source of the
momentum returns. These explanations are generally divided into the risk-related
explanations and the explanations based on behavioural finance.
For macroeconomic risk model of explanations, there has been a long running
debate on the relationship among macroeconomic variables, industry returns and
stock momentum payoffs. For example, Hutchinson and O’Brien (2015) claim that
the industry momentum trading profits and individual stocks both contribute to
the common prediction factors. Also, the individual stock momentum profits
and the industry-based momentum returns are proven to be separate and distinct
(Hutchinson and O’Brien, 2015). Similarly Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) ar-
gue that different credit market situations have a significant impact on risks and
expected returns for small and big corporations. Further, they suggest that time
variation in expected returns depends on the context of the economy’s develop-
ment. In another study, Burganova, Novak, and Salahieva (2014) indicate that the
number of active projects, systematic risk of existing assets and the current inter-
est rates can determine the expected stock returns. Elsewhere, Perez-Quiros and
Timmermann (2000) found the change in interest rates has a different impact on
expected returns and that small companies have larger discrepancies between risk
characteristics across business cycles than large companies. In this line of research,
the profitability of momentum trading is simply interpreted as the compensation
for risk. For example, Conrad and Kaul (1998) argued that momentum profit is
attributable to the cross-sectional dispersion in unconditional expected returns.
In another study, Lewellen (2002) found that the negative cross-serial correlation
among stocks, not under-reaction, is the main source of momentum profits. Also,
Yao (2008) used the frequency domain component method and decomposed stock
returns that suggest momentum is rather a systematic phenomenon. Similarly,
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Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) illustrated that momentum profits arise because of
persistent systematic risk in a firm’s project portfolios. In another study, Johnson
(2002) posited that momentum comes from a positive relation between expected
returns and firm growth rates.
Another body of research focuses on explaining momentum returns based on ir-
rational financial investor behaviours. Recent development in behavioural finance
provides with many possible explanations for the observed return continuation
effect through psychological models. These models are developed based on the
way how investors behave. Some of these models are based on the fact that in-
vestors are subject to some psychological biases, for example, the cognitive bias,
that enable them to make systematic errors in forming their beliefs and prefer-
ences. Some models, on the other hand, purely build on the interaction among
different investor types. For the behavioural arguments, the return continuation
phenomenon is often interpreted as evidences that investors under-react to new
information. For example, Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sub-
rahmanyam (1998), and Hong et al. (2000) have developed behavioural models to
explain momentum phenomenon and demonstrated that momentum profits are
related to several characteristics not typically associated with the priced risk in
standard asset pricing models. Furthermore, a large part of the literature concurs
with behavioural and information-based explanations. In this vein, momentum in
stock returns is interpreted as the result of investors having a tendency to herd,
under-react to information, trade securities too infrequently, or pay too much at-
tention to recent stock performance (e.g.(Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998;
Grinblatt and Han, 2005)).
There is other strand of literature that places emphasis on momentum profits
and stocks characteristics. For example, momentum returns are observed to be
higher for stocks that are small, have relatively low analyst coverage (Hong et al.,
2000), have high analyst forecast dispersion (Verardo, 2009), demonstrate low
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return R2 (information efficiency) (Hou, Xiong, and Peng, 2006), and present
high market-to-book ratios (Daniel and Titman, 1999). Since these characteristics
are often used to proxy for information efficiency and limits to arbitrage, these
findings are often interpreted as evidences to support the behavioural explanations
of momentum phenomenon. Other studies document elevated momentum returns
for stocks with low-grade credit ratings (Avramov et al., 2007) and high turnover
(Lee and Swaminathan, 2000). For the market state variables, Cooper, Gutierrez,
and Hameed (2004) argued that the momentum strategy cannot produce profitable
earnings following periods of declines of market returns. Similarly, Wang and Xu
(2010) found that high market volatility periods are followed by lower momentum
payoffs. In addition, Daniel and Moskowitz (2013) documented huge momentum
crashes following market recessions and high market volatility states.
It is thus necessary to further understand which explanation is more reliable in
generating the momentum returns in order to gauge the relevance of the two
prospectives. However, recent publications offer contradictory evidence on the
relative importance of these two explanations. The behavioural approach assumes
that short-term momentum profits are rather a delayed overreaction to positive
news or historical return, resulting in an upward buying pressure on previous
winner shares. Similarly, with negative news, there will be a downward selling
pressure on previous loser shares. For instance, Barberis et al. (1998) attempted
to explain behavioural under-reaction patterns by relying on psychological evi-
dence, for example, self-attributive overconfidence. Similarly, Hong et al. (2000)
argue that momentum profits arise from gradual information diffusion. However,
these psychological explanations ignore the risks that drive momentum patterns.
Indeed, it is challenging to give rational risk-based explanation because it is diffi-
cult to ascertain precisely why it is that a recent stick price increase has a greater
risk. Much research has failed to present direct evidence to suggest risk would
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drive momentum. For example, Fama and French (1996) reported that their three-
factor model cannot explain momentum. Avramov and Chordia (2006) found that
momentum profits are not affected by the time-varying common risk factors. Also
Griffin et al. (2003) showed that there is no evidence that macro economic risk
variables can explain momentum. Yet, Liu and Zhang (2008) changed test designs
and by doing so found very different results. They concluded that risk explains
more than half of momentum profits. In another study, Conrad and Kaul (1998)
found that cross-sectional variations in mean returns can drive momentum, and
Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) argued that liquidity risk factor explains half of
momentum. In addition, Bansal et al. (2005) documented that aggregate con-
sumption risks in cash flows can explain mean return differences in momentum
portfolios. To conclude, the risk academy argued that short-term momentum
profits can be wholly attributed to the cross-sectional variations in mean returns,
implying that stocks with high (low) unconditional expected rates of return in
adjacent time periods are expected to have high (low) realized rates of returns in
both periods.
With regard to liquidity, the literature and findings on the effects of illiquidity on
momentum profits is mixed. Chan, Hameed, and Tong (2000) applied momen-
tum strategies to equity indices and found persistent momentum profits across
the world market. They found that return continuation is more pronounced af-
ter an increased extent of trading volume over previous periods. Their findings
point to the possibility that momentum profits are in some way related to the
aggregate liquidity of the underlying market. Similarly, Sadka (2006) presented
data and indicated that high liquidity equates to a high level of portfolio turnover
and transaction costs. These variations in liquidity, however, may help to ex-
plain a component of the excess returns earned by momentum strategies. Sadka
(2006) also argued that both strategies appear to perform better with positive liq-
uidity shocks but that they under-performed when there were negative liquidity
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shocks. In another study, Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) found that conventional
momentum trading tend to be unprofitable for large investment funds. However,
momentum trading may still generate considerable returns if one considers liq-
uidity when constructing portfolios. In the same vein, Pa´stor and Stambaugh
(2003) found that the addition of liquidity spreads can explain nearly half of the
return anomaly achieved from momentum portfolios. Further, Lee and Swami-
nathan (2000) found that the momentum return premium was much higher in
stocks with high volumes. This is consistent with the findings of Sadka (2006).
The authors hypothesised that trading volume serves as an indicator of demand
for a stock, implying that there is a contemporaneous and structural connection
between overreaction and high trading volumes. Similarly, Chen, Ibbotson, and
Hu (2010) considered liquidity as an investment style and found that portfolios
constructed of low turnover shares outperformed their highly turnover counter-
parts. The authors considered the effects of combining liquidity and momentum
strategies and found that the high momentum together with low liquidity portfo-
lios achieved the highest returns over the sample period, implying that investors
are compensated for liquidity risk even when engaging in momentum strategies.
The above shows that further research is needed to clarify the contradictions in
existing documents regarding the determinants of momentum. This current chap-
ter seeks a rational explanation of price momentum by looking at its relationship
with market illiquidity. Liquidity as a factor has to date been widely documented
for explaining cross sectional stock returns. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) used
bid-ask spread as a liquidity measure and found a positive relationship between
illiquidity and portfolio returns. In another study, Brennan, Chordia, and Subrah-
manyam (1998) used trading volume to measure liquidity and found that illiquid
stocks produce higher returns. Elsewhere, Amihud (2002) proposed a liquidity
measure, which is defined as the absolute daily return divided by daily trading
volume and found evidence to support liquidity and return model from 1962 to
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1999 in the US market. Similar findings have been documented using different
liquidity proxies such as reversal measures, number of zero return days, and effec-
tive tick (e.g. (Corwin and Schultz, 2012; Goyenko et al., 2009; Lesmond et al.,
1999; Liu, 2006; Pa´stor and Stambaugh, 2003)).
Despite the fact that the literature to date has not reached consensus on which
proxy measures liquidity, most of the measures are highly correlated. This chap-
ter follows Lesmond (2005) and adopts their ‘zero-return days’ measure to proxy
illiquidity. Intuitively, when trading cost is higher than the benefit of trading, ra-
tional investors would choose not to trade (Lesmond et al., 1999). Therefore, zero
return would be observed for such days. This measure is reported to be popular in
international finance research, especially when high-quality daily trading volume
data are not available. In another study, Goyenko et al. (2009) compared almost
all existing proxies and develop three new spread measures and nine new price
impact measures. They provided answers to which measure researchers are sup-
posed to use. It is suggested that the dominant and simplest measure for relatively
lower frequency estimations is the analytic ‘effective tick’. Other measures that
are widely used in the literature such as ‘the return to value’ measure proposed
by Amihud (2002), the ‘reversal measure’ developed by Pa´stor and Stambaugh
(2003) are not appropriate to use as proxies for effective or realized spreads. Since
this chapter applies monthly observations in the estimations, the author uses the
‘effective tick’ as an alternative to the ‘zero-return days’ measure for robustness
check. As they are shown below, the results shed light on the relationship of
liquidity proxy inclusion to weakening the explanatory power of momentum.
In another research, Daniel et al. (1998) suggest that investors overreact to private
information because of overconfidence and that this triggers return momentum.
The model shows that when overconfidence is high, there is excessive liquidity
and momentum profits become high. Conversely, there is a reduced momentum
payoff when the market illiquidity is high. Avramov et al. (2014)’s conditional
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models suggest that the profitability of momentum trading varies with the over-
all market illiquidity. Nevertheless, there is one common limitation in financial
empirical literature. It is often assumed that coefficients in linear estimations are
constant. This could lead to the omission of significant bounce among various co-
efficients. What is more, there is time when less sufficient data are available when
running time-series regressions. It is therefore problematic because there will be
no estimation under certain time framework. To solve this problem, this study
improves traditional linear regressions by applying semi-parametric tests, which
to the best of the author’s knowledge, has not been done in momentum-liquidity
literature. In particular, the author modifies the varying coefficient models origi-
nally proposed by Zhang, Lee, and Song (2002) and applies various bandwidth in
the estimations.
3.3 Data, Models and Methodology
3.3.1 Data and Variables
The author obtains raw data from Thomson DataStream of all stocks listed on
the FTSE All-Share index. The sample spans the period 1990-2013. The author
extracts datatype including daily market value (share price multiplied by the
number of ordinary shares in issue); return index (a theoretical growth in value
of a share-holding over a specified period); and unadjusted closing price. At the
end of each month, the total number of shares outstanding, the return index, and
the market value of each stock are obtained. Stocks are kept if they existed for
at least three years prior to the year start.
The Fama-French factor data are downloaded directly from the University of Ex-
eter database as described in Gregory, Tharyan, and Christidis (2013).2The data
include market factor, which is the excess return on the value-weighted market
2While Kenneth French’s US website provides data for the US market, there is currently
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index over the one month T-bill rate; the size factor, which is the small minus big
return premium; and the value factor, which is the high book-to-market minus
low book-to-market return premium.
The momentum portfolio formation method closely follows the approach proposed
by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Daniel and Moskowitz (2013).3In particular,
at the beginning of each month t, all shares are sorted into decile portfolios based
on their lagged eleven-month returns. To avoid the bouncing effect, this study
skips one month from the ranking period (as suggested by Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993)) meaning that the holding period stock returns of month t−12 to t−2 are
calculated. The top ten percent of stocks are identified as the winner portfolios
while the bottom ten percent are loser portfolios. Since one year of data is lost in
forming the momentum factors, the momentum returns in this study start from
January 1991. This chapter only includes stocks that have valid share prices and
number of shares outstanding at the beginning of formation date. This approach
is similar to the screening method used by Daniel and Moskowitz (2013). Inciden-
tally, the construction of the momentum portfolios is similar to the ones reported
by Gregory et al. (2013).
This chapter employs the zero return days measure (ZR) and the effective tick
(ET) measure advocated by Goyenko et al. (2009) to proxy illiquidity. The zero
return days measure is identified as:
ZRi,t =
Ni,t
Tt
(3.3.1)
where Tt is the number of trading days at time t ; Ni,t is the number of zero-return
days of stock i in time t.
no equivalent for the UK market. The author thanks the University of Exeter for provid-
ing remedy and making the UK data freely downloadable at this website: http://business-
school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/xfi/research/famafrench/.
3To avoid survivor-ship bias, this analysis covers not only presently listed stocks but also
dead stocks. Dead stocks refer to those of firms that were de-listed at some point during the
sample period.
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The effective tick is identified as:
ET =
∑1
j=1 γjSj
P¯k
(3.3.2)
This study obtains Sj by using the decimal grid, which is an approach similar to
that of the dollar grid proposed by Hagstro¨mer, Hansson, and Nilsson (2011). In
this case, the possible spreads are at £0.01, £0.05, £0.1, £0.2, £0.5 and £1. P¯k
is the average daily prices in month k, and γj is defined as:
γˆj =
 Min[Max{Uj, 0}, 1] j = 1Min[Max{Uj, 0}, 1−∑j−1k=1 γˆk], j = 2, 3, ..., j
 (3.3.3)
Based on
Uj =

2Fj, j = 1
2Fj − Fj−1, j = 2, 3, ..., j − 1
Fj − Fj−1, j = j
 (3.3.4)
where
FJ =
Nj∑j
j=1Nj
for j = 1, 2, J.
Nj is the number of trades on prices to the j spread using positive volume days.
3.4 Models and Methodology
3.4.1 Varying Coefficient Models
Despite its popularity in the empirical literature, multi-variate linear regression
could lead to many problems. First, linear regression is fully parametric, and is
consequently subject to a number of model assumptions such as linearity. For
example, if the actual relationship between dependent and independent variables
deviates from the model specification, the estimates and inference based on such
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regression will be highly misleading. Furthermore, linear regression cannot ac-
commodate heterogeneity, which means that the coefficients do not evolve along
a time dimension. This scenario is unrealistic in financial estimations because the
time-varying effects of certain variables cannot be captured. The non-parametric
estimations, on the other hand, make no assumption on the model specifications.
However, the non-parametric estimators are highly inaccurate and require fat
data. In addition, non-parametric models are difficult to interpret because they
do not provide the usual coefficient estimates (Chen and Sherif, 2016).
Due to the limitations of the parametric and non-parametric approaches, semi-
parametric models are here introduced in order to achieve accuracy and flexibility.
In particular, the varying coefficient models as one example of semi-parametric
models are simulated by their need in practice. That is different from linear re-
gression as it allows for one or more of the coefficients to change in line with
variables, for example, time. First, varying coefficient models contain functional
components which capture partial non-linearity and alleviate potential specifica-
tion errors. Second, the idea of a time varying coefficient is especially appealing
in this study because the author can capture the illiquidity bounce during certain
periods by allowing for varying betas instead of constant coefficients. Finally, it
is documented that semi-parametric models are usually more accurate in predic-
tions. The models are identified in the next section.
3.4.2 Semi-varying Coefficient Models
This study uses the variant of the varying-coefficient model termed the semi-
varying coefficient model proposed by Zhang et al. (2002). The model is defined
as follows,
Y =
p1∑
j=1
βj(t)Xj +
p2∑
j=1
γjZj + e (3.4.5)
73
The dependent variables are divided into two groups, X1, . . . , Xp1 whose coeffi-
cients change with time t and Z1, . . . , Zp2 whose coefficients do not vary.
To estimate the functional coefficient, this study uses local linear regression as
described by Fan and Gijbels (1996).
For a given functional coefficient β(·) at point t, the author considers the neigh-
bourhood U of t and apply a first order Taylor approximation,
βj(ti) = βj(t) +
∂β(t)
∂t
(ti − t) := β0,j + β1,j(ti − t)
for all ti ∈ U and j = 1, . . . , p. Using Taylor approximation, βj(t) at arbitrary
time is linked to βj(ti) where data are observed. This study combines local least
square with the kernel method to minimise the following objective function:
n∑
i=1
{
yi −
p1∑
j=1
[β0,jXi,j + β1,j(ti − t)Xi,j]−
p2∑
j=1
γjZi,j
}
Kh(ti − t) (3.4.6)
where Kh(·) = K(·/h)h is a kernel function which assigns weights to local ob-
servations. Here, the author chooses the Epanechnikov kernel K(u) = 0.75(1 −
u2)1{|u| ≤ 1}. The author minimises the objective function with respect to β0,j
will give (unfeasible) β(·) estimate at time t. To obtain both estimates for β
and γ, the author shall work with matrix notations. Denote Y = (y1, . . . , yn)
T ,
Z = (z1, . . . ,zn)
T , X = (x1, . . . ,xn)
T , U t = (x1(t1 − t), . . . ,xn(tn − t))T
Dt = [X,U t] W t = diag(Kh(t1 − t), . . . , Kh(tn − t)), e = eT2,1(e1, . . . , en).
β = (β0,1, . . . , β0,j)
T .
For each t,
βˆuf (t) = (Ip1×p10p1×p1)(D
T
tW tD)
−1DTtW t(Y −Zγ) (3.4.7)
where Ip1×p1 is a p1 dimensional identity matrix and 0p1×p1 is a p1 × p1 zeros
matrix.
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The estimator, however, is not feasible for the moment, because it involves the
unknown nonvarying coefficient γ. Once obtaining an estimate γˆ for γ, the author
simply includes it into equation 3.4.7 and this study shall obtain a feasible one.
βˆf (t) = (Ip1×p10p1×p1)(D
T
tW tD)
−1DTtW t(Y −Zγˆ) (3.4.8)
For the purpose of estimating γˆ, this study uses the profile least square method
proposed by Fan and Huang (2005). The author first defines
M = (βˆ
T
uf (t1)x1, . . . , βˆ
T
uf (tn)xn)
T
For each term in M , it can be further expanded as
βˆ
T
uf (tj)xj = (xj,0p1×p1)(D
T
tj
W tjD)
−1DTtjW tj(Y −Zγ)
This implies the study could rearrange M = S(Y −Zγ), with
S =

(x1,0p1×p1)(D
T
t1
W t1D)
−1DTt1W t1
...
(x1,0p1×p1)(D
T
tnW tnD)
−1DTtnW tn
 (3.4.9)
Then semi-varying coefficient model (3.4.2) then can be written as
Y −Zγ = S(Y −Zγ) + e (3.4.10)
or
(I − S)Y = (I − S)Zγ + e (3.4.11)
The last equation naturally gives rise to an OLS estimator for γ
γˆ = (Z ′(I − S)′(I − S)Z)−1Z ′(I − S)′(I − S)Y (3.4.12)
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3.4.3 Choice of Bandwidth
A Semi-parametric regression estimator usually contains a tuning parameter that
controls the level smoothness of the estimated function. For the semi-varying
coefficient model, the tuning parameter is the bandwidth h, which controls the
size of the neighbourhood for local estimation. If h is large, then more data
points are included, which result in smoother function estimates.4 In contrast, a
small h implies a small neighbourhood, which gives wiggly estimated curves. It
is less biased, as only data very close to the point are used but the estimates are
less accurate. Choice of Bandwidth is essentially the balance between bias and
variance.
This chapter relies on cross-validation techniques to choose the bandwidth similar
to the one applied by Wu, Chiang, and Hoover (1998). Let βˆ−i(ti) and γˆ−i be
the estimate at ti without using the ith data. Then the study could examine the
performance of βˆ−i(ti) by computing its prediction error,
PˆEi = (Yi − xTi βˆ−i(ti)− zTi γˆ−i)2 (3.4.13)
This study chooses h so as to minimise the sum of PˆEi for all i.
h∗ = arg min
h
1
n
n∑
i=1
(Yi − xTi βˆ−i(ti)− zTi γˆ−i)2 (3.4.14)
3.4.4 Time Variation Momentum Payoffs in Portfolios
The study examines the predictive role of market illiquidity in explaining the inter-
temporal variation in momentum profits. The analysis is based on the following
4Smoother estimates are less volatile but may have more bias.
76
time-series regression:
WMLt = α0+β1Mktchgt−1+β2Mktilliqt−1+β3DOWNt−1+β4Mktvolt−1+c′Ft+et,
(3.4.15)
where WMLt is the value-weighted return on the winner minus loser momentum
deciles in month t. At the end of each month t, stocks are ranked based on
returns from months t− 12 to t− 2. This study skips month t− 1 as suggested by
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Mktchgt−1 is the lagged market change in returns,
Mktilliqt−1 is the lagged aggregate market illiquidity proxied by ‘zero return days’
proposed by Lesmond (2005). It has been documented by Næs, Skjeltorp, and
Ødegaard (2011) that stock market liquidity is pro-cyclical and worsens during
bad economic states. Therefore, market state and volatility could possibly capture
the market illiquidity effects. It is thus essential to control for these two variables.
In this context, DOWNt−1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one only
when the return on the value-weighted FTSE index during the past twenty-four
months is negative or zero otherwise, and Mktvolt−1 is the lagged market volatility
of daily market returns. The F vectors are the Fama-French three factors which
include the market factor (mkt), the size factor (smb), and the value factor (hml).
It is important to gauge the ability of market illiquidity after controlling for risks
on the momentum portfolio. For the purpose of comparison, this study also runs
the predictive regressions excluding the three risk factors.
3.4.5 Price Momentum in Individual Stocks
It is suggested that to avoid data snooping bias, asset pricing models are bet-
ter implemented using individual securities (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990). Indeed,
Avramov and Chordia (2006) used returns on individual stocks in the conditional
beta setup and found that the impact of momentum on the cross-section of in-
dividual stock returns was influenced by the business cycle. Further, this study
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examines the impact of market illiquidity on momentum from the cross-section
of individual stock returns. Inspired by the two frameworks proposed by Fama
and MacBeth (1973), the varying coefficient adjusted two stage of regressions are
implemented.
First, the author runs the monthly cross-sectional regressions in the following
ways.
Ri,t = α0 + β0,tiRi,t−12:t−2 + γtILLIQi,t−1 + et (3.4.16)
Where Ri,t is the return of stock i in month t, Ri,t−12:t−2 is the cumulative stock
return in the formation period from month t− 12 to t− 2, and ILLIQi,t−1 is the
stock illiquidity in the previous one month. This study regresses a stock’s returns
on its past returns and illiquidity and obtain the varying coefficients β0,ti . This
measures the individual stock level of momentum in month t for stock returns. The
second stage is the time series regressions. The author uses the estimated betas
arising from the above cross-sectional regressions as the dependent variable. The
independent variables are the market illiquidity, market state, and the volatility.
The regression is formulated as
β0,ti = α0 + γ1Mktilliqt−1 + γ2Mktchgt−1 + γ3Mktvolt−1 + et (3.4.17)
3.4.6 Individual Stock Momentum and Variation with State
Variables
To ascertain whether stock exposures to market state variables can drive mo-
mentum payoffs, this study follows Avramov et al. (2014) and run the two-pass
regression method. In the first stage, the time-series regressions are implemented
for each firm and the expected stock returns predicted by past market variables
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and asset pricing factors are removed:
Rei,t = α0 + βi,1Mktilliqt−1 + β2Mktchgt−1 + β3Mktvolt−1 + c
′Ft + ei,t (3.4.18)
Where Rei,t is the excess return of stock i on month t. Mktilliqt−1, Mktchgt−1
and Mktvolt−1 are the market state variables on month t−1. The vector F is the
Fama-French three factors. Consequently, by running the above equation, this
study obtains the unexpected part of each individual stock returns, i.e.
R∗i,t = αi + ei,t.
For the second stage, this study measures the extent to which the market state
variables account for the individual stock level momentum. The monthly cross-
sectional regression is identified as:
R∗i,t = α0 + β1Ri,t−12:t−2 + ui,t, (3.4.19)
Where Ri,t−12:t−2 is the past eleven months return of stock i.
3.4.7 Robustness Test: Liquidity Shock Using the Differ-
ence in Differences (DID) Method
The difference in differences (DID) method is a technique used to examine the
differential impact of a sudden event on a treatment group versus a control group
(Ashenfelter and Card, 1985). In contrast to time-series and cross sectional es-
timates, DID uses panel data to measure the differences between the treatment
and control groups of the changes in the outcome variable that occur over time
(Abadie, 2005). The formula is described as follows:
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Y (i, t) = δ(t) + α ∗D(i, t) + η(i) + υ(i, t) (3.4.20)
where δ(t) is the time specific component, η(i) is the individual component, υ(i, t)
is the control variable and α represents the impact of the treatment.
The DID approach is an important analysis to test the differing sensitivities on
momentum crash when significant liquidity shock occurs. The 2007-2009 financial
crisis is a natural liquidity shock. This study therefore performs the next regres-
sion to check whether stocks associated with high illiquidity are more sensitive to
systemic shocks.
Ri,t = β0+β1Liquidi,t+β2Crisisi,t+β3Liquid∗Crisisi,t+β4Sizei,t−1+u (3.4.21)
where Liquidi,t is the dummy variable that takes 1 if the stock is included in the
high liquid portfolio5 and 0 otherwise. Crisisi,t is the dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if the time is between September 2007 and December 2009 and 0
otherwise. Importantly, this study is interested in the value of β3, a difference in
difference coefficient that measures the different explanatory powers of high liquid
stocks following a sudden liquidity shock.
3.5 Empirical Findings
This study begins the analysis with the descriptive statistics of momentum pre-
dictors. Panel A of Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of market state
variables in evaluating momentum payoffs over the full sample period. As seen
from Table 3.1 the momentum profit (WML) is negatively skewed with a skewness
equal to -1.034. This pattern and characteristic is similar to the findings reported
5The author ranks stocks based on illiquidity in ascending orders. The top 20% stocks are
grouped in the high liquid portfolio.
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in Daniel and Moskowitz (2013) and Avramov et al. (2014), suggesting that mo-
mentum comes with occasional crashes. The change in market return (Mktchg)
is measured by using the changes of market return from month t− 1 to month t.
It is known at month t to predict momentum returns at month t+ 1. Therefore,
market return as a variable here is different from the contemporaneous market
return of the Fama-French model, which is a risk factor. The author also reports
the characteristics of aggregate market illiquidity proxied by ‘zero-return days’
(Lesmond, 2005). The individual illiquidity is defined as ZRi,t =
Ni,t
Tt
, where Tt is
the number of trading days at time t ; Ni,t is the number of zero-return days of
stock i in time t. Aggregate market illiquidity (Mktilliq) in month t − 1 is then
defined as the value-weighted average of each stock’s monthly zero-return illiq-
uidity. The high cross-sectional market level illiquidity (mean=3.755%) and high
positive skewness (skewness=3.220) indicate that the performance of momentum
is potentially linked to market level illiquidity and that illiquidity can be one pos-
sible explanation of momentum crash. ‘Down’ is a market dummy that takes the
value of one only if a negative cumulative two-year return is calculated in month
t − 1. Finally, the monthly time series market volatility (Mktvol) is constructed
by taking the average daily volatility in each month.
Panel B of Table 3.1 shows the correlation matrix of the four aggregate market
level variables and examines their time-series correlation with the momentum re-
turns. Notably, the lagged change in market return is negatively correlated with
momentum profits (correlation=-0.017), implying that momentum tends to make
profits after a recent market decline. The study also reports a negative correlation
between momentum and the market dummy Down (correlation=-0.024). Unlike
the market change variable, the Down indicator specifies a long and persistent
market recession over the previous two years. The negative correlation further
suggests that momentum is negatively linked to market conditions. This is con-
sistent with the findings of Cooper et al. (2004) and Avramov et al. (2014), who
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics and Correlations
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of market state variables. WML is the momentum
profits, Mktchg stands for market change, Mktilliq is the market aggregate illiquidity proxied by
the ‘zero return days’ proposed by Lesmond (2005), Down is the market dummy for negative
market returns over the previous two years, and Mktvol is the market return volatility. Panel B
reports the correlation of momentum returns and the market state variables.
Panel A WML Mktchg Mktilliq Down Mktvol
Mean 1.044% -1.079 3.755% 0.900% 55.52%
Std. 4.776% 8.342 6.531% 0.520% 49.78%
Skew. -1.034 0.053 3.220 2.538 -0.222
Kurt. 7.940 30.368 17.517 13.770 1.049
Min. -25.03% -62.7946 0 0 0
Max. 16.04% 62.9315 47.88% 4.539% 1
Panel B WMLt Mktchgt−1 Mktilliqt−1 Downt−1 Mktvolt−1
WMLt 1.000
Mktchgt−1 -0.017 1.000
Mktilliqt−1 -0.027 -0.042 1.000
Downt−1 -0.024 -0.041 0.123 1.000
Mktvolt−1 -0.050 -0.051 -0.057 -0.076 1.000
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claim that the negative market states are associated with lower momentum re-
turns. Also, the lagged market illiquidity is negatively correlated with momentum
returns, with a correlation of -0.027, suggesting that momentum payoffs are low
following periods of high aggregate illiquidity. In unreported results, the author
considers an alternative illiquidity measure ‘effective tick’ proposed by Goyenko
et al. (2009) to construct market aggregate illiquidity. This chapter’s results hold
using this alternative measure. This is consistent with the existing literature. Fi-
nally, this study reports the correlation between momentum profits and the lagged
market volatility. The evidence shows a negative correlation of -0.050, which con-
firms the findings of Wang and Xu (2010) that the aggregate market volatility
predicts momentum profits.
Next, this study examines the predictive role of market state variables in explain-
ing the variation in momentum profits. The examination is based on the time-
series regression specification mentioned in Section 3.4. Table 3.2 reports the
results of the monthly time-series regression of momentum profits. In particular,
the study runs all seven regressions that take into consideration the combination
of predictive variables.
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Table 3.2: Momentum Payoffs and Market States
This table presents the results of the following monthly time-series regressions and their corresponding p-values,
WMLt = α0 + β1Mktchgt−1 + β2Mktilliqt−1 + β3DOWNt−1 + β4Mktvolt−1 + c′Ft + et, where WMLt is the value-
weighted return on the winner minus loser momentum deciles in month t, Mktchgt−1 is the lagged market change
in returns, Mktilliqt−1 is the lagged aggregate market illiquidity proxied by ‘zero return days’ proposed by Lesmond
(2005), DOWNt−1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one only when the return on the value-weighted FTSE
index during the past twenty-four months is negative and zero otherwise, and Mktvolt−1 is the lagged market volatility
of daily market returns. The F vectors are the Fama-French three factors which include the market factor (mkt), the
size factor (smb), and the value factor (hml). Numbers with “*”, “**”, and “***” are significant at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level respectively.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Intercept 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.007** 0.015*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.026 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.030) (0.001) (0.001) 0.003 (0.001)
Mktchg -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 **
(0.044) 0.039 (0.023)
Mktilliq -0.091** -0.082* -0.091**
(0.039) (0.063) (0.037)
Down -0.007 -0.011* -0.010*
(0.255) (0.067) (0.088)
Mktvol -1.257** -1.021* -1.469**
(0.043) (0.068) (0.018)
mkt -0.049 -0.069 -0.062 -0.050 -0.107 -0.153 **
(0.498) (0.343) (0.388) (0.491) (0.167) (0.049)
smb 0.064 0.070 0.066 0.064 0.020 0.020
(0.468) (0.423) (0.454) (0.469) (0.827) (0.818)
hml -0.230*** -0.220*** -0.233*** -0.220*** -0.228*** -0.206**
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.014)
R-square 0.034 0.048 0.049 0.038 0.048 0.048 0.089
Adj-Rsq 0.023 0.034 0.035 0.024 0.034 0.033 0.065
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This study considers the regressions ranging from the simplest Model 1, which
drops all predictors and retains the intercept and Fama-French three-factors only,
to the all-inclusive Model 7, which consists of the variables of market change, mar-
ket illiquidity, market conditions, market volatility, and the Fama-French three-
factors. For all these regressions, the explained variable WMLt is the value-
weighted return on the winner minus loser deciles that is formed based on the
previous eleven-month stock returns.
With regard to explanatory variables, Mktchgt−1 is the lagged market change in
returns. Mktilliqt−1 is the lagged aggregate market illiquidity proxied by ‘zero
return days’ proposed by Lesmond (2005). DOWNt−1 is a dummy variable that
takes the value of one only when the return on the value-weighted FTSE index
during the past twenty-four months is negative and zero otherwise, and Mktvolt−1
is the lagged market volatility of daily market returns. The F vectors are the
Fama-French three factors, which include the market factor (mkt), the size factor
(smb), and the value factor (hml). For Model 6, the author excludes the F vectors
for the purpose of comparison.
The evidence from Table 3.2 suggests a negative impact of the ‘zero-return days’
illiquidity on momentum profits. The slope coefficients are negative across the
board from -0.091 to -0.082. This implies that momentum profits will decline after
the illiquid periods. This further suggests that momentum could crash following
the illiquid market conditions. This is consistent with the findings of Avramov
et al. (2014) who investigated this relationship in the US market. Meanwhile,
this study finds a significant negative impact of market volatility on momentum
payoffs. As seen from Table 3.2, the slope coefficient is -1.469 for the all-inclusive
model. However, conversely to Cooper et al. (2004) and Wang and Xu (2010), this
chapter’s analysis indicates only weak evidence to capture meaningful connections
between momentum payoffs and the market long-term condition. Notably, the co-
efficient is insignificant for the Down-only predictive model (Model 4). Therefore,
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this study applies the proxy for short-term market change (Mktchg). Subse-
quently, the study finds that the slope coefficients are negative and significant. To
illustrate, market change, market illiquidity and market volatility are statistically
significant at the 5% level. The market condition dummy, however, is significant
only at the 10% level of significance in the all-inclusive models. Overall, the main
evidence from Table 3.2 confirms the important predictive role of illiquidity either
on a stand-alone basis or on a joint-basis with volatility and the overall market
conditions.
Next, the author performs the estimations from portfolio level to individual level.
This is especially important when the sample size is not large enough to form
meaningful portfolios. In fact, it is argued by Lo and MacKinlay (1990) that
portfolio estimation could result in potential data snooping bias. Therefore, this
study further investigates the relationship between momentum and illiquidity by
performing asset pricing tests on individual securities. Moreover, to bring new
insights regarding the validity of various models and account for anomalies, the
study applies the semi-parametric tests to allow for varying betas. This approach
allows us to capture the impact of momentum on the cross-section of stock returns
influenced by the economic cycle.
Figure 3.1 plots the time series momentum portfolio payoffs over the period be-
tween February 1991 and December 2013. It reports the average monthly value-
weighted price momentum profits. As seen in Figure 3.1 the momentum profits
tend to bounce dramatically in the early 2000s and during the 2007-2009 financial
crisis time. Considering these illiquidity events, this study further investigates
such patterns of findings by applying the varying coefficient models.
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Figure 3.1: Time Series Momentum Portfolio
50 100 150 200 250
−0.25
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Month
M
O
M
 Time Series of Momentum Payoffs
87
Figure 3.2 presents the results from the varying coefficient models. On the left
hand side, the three graphs are generated based on relatively low bandwidth
settings. The graph presents a clear heterogeneity existing in the sample. The
horizontal axis represents the monthly observations from the sample pool. The
varying coefficient models clearly suggest a significant bounce after the financial
crisis, which happened during periods between 2007 and 2009. The three graphs
on the right hand side are varying betas along months based on wider bandwidth
settings. In the extreme cases when bandwidth is enormously high, the beta
coefficient becomes constant. 6.
Table 3.3 shows the results of the varying coefficient models. In particular, this
chapter is motivated by the Fama and MacBeth (1973)’s two-stage regressions
in capturing the specific relationships between momentum and illiquidity. Both
time series and cross-sectional regressions are applied in this chapter. In the first
stage, the study runs the cross-sectional regressions of stock returns on its own
past returns and past illiquidity, proxied by ‘zero-return days’. In each month t,
this study obtains varying stock momentum coefficients β0ti. Panel A of Table 3.3
describes the cross-sectional first stage regression results.7 From the individual
level of evidence, there is a strong continuation in stock returns in the cross-
section. The optimal β0ti is significantly positive. The slope coefficient of the
illiquidity has an average of 1.2746 suggesting that illiquid stocks earn higher
future returns than relatively liquid stocks. This is in line with the findings from
Chen and Sherif (2016) who applied the seven illiquidity proxies and reported
significant illiquid premiums in the UK market.
Next is the second-stage estimations, i.e. the time-series regressions. Panel B in
Table 3.3 presents the estimations associated with time series regressions of the
6This chapter contributes to literature by applying a narrow bandwidth setting and allow for
varying betas to change along periods.
7To obtain more accuracy results, the author sets a narrow bandwidth in the varying coeffi-
cient models.
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Figure 3.2: Choice of Bandwidth
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(a) Low bandwidth varying coefficient models
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(b) High bandwidth varying coefficient models
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Table 3.3: Individual stock momentum and market states with varying coefficients
Note: Panel A presents the coefficients of the following Fama-MacBeth regressions:
Ri,t = α0 + β0,tiRi,t−12:t−2 + γtILLIQi,t−1 + et,
where Ri,t is the stock return i in month t, Ri,t−12:t−2 is the accumulated stock returns
between month t − 12 and t − 2 and ILLIQi,t−1 is the ‘zero return days’ proposed by
Lesmond (2005).
Panel B presents the second stage of regression which is described as:
β0,ti = α0 + γ1Mktilliqt−1 + γ2Mktchgt−1 + γ3Mktvolt−1 + et,
The coefficients are regressed on the time-series of lagged market state variables: Mktilliqt−1
is the market illiquidity proxied by the ‘zero return days’ (Lesmond, 2005), Mktchgt−1 is a
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the return on stock market index is negative
in the past twenty four months and zero otherwise, and Mktvolt−1 is the standard deviation
of daily market returns. Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are applied and ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’
are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A: Varying coefficient regressions of stock returns
Average coefficient estimations
α0 0.0406
Rt−12:t−2 0.0215***
ILLIQt−1 1.2746***
Panel B: Varying betas regressed on lagged state variables
Coefficient estimations on varying betas
α0 -0.004
Mktilliq -0.461***
Mktchg -0.01
Mktvol -1.964***
varying momentum coefficients β0ti on the three market state variables, i.e. the
market illiquidity, market condition (Mktchg), and market volatility. The analy-
sis indicates a significant negative correlation between illiquidity and momentum
in stock returns, with the estimated slope coefficient of -0.461 signifcant at the
1% level of significance. This study also reports the result of the all-inclusive re-
gression in Table 3.3. Similar to the findings from portfolio level, this study fails
to find a significant impact using the market conditions in the regression. The
volatility, on the other hand, displays a significant negative effect on momentum
profits, as the estimated slope coefficient for volatility is -1.964.
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To conclude before moving onto the next stage of research, the study compares
the results between Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The similarity in the effect of illiquidity
on momentum in both portfolio and individual returns suggests that momentum
strategies are largely dependent on the liquidity of stocks. The payoffs are weak
or sometimes negative when the aggregate market is illiquid. Moreover, including
the market illiquidity can eliminate the explanatory power of market state in
the time series predictions. Notably, the varying coefficient estimations hold a
similar pattern of results to those reported in the previous studies. For example,
it is reported by Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010) that stock illiquidity is
somehow related to market returns and volatility. Also, Næs et al. (2011) show
that stock market liquidity is pro-cyclical and can be worsened during poor market
conditions, which suggests that market illiquidity could cause momentum payoffs
to vary over time.
Finally, the author was curious to see whether the stock exposures to market
illiquidity drive the price momentum. Hence, Table 3.4 presents the cross-sectional
and time series results.
Panel A of Table 3.4 presents the cross-sectional coefficients of the regression de-
scribed in section 4.3 for firm i. The author includes the Fama-French three factors
to control for the factor of risk exposure and report the all-inclusive model (Model
7) results in this table. This study reports high stock returns with high market
illiquidity. The slope coefficient is reported to be 0.2108 and is statistically signif-
icant. The author also reports significant individual future stock returns implied
by low market volatility (-0.4983). The effect of volatility is significantly negative,
which is consistent with the findings of Avramov et al. (2014) who report a nega-
tive impact using US data. This chapter’s findings, overall, suggest that following
periods of high volatility in the market, stock returns tend to decline in the future.
Panel B of Table 3.4 presents the second-stage regression results. Overall, this
study finds that the individual stock momentum transpire to be insignificant after
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Table 3.4: Individual stock momentum and market states
Panel A presents the cross-sectional coefficients of the following regression for firm i:
Rei,t = α0 + βi,1Mktilliqt−1 + β2Mktchgt−1 + β3Mktvolt−1 + c
′Ft + ei,t,
Where Rei,t is the excess return of stock i on month t. Mktilliqt−1, Mktchgt−1 and
Mktvolt−1 are the market state variables on month t− 1. The vector F is the Fama-French
three factors.
Panel B presents the results of the following monthly regressions,
R∗i,t = α0 + β1Ri,t−12:t−2 + ui,t,
Where Ri,t−12:t−2 is the past eleven months return of stock i. Newey-West adjusted t-
statistics are applied and ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A: First-stage regression coefficient estimations
Average coefficient estimations
α0 0.068
Mktilliq 0.2108***
Mktchg 0.003
Mktvol -0.4983***
RM −RF 0.039*
SMB 0.2197***
HML 0.056*
Panel B: Second-stage risk and market state adjusted regressions
Coefficient estimations
α0 -0.05
Ri,t−12:t−2 -0.01
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controlling for the predictive effect of the market states. Consequently, it can be
concluded that the price momentum is driven by aggregate illiquidity and market
volatility, but not market condition, either in a long-term or short-term specifi-
cation. Furthermore, the overall results suggest that market illiquidity is related
to momentum profits in both time series and cross-sectional analysis for the in-
dividual and portfolio-based stocks. Momentum strategy profits are significantly
slashed after an illiquid market condition.
Next, this study examines the forecasting power of momentum profitability using
out-of-sample performance. It is well documented that the empirical evidence
based on in-sample performance is sensitive to outliers and data mining (White,
2000). According to Diebold and Rudebusch (1991), out-of-sample forecast perfor-
mance is generally considered more trustworthy than evidence based on in-sample
performance, and also reacts better to the information available to the forecaster
in “real time”. This in fact has motivated the author to regard out-of-sample
performance as the ‘ultimate test of a forecasting model’ (Stock, Watson, and
Addison-Wesley, 2007). Table 3.5 reports the summary statistics of the forecast
errors based on the time-series estimation of out-of-sample forecasts. The forecast
of momentum profits in month t+ 1 is obtained as follows:
ˆWMLt+1 = αˆ0 + βˆ1,tMktchgt + βˆ2,tMktilliqt + βˆ3,tDownt + βˆ4,tMktvolt + c
′
t−1Ft
(3.5.22)
where ˆWMLt+1 is based on the lagged values of market state proxies. The data
spans the period from Feburary 1991 to December 2013. Following a common
empirical approach of out-of-sample test literature (Hansen and Timmermann,
2012; Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou, 2010; Xie and Wang, 2015), the study performs
out-of-sample tests using the latest 70%, 50%, 30% and 20% as split break-points
of the full sample. The reason for adopting several different out-of-sample periods
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Figure 3.3: Out-of-Sample Tests
are to minimize the concerns of data-mining. This study reserved multiple time
periods of historical data. Figure 3.3 presents the illustrative time line representing
the length of in and out-of-sample data used in the tests. Consequently, the four
different out-of-sample periods applied in this study were 1997-2013, 2002-2013,
2007-2013, and 2009-2013.
Table 3.5: Out-of-sample Forecasting
This table presents the results of the root of mean squared error (RMSE) of the forecast
error based on several out-of-sample forecasts. The momentum profits are regressed on an
intercept, Fama-French three factors and a combination of the four market state variables
(market change in returns, market aggregate illiquidity, down market dummy and the market
volatility). The seven model specifications are the same as those presented in Table 3.2. The
table reports out-of-sample test results in four different splits. The * represents the 10%
level and ** represents the 5% level of Diebold-Mariano significance test.
RMSE 30% Breakpoint 50% Breakpoint 70% Breakpoint 80% Breakpoint
Model 1 0.0539 0.0488 0.0556 0.0527
Model 2 0.0537 0.0489 0.0554 0.0525
Model 3 0.0540** 0.0483* 0.0552* 0.0525**
Model 4 0.0537 0.0489 0.0555 0.0526
Model 5 0.0538 0.0490 0.0559** 0.0540
Model 6 0.0526** 0.0484* 0.0562* 0.0538**
Model 7 0.0530* 0.0480 0.0556* 0.0537*
For Table 3.5, the author follows the same sequence of model specifications as those
used with Table 3.2. The forecast error is measured by reporting the difference
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between the realised momentum profit and the predicted one. The out-of-sample
analysis shows that the aggregate market illiquidity (Model 3) has the maximum
effect and is statistically significant in reducing the root of mean squared forecast
error (RMSE) compared with other models in the 50%, 70% and 80% splits. To
conclude, the out-of-sample evidence supports the sample analysis that illiquid
market states predict momentum payoffs.
This study presents the robustness check results in Table 3.6. The positive β3
(β3=0.317 and t=3.93) in Table 3.6 indicates that more liquid stocks yield returns
higher than illiquid stocks in the post crisis period. This study includes time and
stock fixed effects and size factor as the control variable.
Table 3.6: The Effect of Sudden Liquidity Shock
This study considers the 2007-2009 financial crisis as an exogenous liquidity shock to stock
returns. This table presents regression results on the dependent variable Return for the full
sample. This study considers liquid stocks as in the treatment group Liquidi,t and other
stocks as control group.The dummy variable Crisis is one between September 2007 and De-
cember 2009, and zero otherwise. DID refers to the difference-in-differences beta coefficient
which is Liquid ∗ Crisis. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **,
*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Return
DID 0.317***
(3.93)
Sizelag -0.247***
(-37.34)
Constant -1.819
(-53.44)
Time fixed effects Yes
Stock fixed effects Yes
Number of observations 67,470
R2 0.0224
This study finds that more liquid stocks, relative to illiquid stocks, exhibit signif-
icantly better performances after the sudden liquidity shock. This further proves
that liquidity is an important variable in explaining return continuation effect.
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3.6 Conclusion
Marketwide liquidity appears to be a state variable that is important for pric-
ing common stocks and explaining momentum profits. This study investigated
whether marketwide liquidity is a state variable important for momentum profits.
Further, this chapter used the time varying coefficient models to analyze the ability
of the state of market illiquidity to explain and predict momentum payoffs using
out-of-sample performance at both the portfolio and individual levels. To correct
heterogeneity in the sample, this chapter used semi-parametric estimations.
The author finds that the periods of high market illiquidity are followed by low
momentum profits, and very often negative returns. In the presence of aggregate
illiquidity, the power of the competing state variables (for example, the down mar-
ket condition) disappears. This chapter finds significant bounce in varying beta
coefficients changing over time. Consequently, the models capture more precise
beta coefficients in the estimation compared to those linear parametric tests which
assume linearity and smooth the line of slope coefficients. Furthermore, this study
captures significant momentum crash and the increase of liquidity risks during the
financial crisis. Regarding the endogeneity problem, the author investigates the
change in return when sudden liquidity shocks hit the market. This chapter finds
that stocks with high illiquidity are more sensitive to systemic shocks.
Overall, this chapter illustrates how illiquidity shocks predict both momentum
and value investment returns. Thus, this study offers insights to policymakers
interested in momentum profits and stock market liquidity. The results of this
study, therefore, may be useful for investors and regulators who are continually
adopting regulations in attempts to enhance understanding the factors that ex-
plain past and future stock price returns, or who are looking for additional ideas
for profitable trading strategies.
96
Despite filling some of the gaps in current asset pricing and stock return litera-
ture, this study highlights a number of others for future research. One direction
for future research is to explore whether liquidity risk plays a role in various
pricing anomalies in financial markets. Future research could investigate whether
expected returns are related to stocks’ sensitivities to fluctuations in other aspects
of aggregate liquidity. It would also be useful to explore whether some form of
systematic liquidity risk is priced in other financial markets, such as fixed income
markets.
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Chapter 4
Momentum and Information
Uncertainty: the Case of
Institutional and Individual
Investors
4.1 Introduction
Testing stock trading strategies is one of the major topics in finance that has
been the focus of financial scholars, investors and economists during the last two
decades (Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron, 1992; Han, Yang, and Zhou, 2013;
Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Kim and Shamsuddin, 2015). This is documented
by the increasing number of studies, conferences and journals dedicated to stock
trading perspectives. In particular, the robust momentum strategy of buying past
winners and selling past losers has received significant attention and has had a
significant impact on stock returns at short and intermediate horizons both in
and out of sample across several markets around the world (e.g.(Jegadeesh and
Titman, 1993; Rouwenhorst, 1998)).
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Notably, this strategy and return pattern presents a real challenge and puzzle to
the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) because the return continuation effect can-
not be explained by the existing asset pricing models (Fama and French, 2015).
Consequently, behavioural theories and their related studies have been introduced
which claim that return continuation could be caused by irrational investors with
biased expectations (Barberis et al., 1998; Hong et al., 2000). For example, Hvidk-
jaer (2006) present data to suggest that individual and institutional traders exhibit
distinct trading behaviours. Hvidkjaer (2006)’s analysis shows that individual in-
vestors are more likely to suffer from initial under-reaction which is subsequently
followed by delayed reactions. Institutional investors, however, have little evi-
dence of initial under-reaction and this evidence is consistent with informed trad-
ing among large institutional traders. Hence, the momentum trading strategy is
considered as a starting point in investigating individual and institutional investor
behaviours due to its simplicity and its role in providing investors with key signals
that are used by investors to gain momentum profits.
Previous studies on stock return momentum have paid significant attention to the
JT momentum strategy presented in a seminal study by Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993) (hereafter JT). JT found that returns on stocks exhibit continuation be-
haviour at intermediate periods. One of the alternative strategies to this, however,
was advocated and proposed by George and Hwang (2004) (hereafter GH). GH ex-
amined the return predictability of the 52-week-high price in the US market with
a strategy formed and based on the extent to which the current price of a stock is
close to its past 52-week-highest price. When portfolios are sorted using current
stock price divided by its past 52-week-high price, they found that companies
with highest ratios performed better than those associated with low ratios over
a subsequent period of 6 to 12 months subsequently. Consequently, GH claimed
that investors are argued to form a psychological ‘anchor’ on the elevated price
when stocks are traded near the 52-week-high price, resulting in an under-reaction
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to new information on these stocks. When the information relating to the fun-
damental value of stocks continues to persist in the long term, the adjustment of
investors’ previous under-reaction leads to a price continuation effect. According
to Burghof and Prothmann (2011), the existence of the GH momentum profits
are attributable to information uncertainty in stocks, which results in an increase
in the anchoring and adjustment biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Thus,
the prevalence of the GH return anomaly provides a setting for examining the
relationship between market efficiency and increasing information uncertainties.
Further, previous studies have found that analysts facilitate market efficiency by
processing information about firms. It is documented that analysts’ recommen-
dations are essential to reestablish stock prices back to fundamental values (e.g.
(Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman, 2001; Wieland, 2011)). However,
there are also arguments in literature that analysts’ forecasts are inefficient be-
cause they do not fully incorporate past information into their recommendations.
Analysts are argued to place more weight on heuristic valuations than present
valuation models (e.g. (Bradshaw, 2004)). Furthermore, the majority of previous
studies are dominated by studies only considering institutional investors, who are
arguably more sophisticated than individual investors (Amihud and Li, 2006; Co-
hen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho, 2002; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2001; Sias,
Starks, and Titman, 2006). For example, Campbell, Sharpe et al. (2009) and Feng
and Seasholes (2005) indicate that experts’ consensus forecasts of macroeconomic
information are biased towards previous values, which in turn leads to a greater
extent of forecast errors.
Several recent studies have documented that the 52-week high has predictive
ability for stock returns (Amihud and Li, 2006; Cohen et al., 2002; George and
Hwang, 2004; Gompers et al., 2001; Li and Yu, 2012; Liu, Liu, and Ma, 2011;
Sias et al., 2006). However, most of the discussion and empirical work of the
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previous studies is closely intertwined with institutional investors’ trading. In-
spired by the strong performance of the 52-week-high price momentum strategy,
whether investor groups trade on stocks that exhibit price momentum is a ques-
tion of importance. In addition, despite this large body of empirical research on
anchoring (or reference points), there is as yet only limited literature on the effect
of behavioural biases on informed trading. However, to the best of the author’s
knowledge, no prior study has examined the impact of both the momentum and
contrarian trading of different investor groups in the UK.
Based on the existing literature, this study extends the literature on momentum
return strategies by investigating both the individual and institutional investors’
roles in the financial market. Thus, this chapter contributes toward filling a gap
in the literature by differentiating the behavioural differences of institutional and
individual investors in momentum trading. Indeed, the literature tends to ig-
nore the fact that individual investors are inexperienced in terms of their financial
knowledge. This study therefore examines the relationship between analysts’ fore-
cast revision ratios and stock future returns in order to determine the experience
levels of institutional and individual investors. Further, in contrast to the ex-
isting literature, this study clearly classifies individual and institutional investors
and investigates their different contributions to momentum crash when significant
negative economic shock takes place.
In this study, the overall aim is therefore to study the role of institutional and in-
dividual investors in momentum tradings. This research is conducted by studying
both anchored and unanchored momentum strategies for each type of investors.
This study uses the 52-week-high momentum as a proxy for information uncer-
tainty to study the behavioural differences of the two types of investors. Further,
by applying ‘difference in differences’ methodology, This chapter aims to iden-
tify the causal link of momentum crash and negative economic shock and the
corresponding selection bias for both institutional and individual investors.
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Drawing upon time series UK data obtained from different sources coupled with
a stock’s current price and the 52-week high price over the period 1986 to 2014,
this study finds that the 52-week-high measure is persistent and does not revert at
short, intermediate and long horizons in the UK. The findings also show that dur-
ing times of greater information uncertainty, individual investors tend to apply the
52-week-high price as a psychological anchor to assess the impact of new informa-
tion about stocks more than institutional investors. This implies that momentum
anomaly is partly driven by the behaviour of individual traders. This study also
investigates the link between analysts’ forecast revisions and the 52-week-high
momentum strategy in various portfolio sorting and regression analyses. This
study finds that analysts’ forecast revisions have explanatory power for future
stock returns especially for institutional investors. This is due to institutional
investors having more expertise and access to analysts’ recommendation infor-
mation. Therefore, institutional investors can partly facilitate market efficiency
by studying analysts’ earnings forecasts that are closely related to momentum
indicators.
Further, the time series momentum payoffs of both institutional and individual
investors show that momentum tend to crash during negative event times. It is dif-
ficult to establish a causal link between investor reaction and momentum crashes
and much remains regarding whether large systematic economic shocks translate
into more pressure on institutional traders. This study exploits the sudden bank
run event of local UK bank Northern Rock in September 2007 as a negative source
of variation. This study’s identification strategy relies on the hypothesis that a
financial crisis affects institutional traders more than individual traders since in-
stitutions suffer from sudden liquidity constraints whereas individual investors
are not much affected since they have limited cash flow in the first place. Empir-
ically, this study identifies stocks included by institutional momentum investors
but which were not selected by individual investors as the treatment group. This
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study finds that large negative economic shock significantly affects institutional
portfolio returns, for both winner and loser portfolios. The findings are consistent
with the justification from Shleifer (2000) who argued that investors tend to use
heuristics, leading them to hold particular models of risk and expected returns.
When different models lead to similar predictions, investors will try to trade the
same securities at the same time thus pushing prices far away from fundamen-
tals. In this framework, the price ‘anchor’ does not apply to future stock returns.
This chapter confirms such cognitive bias of institutional investors using an ‘unan-
chored’ robustness test proposed by Lou and Polk (2013). They proposed como-
mentum as the abnormal return correlation among momentum portfolios. They
showed that during periods of low co-momentum, momentum strategies are prof-
itable and stabilizing, whereas during periods of high comomentum, returns tend
to crash and revert, reflecting previous overreaction resulting from crowded mo-
mentum tradings from institutional investors. This study confirms their findings
in the UK market. This chapter concludes that both individual and institutional
investors have a destabilising effect on stock market efficiency. Individual investors
are largely subject to ‘anchoring biases’, reflecting initial under-reaction to new
information. Institutional investors, on the other hand, absorb new information
efficiently, especially with analysts’ earnings forecast revisions. However, they
tend to have more ‘recognition biases’ when there are negative economic shocks.
This chapter contributes to the momentum literature in the following ways. First,
this study examines various holding horizons of GH momentum returns for both
individual and institutional investors in the UK. Although momentum pattern
has been documented to have generated significant returns for investors, exist-
ing studies mostly examine institutional investors. In fact, retail investors are
often neglected because of barriers such as the relatively small amounts of capital
they have invested, trading frictions and nonstandard trading horizons. How-
ever, momentum trading can be applicable to individual investors because it does
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not require profound investing expertise and is easy to conduct. Therefore, in
addition to conventional momentum strategies that applies to institutional in-
vestors, this chapter investigates the profitability of momentum trading when
only small numbers of firms are selected to construct winner and loser portfo-
lios. Second, this study examines the rolling holding horizons from 3 months to
5 years of momentum profits in a 26-year sample period. The author finds sig-
nificant and positive GH momentum returns for both institutional and individual
investors in the UK. In particular, individual investors can profit more from the
sell side loser portfolios. This momentum profits do not revert even in the long
run. Thirdly, this chapter links the 52-week-high momentum with information
uncertainty and finds that price momentum is partly driven by individual traders
who suffer from initial under-reaction to new information due to ‘anchoring bi-
ases’. During times of greater information uncertainty, individual investors tend
to apply the 52-week-high price as an anchor more than institutional investors do,
especially from the sell-side. Fourthly, this study links analysts’ forecasts with the
52-week-high momentum and finds that institutional investors who have access to
analysts’ earnings forecasts revisions are more likely to facilitate market efficiency.
This further demonstrates that stock market inefficiency is partly driven by in-
dividual investors. Fifthly, the author studies the causal link between investor
behaviours and momentum crashes. This study exploits the sudden financial cri-
sis as a negative shock. The difference-in-differences (DID) model suggests that
large negative economic shock significantly affects institutional portfolio returns.
Finally, this chapter confirms the presence of cognitive bias of institutional in-
vestors as evidenced by their use of ‘unanchored momentum strategy’.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides theo-
retical background that will guide us in the empirical investigation. Section 4.3
presents the full picture of research design. Section 4.4 provides information about
the data and discusses the findings, while section 4.5 concludes the study.
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4.2 Theoretical Background
4.2.1 Individual Investors Versus Institutional Investors
Individual investors were reported to hold 10.7% of shares listed on the London
Stock Exchange by the end of 2012 (NationalStatistics, 2013). These investors
are often criticised for their irrational investment decisions. For example, Barber
and Odean (2011) reported that individual investors tend to excessively trade
stocks, which resulting in higher transaction costs. It is also argued that due to
their limited capital, individual investors are more likely to hold non-diversified
portfolios (Statman, 2004). In fact, individual investors have been treated as noise
traders because of their constant decision-making errors (De Bondt, 1998).This is
in line with Barber et al. (2009), who documented that individual investors lost
an annual average of 3.8 percentage points in portfolio performances in Taiwan in
general.
Although individual investors are documented to be at a disadvantage in trading
against professionals in terms of skills (Barber et al., 2009; Gao and Lin, 2015;
Li et al., 2015; Tekc¸e et al., 2016), the literature tends to neglect the fact that
individuals do indeed make profits. In addition, the distinct characteristics of
individual investors suggest that momentum trading can benefit this group more
because such strategies do not require extensive financial knowledge. Investors
only need to buy and sell based on a typical strategy. Here, individual stocks
are recommended for them to follow momentum trading patterns. The existing
research mostly focuses on institutional traders who select a large amount of
stocks in portfolios. Clearly, small investors are not in these financial positions
for such big portfolios. In fact, Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) document that US
individual investors hold an average of only three or four shares in each portfolio.
Thus, individual investors in this study are investors who take a simplified mo-
mentum trading strategy that only exploits excess returns from top and bottom
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side momentum for a small number of individual stocks. This definition of indi-
vidual investors is consistent with the definitions of Siganos (2010) and Foltice and
Langer (2015). Such a definition is contrasted with that of institutional investors,
who can be defined as conventional momentum investors who manage portfolios
that include a large number of stocks (Lou and Polk, 2013).
In terms of their approach to rationality, according to (Lou and Polk, 2013), in-
vestors are argued to be boundedly rational. There are a group of momentum
investors acting as ’newswatchers’. This type of investors predict price move-
ments based on market signals. These signals are essentially their private obser-
vations on future firm value. Given only newswatchers, market price exhibits pure
under-reaction: prices slowly adjust to equilibrium. This study assumes individ-
ual investors tend to act as newswatchers. Additionally, Stein (2009) argues that
momentum investors do not know how much other investors deploy in the same
strategy. The failure of each investor to condition his trade on others’ behaviour
generates the controversial explanation of momentum investor behaviour: when
there are too few participants in a strategy, the share mispricing is not fully cor-
rected, sometimes exhibiting market under-reaction. However, when there are too
many participants, the share mispricing is overcorrected as the market appears to
overreact. This chapter assumes institutional rather than individual investors are
more likely to have such behaviours.
4.2.2 Momentum and Information Uncertainty
Momentum profits are well documented in numerous studies. For example, Bar-
beris et al. (1998) and Daniel et al. (1998) argue that momentum returns are the
result of investor overreaction. However, both Hong et al. (2000) and Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993) suggest that the abnormal returns come from investor under-
reaction. Overall, this study believes that institutional investors and individual
investors are distinct in their respective characteristics, and that they therefore
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may reflect different trading behaviours.
George and Hwang (2004) propose a 52-week-high momentum strategy that buys
stocks near this 52-week-high price and sells stocks far from 52-week-high price.
This momentum strategy incorporates current price information rather than sim-
ply using past return changes as proposed by (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).
Similarly, Liu et al. (2011) found this strategy generates significantly positive re-
turns in 20 developed stock markets. In another study, Burghof and Prothmann
(2011) defined the distance between the 52-week-high price and its 52-week-low
price as a proxy for information uncertainty. They documented that the increase
in anchoring biases resulted from information uncertainty in stocks. Furthermore,
investors are slow to adjust their initial reactions to firm-specific information.
Therefore, GH’s momentum strategy provides us with a natural setting in exam-
ining the relationship between the effect of information uncertainty on stocks and
the behavioural biases. This chapter evaluates the role of individual and institu-
tional investors separately in facilitating market efficiency when there is increased
information uncertainty.
4.2.3 Information Uncertainty and Analysts’ Forecast Re-
vision
In a seminal study, Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) provided evidence
that analysts’ forecasts can reconnect stock prices back to their fundamental val-
ues. Indeed, analysts play a significant role in the financial market by profes-
sionally processing information on firms. Financial analysts have a number of
informational advantages. First, they are reported to have greater expertise and
access to information about companies. Therefore, their recommendations are
more value-relevant. Moreover, analysts have the skill-sets to incorporate firm-
specific strategies, industry review, and macroeconomic factors into their forecasts
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(Wieland, 2011). In a key study, Barber et al. (2001) found empirical evidence of
stock prices drift following the release of earnings forecast. It is argued elsewhere
that such post-forecast revision drift is caused by a cumulative delayed response to
new information since there is inefficiency in utilising analysts’ forecast informa-
tion (Gleason and Lee, 2003). These findings support Hoppe and Kusterer (2011)’s
conservatism bias. Investors are criticised for not updating their expectations ad-
equately, manifesting only slow adjustment of their under-reaction behaviour into
stock prices. Elsewhere, Hou, Hung, and Gao (2014) found evidence using data
on the Australian stock market that investors react more slowly to analysts’ fore-
cast revisions when there is increased information uncertainty regarding stocks.
This implies that stock mispricing is contingent on the extent of uncertainty in
information. Based on the existing literature, it can be argued that the mean of
analysts’ earnings forecast revision predict future stock returns.
4.2.4 Negative Economic Shock and Momentum Crashes
Despite the many documented high abnormal returns and Sharpe ratio, momen-
tum payoffs are also reported to have negative skewness and excess kurtosis (Hei-
dari, 2015). Notably, the abnormal returns are often wiped off during market
recessions. In 1932, for example, during the Great Depression in the US, the
momentum returns dropped by 92% in just two months. Echoing this, in 2009,
momentum crashed around 73% in returns over three months in the US (Heidari,
2015). Grundy and Martin (2001) explain this pattern as the time-varying system-
atic risk of momentum strategy. They found significant negative beta following
market recessions. Conversely, however, Daniel and Moskowitz (2011) empiri-
cally show that using betas does not avoid crashes taking place. Importantly,
they found that loser stocks experience strong gains during extreme market en-
vironments, and it is these that result in the crashes. In behavioural literature,
researchers argue that investor inexperience creates crashes. Caginalp, Porter,
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and Smith (2000) observe investor behaviours in financial market under an ex-
periment setting. They found that with inexperienced traders, crashes commonly
occur and that this is a phenomenon that tends to disappear when traders be-
come more experienced. To understand the price dynamics, they applied over 150
experiments, the results of which showed that inexperienced investors generated
price bubbles. Due to the author’s ability to distinguish between institutional
investors who are more experienced than individual traders, this study is able to
observe the role that different types of investors have, in particular when negative
economic shock takes place.
Building on the previous different streams of studies, the author facilitate this
research by studying the relationship between momentum crash and negative eco-
nomic shock. Moreover, the author studies the difference between institutional
and individual investors. In particular, this chapter studies the relationship be-
tween level of experience and momentum crashes.
4.3 Research Design
4.3.1 Momentum Variables
To construct the winner and loser portfolios of current (GH) and past (JT) infor-
mation, this study ranks stocks based on each strategy’s ranking criterion at the
end of each month t.
GH’s current price to the 52-week-high price ratio is given by:
GHi,t = Pi,t−1/Highi,t−1 (4.3.1)
where GHi,t is the GH ratio of stock i on month t; Pi,t−1 is the price of stock i at
the end of month t− 1; Highi,t−1 is the highest price of stock i during the past 52
weeks that ends on month t− 1 (George and Hwang, 2004). In this study, GHH
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(GHL) is the dummy variable that equals to 1 if stocks are in the winner (loser)
portfolios based on the GH ratio and 0 otherwise.
Comparatively, JT’s ranking criterion is based on past stock returns:
JTi,t = Pi,t−1/Pi,t−j (4.3.2)
where JTi,t is the JT ratio of stock i on month t; Pi,t−1 is the price of stock i at
the end of month t − 1; Pi,t−j is the price of stock i at the end of month t − j,
based on different ranking horizons j.
This study examines momentum strategies using UK data between January 1987
and December 2012. The data are obtained over the period 1986 to 2014 to
construct meaningful momentum portfolios. Based on different ranking criteria,
stocks are classified into three portfolios: loser portfolio (Pl), median portfolio
(Pm), and winner portfolio (Pw). A filter rule of 30% is then applied for insti-
tutional investors: that is, the top 30% of stocks are classified as winners and
the bottom 30% of stocks are included in the loser portfolios. As for individual
investors’ momentum portfolios, they contain more extreme performing stocks:
the individual held winner (loser) portfolios contain best (worst) performing 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 10, 15 and 20 shares. Stocks are equally weighted and are held for 3, 6,
9, and 12 months as suggested by the conventional momentum literature. This
study extends the holding period up to 5 years after the construction of portfolios
as doing so allows us to observe long term return reversal effects.1 The mean
return of each portfolio is identified as:
Pk =
1
T
∑
t
rk(t) =
1
T
∑
t
[
1
Nk(t)
∑
i∈k
r(i, t)
]
(4.3.3)
where r(i, t) is the holding period return of stock i in period t, Nk(t) is the number
of stocks in portfolio k in period t, and T is the total number of periods in full
1The author also checks the returns of value-weighted portfolios in robustness tests.
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sample.
The portfolio selection and holding process follow a rolling pattern that takes
place at the end of each month in the sample period. The analyses of momentum
returns are based on the following Fama and French (1993) three-factor model:
Rpt −Rft = αp + βp,MKTMKTt + βp,SMBSMBt + βp,HMLHMLt + εpt (4.3.4)
where SMBt stands for size factor and HMLt is the value factor at the end of
month t.
This study intends to demonstrate the unexplained alphas after stock momentum
returns are controlled for market, size, and value factors. The author reports both
gross and adjusted momentum returns of various horizons and corresponding t-
statistics in section 4.4.
4.3.2 Analyst Forecast Revisions
This study defines an analyst as the financial professional that has the expertise to
evaluate investments and make earnings forecasts of securities for I/B/E/S similar
to the classification from (Low and Tan, 2016). The measurement of analysts’
forecast revisions are important in facilitating market efficiency. Following Zhang
(2008) and Chen, Narayanamoorthy, Sougiannis, and Zhou (2015), this study
proxies the earnings forecast revision ratio as:
REi,t = (Fi,t − Fi,t−1)/Pi,t−1 (4.3.5)
where Fi,t is the monthly mean earnings forecast of stock i at month t and Pi,t−1 is
the price of stock i at previous month. The forecast consensus revision is measured
as the percentage change in monthly consensus mean forecasts. This is consistent
with the measurement of momentum variables.
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The sign of this forecast revision ratio acts as the signal in response to good and
bad news. For example, a positive sign would signal good news about a particular
stocks and suggests a favourable recommendation and vice versa. Consistent with
momentum variables, the top stocks with the highest analysts’ forecast revision
ratio are included in the ‘buy’ portfolio, while the bottom stocks are included in
the ‘sell’ portfolio.
In this study, the author follows momentum literature (e.g.(Jegadeesh and Tit-
man, 1993)) and includes firm size and value as control variables. Firm size and
value are common risk factors defined by Fama and French (1993). They are also
the measures of information uncertainty. While firm size is measured as the log
value of market capitalisation, firm value is measured as the book-to-market ra-
tio. Further, this study controls for the previous month’s stock returns since past
returns include the information about future stock returns. Subsequently, the
chapter controls for short-term price reversals (Grinblatt and Moskowitz, 2004)
and behavioural biases (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).
4.3.3 Panel Regression with Forecast Revisions
This study applies the following regression model and examine the role of analysts
as information intermediaries in the market. Then the study tests their contri-
butions in explaining future stock returns after controlling for momentum and
information uncertainty variables for both individual and institutional investors.
Using a panel regression approach, future stock returns in month t + 3 is the
dependent variable. The control variables are positioned at month t + 2, and
momentum variables are taken at month t− 1.
Ri,t+3 = β0 + β1Buyi,t + β2Selli,t + β3GHHi,t−1 + β4GHLi,t−1
+β5Sizei,t+2 + β6V aluei,t+2 + β7Ri,t+2 + u
(4.3.6)
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where Buyi,t is the buy revision and Selli,t is the sell revision.
2
4.3.4 The Financial Crisis and Groups of Investors: the
Difference in Differences (DID) Method
The difference in differences (DID) method is a technique used to examine the
differential impact of a sudden event on a treatment group versus a control group
(Ashenfelter and Card, 1985). In contrast to time-series and cross sectional es-
timates, DID uses panel data to measure the differences between the treatment
and control groups of the changes in the outcome variable that occur over time
(Abadie, 2005). The formula is described as follows:
Y (i, t) = δ(t) + α ∗D(i, t) + η(i) + υ(i, t) (4.3.7)
where δ(t) is the time specific component, η(i) is the individual component, υ(i, t)
is the control variable and α represents the impact of the treatment.
The DID approach is an important analysis to test the differing contributions
of institutional and individual investors on momentum crash when significant
negative economic shock occurs. To study different investor behaviours associated
with negative economic shocks, this chapter considers the 2007-2009 financial crisis
as a sudden liquidity shock and examine the causal effects of investor behaviours
and momentum crash. Thus, this study performs the next regression using:
Ri,t = β0 + β1WHHTi,t + β2PostCrisisi,t + β3WHHT ∗ PostCrisisi,t
+β4Ri,t−1 + β5Sizei,t−1 + β6V aluei,t−1 + u
(4.3.8)
where WHHTi,t is the dummy variable that takes 1 if the stock is included in
the institutional winner portfolio but is not included in the individual portfolio,
2The detailed variable explanations are presented in Table 4.1.
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and 0 otherwise. PostCrisisi,t is the dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
the time is after September 2007 and 0 otherwise. Importantly, and in particular,
the study is interested in the value of β3, a difference in difference coefficient that
measures the different explanatory powers of individual and institutional selected
stocks following a negative economic shock.
4.3.5 Unanchored Momentum Comovement
Following Lou and Polk (2013) the author further exploits investor behaviours of
cognitive bias through a robustness test by removing the effect of return premi-
ums generated by the Fama-French three-factor model. According to Lou and
Polk (2013), the size of the momentum crowd is identified by the degree of past
abnormal return correlations among momentum shares. This is undertaken and
performed by sorting all stocks into decile portfolios based on their previous 6-
month return.3 It is worth noting that the JT approach is different from the 52-
week-high momentum strategy used in this analysis because the former is more
of an unanchored strategy. This study controls for Fama-French asset pricing risk
factors and compute pairwise partial correlations. The size of momentum crowd
is then measured by the average correlation of the three-factor residual of every
stock in a particular momentum decile. The size of loser (MomCrowdL) and
winner (MomCrowdW ) crowd are identified as:
MomCrowdL =
1
NL
NL∑
i=1
partialcorr(retrfLi , retrf
L
−i|mktrf, smb, hml) (4.3.9)
MomCrowdW =
1
NW
NW∑
i=1
partialcorr(retrfWi , retrf
W
−i |mktrf, smb, hml)
(4.3.10)
3In unreported analyses, this study finds that momentum strategy is most profitable via a
6-month selection horizon in the UK using JT strategy.
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where retrfLi (retrf
W
i ) is the daily return of stock i in the extreme loser (winner)
decile, retrfL−i (retrf
W
−i ) is the daily return of equal-weight extreme loser (winner)
decile excluding stock i and NL (NW ) is the number of stocks in the extreme loser
(winner) decile.
When momentum investment is not crowded, price must appear to be a contin-
uation in the short-run and there is no return reversal in the long run. When
momentum investing is crowded, however, the overreaction phenomenon will ap-
pear, as a result of the fact that prices overshoot the fundamentals and render
return reversals in the long run.
4.4 Data and Empirical Findings
4.4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The sample comprises all companies listed on FTSE All-Share from 1986 to 2014
obtained from Thomson DataStream.4 This study starts from the year 1986 be-
cause return index data for FTSE All-share firms are available as of January 1986.
This study collects daily and monthly stock prices and their corresponding 52-
week high prices, trading volume (turnover by volume), market value (share price
multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue), return index (a theoretical
growth in value of a share-holding over a specified period), market to book value
(market value of common equity divided by the balance sheet value of common
equity in the company), number of shares outstanding and the bid and ask prices
of companies. Stocks are kept if they existed for at least three years prior to the
year start.
The author obtains analysts’ earnings forecast data from the I/B/E/S Thompson
Reuters detailed forecast database. In particular, the mean forecasts of earnings
4To avoid survivor-ship bias, this analysis covers not only presently listed stocks but also
dead stocks. Dead stocks refer to those of firms that were de-listed at some point of time during
the sample period.
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per share of each company data are obtained.
The size and value risk factors are obtained from the University of Exeter as
described in Gregory et al. (2013).5The data obtained is market factor (the excess
return on the value-weighted market index over the one month T-bill rate), the
size factor (small minus big return premium) and the value factor (high book-to-
market minus low book-to-market return premium).
5While Kenneth French’s US website provides data for the US market, there is currently
no equivalent for the UK market. The author thanks the University of Exeter for provid-
ing remedy and making the UK data freely downloadable at this website: http://business-
school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/xfi/research/famafrench/.
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Table 4.1: Variables and Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics of the key variables in full sample. The sample consists of stocks listed on FTSE
All-Share for the period January 1987 to December 2012.
Variables Description Obs. Mean Std. Min Max
Panel A: Dependent Variable
Returns monthly stock returns 199,680 0.0076 0.0810 -0.2162 0.2535
Panel B: Independent Variables
GHH
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if stock i belongs to 199,680 0.1803 0.3844 0 1
GH winner portfolio and value 0 otherwise
GHL
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if stock i belongs to 199,680 0.1802 0.3844 0 1
GH loser portfolio and value 0 otherwise
WHH
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if stock i belongs to
Institutional selected winner portfolio but not belongs to 199,680 0.1513 0.3583 0 1
individual selected winner portfolio and value 0 otherwise
WHL
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if stock i belongs to
Institutional selected loser portfolio but not belongs to 199,680 0.1513 0.3583 0 1
individual selected loser portfolio and value 0 otherwise
Buy
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if stock i belongs to 199,680 0.1675 0.3734 0 1
top forecast revision portfolio and value 0 otherwise
Sell
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if stock i belongs to 199,680 0.1615 0.3680 0 1
bottom forecast revision portfolio and value 0 otherwise
Panel C: Control Variables
Returns lag lag one month stock returns 199,680 0.0075 0.0810 -0.2161 0.2537
Size lag log of market capitalization at previous month 120,414 5.8080 1.7996 -0.3425 12.2315
BTMV lag lag book to market value 199,680 0.4659 0.7393 0 2.2727
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Table 4.1 presents a summary of each variable and the descriptive statistics. Panel
A reports the summary of monthly stock returns. As can be seen from Table 4.1
panel A, the returns tend to cluster around a mean value of 0.76%. Panel B
shows the independent variables associated with information uncertainty. GHH
(GHL) is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if stocks are in the top (bottom)
portfolios based on the GH ratio and 0 otherwise. The mean of GHH which is
0.1803 is interpreted as around 18% of the stocks having a current price that close
to their 52-week-high price. WHH (WHL) is a dummy variable that equals to 1
if stocks belong to institutional winner (loser) portfolios but are not included in
individual winner (loser) portfolios and 0 otherwise. Variables Buy and Sell are
analysts’ forecast revision dummies. Similar to momentum variables, Buy (Sell) is
a dummy variable that takes 1 if stocks are in the top (bottom) forecast revision
portfolio. Panel C presents the control variables used in this study. The log mean
size of firms is around 5.81, which is large in size. The book-to-market ratio is
evenly distributed around the mean of 0.47.
The average monthly stock returns are close to those reported by Chen et al.
(2015) in the US market. The author further studies the relationship among
variables in the next section.
4.4.2 Empirical Findings
Individual Anchoring and Adjustment Bias
The author reports the GH momentum returns in Table 4.2 and 4.3 for institu-
tional and individual portfolios.
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Table 4.2: GH Momentum Returns in the UK: Institutional Investors
This table presents returns of winner and loser portfolios for institutional investors and the consequent momentum
profits of various holding periods. The sample includes firms listed on FTSE All-Share from January 1987 to December
2012. Relevant portfolios are constructed by sorting all firms by the current price to the past 52 week high price ratio.
This study sorts top 30% winning performing firms into winner portfolio and the bottom 30% firms into loser portfolio.
Panel A reports monthly returns and Panel B presents the corresponding Fama-French three-factor alphas in each
portfolios respectively. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A: Holding Period Returns
Portfolios 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
Winner 1.43%*** 1.38%*** 1.33%*** 1.29%*** 1.09%*** 1.00%*** 0.93%*** 0.86%***
(9.07) (11.92) (14.38) (16.07) (20.52) (21.93) (23.90) (23.79)
Loser -0.27% -0.25% -0.23% -0.21% -0.11% -0.06% -0.06% -0.05%
(-1.04) (-1.29) (-1.46) (-1.53) (-1.25) (-0.90) (-1.23) (-1.37)
Buy-Sell 1.68%*** 1.62%*** 1.56%*** 1.50%*** 1.19%*** 1.06%*** 0.98%*** 0.91%***
Strategy (10.34) (13.45) (15.31) (16.93) (22.25) (25.41) (25.76) (25.11)
Panel B: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
Portfolios 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
Winner 0.945%*** 0.932%*** 0.905%*** 0.890%*** 0.753%*** 0.700%*** 0.685%*** 0.688%***
(6.16) (7.70) (9.20) (10.31) (13.22) (15.29) (19.88) (25.49)
Loser 0.074% 0.050% 0.011% -0.035% -0.259%*** -0.322%*** -0.346%*** -0.321%***
(0.26) (0.23) (0.06) (-0.22) (-2.58) (-4.53) (-5.78) (-6.50)
Buy-Sell 1.388%*** 1.384%*** 1.320%*** 1.258%*** 0.895%*** 0.780%*** 0.740%*** 0.735%***
Strategy (7.40) (10.11) (11.46) (12.69) (15.16) (18.37) (19.62) (21.80)
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Table 4.3: GH Momentum Returns in the UK: Retail Investors
This table presents returns of winner and loser portfolios for retail investors and the consequent momentum profits of
various holding periods. The sample includes firms listed on FTSE All-Share from January 1987 to December 2012.
Relevant portfolios are constructed by sorting all firms by the current price to the past 52 week high price ratio. This
study sorts top winning performing firms into winner portfolio and the bottom firms into loser portfolio. *, **, ***
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
No. of stocks 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
W <= 5 1.56%*** 1.32%*** 1.33%*** 1.26%*** 0.97%*** 0.84%*** 0.72%*** 0.66%***
L <= 5 -1.14%** -0.70%* -0.42% -0.22% 0.15% 0.27%** 0.45%*** 0.48%***
W-L <= 5 2.70%*** 2.02%*** 1.74%*** 1.47%*** 0.82%*** 0.57%*** 0.27%*** 0.17%**
W <= 10 1.45%*** 1.26%*** 1.28%*** 1.21%*** 0.91%*** 0.80%*** 0.70%*** 0.64%***
L <= 10 -1.12% -0.78%** -0.53%** -0.32% 0.18% 0.33%*** 0.46%*** 0.50%***
W-L <= 10 2.57%*** 2.04%*** 1.81%*** 1.53%*** 0.72%*** 0.47%*** 0.24%*** 0.14%***
W <= 15 1.40%*** 1.24%*** 1.21%*** 1.17%*** 0.89%*** 0.79%*** 0.71%*** 0.66%***
L <= 15 -0.85%** -0.64%** -0.45%* -0.23% 0.27%** 0.39%*** 0.49%*** 0.52%***
W-L <= 15 2.25%*** 1.88%*** 1.66%*** 1.39%*** 0.62%*** 0.40%*** 0.22%*** 0.14%***
W <= 20 1.37%*** 1.21%*** 1.18%*** 1.13%*** 0.88%*** 0.79%*** 0.72%*** 0.66%***
L <= 20 -0.78%** -0.58%** -0.39%* -0.18% 0.33%*** 0.44%*** 0.51%*** 0.53%***
W-L <= 20 2.14%*** 1.78%*** 1.56%*** 1.30%*** 0.55%*** 0.35%*** 0.20%*** 0.13%***
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Panel A of Table 4.2 presents the returns of winner and loser portfolios for institu-
tional investors and the gross momentum returns (winner minus loser) following
the GH momentum strategy that ranks stocks based on the current price divided
by its 52-week-high price. In addition, the monthly holding period returns of
each holding horizons are calculated and reported in Table 4.2. Interestingly, this
study finds positive and significant returns all coming from winner portfolios. Al-
though this study finds negative average returns from loser side, none of these is
statistically significant. Moreover, momentum returns decrease uniformly when
holding horizons increase (from 1.68% to 0.86% over 3 months to 5 years). The
shorter the holding period, the larger magnitude of momentum profits that can be
obtained. However, the positive and significant gross returns do not revert over 5
years, reflecting a clear under-reaction behaviour from investors.
Panel B of Table 4.2 reports the Fama-French three-factor alpha of winner and
loser portfolios following the GH momentum strategy. After controlling for mar-
ket, size and value factor, the abnormal returns slightly decrease. However, the
unexplained alpha still persists from 3 months to 5 years holding horizons. Sim-
ilarly as with the gross returns, this study finds significant positive momentum
returns for all holding horizons. The adjusted returns decrease uniformly with
the increase of holding period. The net buy and sell strategy yields average re-
turns from 1.388% held for 3 months to 0.735% held for 5 years. Interestingly,
the loser portfolio returns become large in value and have statistical significances
when holding horizons increase above 2 years. This suggests that the sell side
loser portfolios may be under performing even in the long run.
Table 4.3 presents the returns of winner and loser portfolios for individual investors
and the gross momentum returns (winner minus loser) following GH momentum
strategy. This chapter reports portfolios that contains less than 5 stocks, and
those that contain from 6 to 10 stocks, 11 to 15 stocks, and 16 to 20 stocks in
the table. The study finds significant high returns for almost all portfolios in all
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holding horizons. Individual winner portfolios, similarly to institutional held win-
ner portfolios, yield significant positive monthly returns. The fewer the number
of stocks contained in the portfolios, the higher the momentum returns this study
observes. The highest per month return from the winner side comes from the
extreme portfolio that contains less than 5 stocks. It yields an average of 1.56%
monthly return over a 3-month holding horizon. Meanwhile, the sell side loser
portfolio yields similar returns. This study observes 1.14% returns if investors sell
loser portfolios simultaneously when they purchases the winner portfolio, result-
ing in a 2.70% monthly profit through buy and sell strategy. This study finds
that individual held portfolios yields higher momentum returns over short (3 to
6 months) and intermediate (6 to 12 months) horizons compared to institutional
held portfolios. This implies that individual investors act as destablisers in the
financial market. Moreover, the anchoring and adjustment biases are more signif-
icant among individual investors. When portfolios are held over a long horizon
(greater than 12 months), the author observes loser portfolio return reversion from
individual held portfolios. Note that this study didn’t observe such reversion from
institutional held portfolios. Therefore, this chapter concludes that, when com-
pared to institutional investors, individual investors are more sensitive to negative
information, resulting in an initial overreaction from the sell side.
Information Uncertainty and Earnings Forecast Revisions
Table 4.4 reports the findings and estimates examining whether analysts’ forecast
revision consensus ratio is a strong predictor for future returns.
Table 4.4 shows that if analysts are able to recognise momentum signals and
translate their forecast revisions as news, and the author would therefore expect
forecast revisions to explain future stock returns after controlling for GH momen-
tum variables. The study reports the regression results for 3 months ahead stock
returns for both institutional held portfolios and individual held portfolios. The
122
Table 4.4: Panel Regression with Forecast Revision
This table reports the regression results for month t + 3 stock returns as the dependent
variable for institutional held portfolios and individual held portfolios. For full description
of the variables, please refer to Table 4.1. The sample is stocks listed on FTSE All-Share
for the period 1987 to 2012. The corresponding t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Variables Predicted Sign Institutional Rt+3 Individual Rt+3
Buy + 0.0056*** 0.0063***
(7.87) (8.87)
Sell - -0.0028*** -0.0043***
(-3.58) (-5.85)
GHH + 0.0006 -0.0044
(0.78) (-1.33)
GHL - -0.0046*** 0.0232***
(-5.78) (7.00)
Sizelag +/- -0.0110*** -0.0104***
(-29.87) (-28.47)
V aluelag +/- 0.0151*** 0.0148***
(33.35) (32.79)
Rlag + 0.0255*** 0.0271***
(8.75) (9.21)
Cons +/- 0.0650*** 0.0609
(28.58) (27.30)
N 555 555
R2 0.0205 0.0268
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
detailed introduction of each variable are listed in Table 4.1.
This study finds significant positive (negative) coefficients for Buy and Sell vari-
ables for both regressions (βInstBuy = 0.0056, t = 7.87; βIndiBuy = 0.0063, t = 8.87;
βInstSell = −0.0028, t = −3.58; and βIndiSell = −0.0043, t = −5.85). The findings
demonstrate that the self-funded strategy that longs stocks in the Buy revision
and short stocks in the Sell revision portfolios is profitable and significant. There-
fore, this study observes a post-forecast revision drift in the UK market, and the
data confirms the profitability of Buy-Sell revision method, which is consistent
with existing literature (Chen et al., 2015).
However, after controlling for anchored momentum variables, individual held
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portfolios yield the opposite signs of coefficients for winner and loser dummies
(βIndiGHH = −0.0044, t = −1.33; βIndiGHL = 0.0232, t = 7.00). This contrasts
with the findings from Low and Tan (2016) who adopt 20% cutoff point to con-
struct momentum portfolios which is similar to the institutional held portfolios
that used a 30% filter rule. On the other hand, the institutional held portfolio
regression results are consistent with other prior literature (βInstGHH = 0.0006,
t = 0.78; βInstGHL = −0.0046, t = −5.78). This implies that individual investors
are more volatile investors while institutional investors tend to incorporate ratio-
nal recommendations in their strategies.
Momentum Crash and Institutional Cognitive Bias
To date, this chapter’s results show that individual investors are more volatile
investors and suffer from significant anchoring and adjustment biases compared
to institutional investors.
Figure 4.1 visually represents the time-series momentum payoffs in the sample pe-
riod for both institutional investors and individual investors. As can be seen from
Figure 4.1, institutional momentum portfolio returns move in the same direction
as individual momentum portfolio returns, but in a much smoother way. The plot
further confirms the previous findings that due to anchoring-and-adjustment bias,
individual investors tend to destabilise the market by pushing returns far away
from fundamentals.
In Figure 4.1, the author plots the returns of winner and loser portfolios held by
each group. It is worth noting that institutional loser portfolio performance is sig-
nificantly different from individual loser portfolio performance. Notably, individ-
ual loser portfolios tend to have a lagged effect after institutional loser portfolios.
These findings further confirm that individual investors have a destabilising effect
in the stock market by under-reacting to new information.
In most of the previous cases, momentum returns are positive for both individual
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Table 4.5: Institutional Versus Retail Investors Around Financial Crisis
This study considers the 2007-2009 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to momentum
investors to study the causal effects. This table presents regression results on the dependent
variable Return for the full sample. The study considers stocks that are selected by institu-
tional investors but are not included by retail investors in their winner (loser) portfolios as the
treatment group WHHT (WHLT ) and other stocks as control group.The dummy variable
PostCrisis is one after September 2007, and zero otherwise. DID refers to the difference-
in-differences beta coefficient which is WHHT ∗ PostCrisis (WHLT ∗ PostCrisis). The
corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical signifi-
cance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. The description of variables are listed in Table 4.1.
WHHT WHLT
DID -0.147*** 0.171***
(-5.22) (4.67)
Returnslag 0.118*** 0.115***
(21.69) (21.14)
Sizelag -0.046*** -0.045***
(-12.61) (-12.28)
BTMVlag -0.053*** -0.053
(-6.88) (-6.88)
Constant -2.509*** -2.624***
(-95.46) (-100.44)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
Stock fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 36,478 36,478
R2 0.0277 0.03
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and institutional held portfolios, reflecting a significant return continuation effect.
However, during the 2007 to 2009 global financial crisis, it can be observed that
significant momentum crash exist for both types of investors. Indeed, the crisis
appears as a huge negative shock and the author is eager to learn the impact of
sudden liquidity shock on individual and institutional held stocks. Therefore, this
study defines the time dummy of post crisis factor to be 1 if the observation time
is after September 2007, when local UK bank Northern Rock was nationalized and
0 otherwise. The study defines the treatment group stocks as the stocks held by
institutional investors, but not held by individual investors. Consequently, this
study compares the difference between institutional held stocks and individual
held stocks both before and after a large and negative economic event.
Table 4.5 reports the regression results after controlling for past return, size,
and value factors. The study finds statistically significant evidence showing that
after financial crisis, institutional held winning stocks revert in signs and have a
negative impact over stock returns (βDID = −0.147, t = −5.22) while previous
losing stocks have a positive impact over stock returns (βDID = 0.171, t = 4.67).
The findings extend the existing momentum literature that suggests loser stocks
reversion is the main reason of momentum crash. This study finds that not only
losers, but also winners have the return reversal effect. Furthermore, the treatment
group contains stocks that will only be selected by large traders. Therefore, the
reversal effect is driven solely by the large amount of momentum trading activities.
This is consistent with Hong et al. (2000)’s cognitive bias explanations. That is,
stock mispricing appears when there are too many momentum participants. This
mispricing is overcorrected as the market appears to overreact.
Further Analysis: Comomentum
To further examine the institutional investors’ cognitive biases and their overre-
action behaviour, this study adopts the methodology proposed by Lou and Polk
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(2013) to observe institutional excessive tradings. This chapter designs the unan-
chored investigation of momentum investment in the UK by applying the 6∗12 JT
momentum strategy6, i.e. a six-month ranking period and a twelve-month hold-
ing period. Table 4.6 presents the summary statistics of the momentum crowd
over the period 1987 to 2012 in the UK. Following a conventional momentum
strategy, all stocks are sorted into decile portfolios based on previous 6-month
returns at the end of each month, whilst skipping the most recent month. After
controlling for the Fama-French three factors, this study computes pairwise par-
tial return correlations for all stocks in both winner and loser momentum deciles.
MomCrowdL (MomCrowdW ) is the average pairwise partial return correlation
in the loser (winner) decile. mktret36 is the three-year return on market portfolio
from year t− 2 to t, and mktvol36 is the monthly return volatility of the market
portfolios in year t− 2 to t.
6In the unreported results, the author observes the highest JT momentum return comes from
6 ∗ 12 strategy.
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Table 4.6: Summary Statistics of the size of momentum crowd
This table presents summary statistics of momentum crowd over the period 1987 to 2012 in the UK.
All stocks are sorted into decile portfolios based on momentum strategy. After controlling for the
Fama-French three factors, this study computes pairwise partial return correlations for all stocks in
both winner and loser momentum deciles. Stocks with prices below £5 a share are excluded from
our sample. MomCrowdL (MomCrowdW ) is the average pairwise partial return correlation in the
loser (winner) decile. mktret36 is the three-year return on market portfolio from year t− 2 to t, and
mktvol36 is the monthly return volatility of the market portfolios in year t− 2 to t. Panel A reports
summary statistics of the above variables while Panel B presents the time-series correlations among
these variables.
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Momentum Crowd
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
MomCrowdL 288 0.121 0.093 -0.004 0.649
MomCrowdW 288 0.107 0.092 -0.015 0.488
mktret36 288 0.329 0.327 -0.376 1.046
mktvol36 288 0.044 0.012 0.022 0.071
Panel B: Time-series Correlations
MomCrowdL MomCrowdW mktret36 mktvol36
MomCrowdL 1 0.580 -0.122 -0.024
MomCrowdW 0.580 1 -0.008 0.058
mktret36 -0.122 -0.008 1 -0.565
mktvol36 -0.024 0.058 -0.565 1
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Panel A shows the summary statistics of the above variables. It indicates that
momentum crowd varies over time. The average loser portfolio has an abnormal
correlation of 0.121 during the portfolio selection period throughout the 26-year
UK sample. The results are similar to those documented by Lou and Polk (2013),
who find an average correlation of 0.118 in loser portfolio in the US market.
The abnormal correlation in the loser portfolio ranges from -0.004 to 0.649. The
range is wider compared to those reported in the US market, exhibiting a higher
volatility within the market. A similar pattern can be found from the winner
portfolio. The average partial correlation in the winner portfolio is 0.107, also
showing a wide range from -0.015 to 0.488.
Panel B presents the time-series correlations among these variables. It indicates
that loser and winner momentum crowd are highly correlated over time (the cor-
relation is 0.580). This corresponds with previous literature that has documented
that momentum profits depend on general market state and market volatility
(Cooper et al., 2004). This study also includes the past three-year return of the
market and the monthly market return volatility over the past three years in the
tests. Table 4.6 shows the loser momentum crowd is negatively correlated with
both the average past market return (-0.122) and past market volatility (-0.024).
The winner momentum crowd is also negatively correlated with past market re-
turn (-0.008), but positively correlated with past market volatility (0.058).
Figure 4.2 plots the momentum crowd for both the winner and loser portfolios. It
shows that the momentum crowd is persistent over time. There is a spike in the
momentum crowd in the early 1990s, the time when the Iraq invasion of Kuwait
was taking place. Thereafter, momentum strategies started to attract popularity.
Figure 4.2 also shows an increase of the momentum crowd during major financial
shocks such as the Asian crisis in 1997, the long term capital management crisis
in 1998, the tech boom in 2000 and the financial crisis from 2007 to 2010.
130
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Time series momentum crowd
Year
M
om
en
tu
m
 c
ro
w
d
 
 
MomCrowd(L)
MomCrowd(W)
Figure 4.2: Momentum Crowd and Momentum Returns
131
Table 4.7 shows returns to the conventional Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) mo-
mentum strategy as a function of a lagged momentum crowd. All stocks are
sorted into decile portfolios based on previous 6-month returns at the end of each
month, whilst skipping the most recent month. Stocks with prices below £5 a
share are excluded from sample. This study classifies all months into five groups
based on MomCrowdL, the average pairwise partial return correlation in the
loser decile. The table reports returns to the momentum strategy in each of the
three years after portfolio formation during 1987 to 2012, following low to high
MomCrowdL. Year zero is the portfolio selection period. This study presents the
average monthly returns of the momentum strategy in Table 4.7.
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Table 4.7: Momentum Returns with the size of momentum
This table presents returns to momentum as a function of lagged momentum crowd. Stocks with prices below £5 a
share are excluded from our sample. This study classifies all months into five groups based on MomCrowdL (Panel
A) and mkt36 (Panel B), the average pairwise partial return correlation in the loser decile. The table below reports
returns to the momentum strategy in each of the three years after portfolio formation during 1987 to 2012, following
low to high MomCrowdL. Year zero is the portfolio ranking period. This chapter presents the average monthly
returns of momentum strategy. 5 − 1 is the difference between the highest and lowest MomCrowdL and OLS is
the slope coefficient from the regression of monthly momentum returns on ranks of MomCrowdL. T -statistics are
presented in the parentheses.
Panel A: Momentum Returns Ranked by Momentum Crowd
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Rank No. Obs. Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
1 52 10.54% (11.23) -0.26% (-3.83) -0.89% (-27.74) -0.84% (-40.21)
2 52 11.49% (11.73) -0.35% (-5.31) -0.89% (-29.85) -0.82% (-47.09)
3 52 14.42% (13.06) -0.53% (-7.04) -1.00% (-28.41) -0.83% (-73.62)
4 52 15.54% (15.27) -0.57% (-8.21) -1.03% (-29.66) -0.83% (-62.11)
5 52 18.01% (22.23) -0.74% (-13.84) -1.12% (-36.58) -0.86% (-56.75)
5− 1 7.47% (6.07) -0.47% (-5.67) -0.23% (-5.38) -0.03% (-1.03)
OLS 0.03% (5.70) 0.00% (-5.29) 0.00% (-3.09) 0.00% (-1.33)
Panel B: Momentum Returns Ranked by mkt36
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Rank No. Obs. Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
1 52 9.49% (29.62) -0.51% (-1.93) 0.39% (1.92) 0.52% (1.94)
2 52 8.35% (27.74) 1.59% (3.35) -0.60% (-2.35) 0.00% (0.01)
3 52 7.15% (26.85) 0.24% (0.59) -1.26% (-3.76) 0.36% (1.35)
4 52 7.29% (19.86) -0.42% (-0.90) -1.70% (-3.98) -0.12% (-0.38)
5 52 7.89% (27.46) 0.36% (1.02) -1.71% (-3.82) -0.92% (-2.82)
5− 1 -1.60% (-3.90) 0.87% (2.03) -2.10% (-4.12) -1.45% (-3.51)
OLS -0.01% (-3.96) 0.00% (0.62) 0.00% (1.18) 0.00% (-0.21)
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This chapter finds that returns in portfolio formation year are consistently in-
creasing with the momentum crowd. Group 1 contains months whose momentum
crowd is low, whereas Group 5 has the highest momentum crowd months. The
larger the momentum crowd, the higher the momentum returns that are generated.
The study reports the momentum differential being 7.47% per month (t = 6.07)
between Group 5 and Group 1. However, this study finds that post-formation
returns are decreasing in the level of momentum crowd. Moreover, all returns
become negative in Year 1, 2 and 3. In Year 1, the monthly momentum return is
0.47% per month lower (estimate=-0.47%, t = −5.67) when the momentum crowd
is in Group 5 compared to the return in Group 1. Similar patterns are identifiable
in Year 2 and 3. The momentum returns are marked and consistently decreasing in
the momentum crowd. In Year 2, the post-formation monthly return gap between
Group 5 and 1 on momentum stocks is 0.23% lower (estimate=-0.23%, t = −5.38).
In Year 3, the gap becomes 0.03% lower (estimate=-0.03%, t = −1.03).
This study also reports returns to momentum strategy as a function of a lagged
momentum crowd. The study classifies all months into five groups based on
mktret36, the three-year return on market portfolio from year t− 2 to t. The
results exhibit no clear pattern in the post-formation returns and there are no long-
run reversal patterns. These findings are consistent with Lou and Polk (2013),
who suggest that such measure of momentum crowd is unique.
The upper section of Figure 4.3 plots the cumulative returns from the momentum
strategy in the past three years after the portfolio formation period. It shows that
a cumulative buy-and-hold strategy return is positive when the momentum crowd
is low, and negative when the momentum crowd is high. The bottom section
of Figure 4.3 plots the momentum strategy from the beginning of the formation
year to the three years after the portfolio’s formation. It shows that when the
momentum crowd is low, the cumulative momentum returns gradually increase
and the pattern of under-reaction appears. Conversely, the scenario is the opposite
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Figure 4.3: Momentum Crowd and Momentum Returns
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with regard to the high momentum crowd. The corresponding momentum return
exhibits overreaction as returns decline from the peak from Year 1 to Year 3. This
further confirms Lou and Polk (2013)’s unanchored comomentum strategy of the
cognitive bias effect among institutional investors.
Table 4.8: Forecasting Momentum Return Skewness
This table reports skewness of momentum returns as a function of lagged momentum crowd.
Stocks with prices below £5 a share are excluded from our sample. This study classifies
all months into five groups based on MomCrowdL, the average pairwise partial return
correlation in the loser decile. This table below reports the skewness in daily returns to
the value-weight winner minus loser portfolio in month 1 to 3 (1 to 6 and 1 to 12) after
portfolio formation during 1987 to 2012, following low to high MomCrowdL. 5 − 1 is the
difference between the highest and lowest MomCrowdL and OLS is the slope coefficient
from the regression of monthly momentumm returns on ranks of MomCrowdL. T -statistics
are presented in the parentheses.
Month1 Months 1-3 Months 1-6 Months 1-12
RankNo. Obs. Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
1 52 0.054 (0.44) 0.015 (0.09) -0.126 (-0.70) -0.159 (-0.89)
2 52 -0.018 (-0.13) -0.220 (-1.79) -0.404 (-3.32) -0.485 (-4.41)
3 52 -0.090 (-0.73) -0.219 (-1.47) -0.052 (-0.31) -0.216 (-1.21)
4 52 0.048 (0.35) -0.124 (-0.77) -0.541 (-3.06) -0.736 (-4.92)
5 52 -0.180 (-1.74) -0.327 (-2.52) -0.231 (-1.45) -0.197 (-1.02)
5− 1 -0.234 (-1.60) -0.343 (-1.52) -0.105 (-0.47) -0.039 (-0.15)
OLS 0.000 (0.66) 0.000 (0.01) -0.001 (-1.17) -0.001 (-0.91)
There are a number of studies that point out that momentum crashes can be
predicted when the market declines and when it is volatile. For example, Daniel
and Moskowitz (2011) and Daniel, Jagannathan, and Kim (2012) focus on the
non-normality feature of momentum returns. In Table 4.8 the study presents
data to show the extent to which momentum crowd forecasts time-series variation
in the momentum return skewness. The author examines the skewness of daily
returns. Table 4.8 reports the skewness in daily returns to the value-weighted
momentum portfolio in month 1, month 1 to 3, month 1 to 5 and month 1 to
12 after the formation of the portfolio. When the momentum crowd is high, the
skewness becomes low. As can be seen from Table 4.8. In the first three months
of the holding period, the months whose momentum crowd are the lowest have an
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average return skewness of 0.015 (t = 0.09). Importantly, however, group 5, that
contains the highest momentum crowd months, exhibits an estimate of skewness
of -0.327 (t = −2.52). These results hold when the study examines daily return
skewness over a longer holding period.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter examined the 52-week high anchored momentum strategy (George
and Hwang (2004)) for both institutional and individual investors of various hold-
ing horizons in the UK.
This chapter found that return continuation effect is high and robust with short
holding horizons. The analysis also shows that individual investors appear to have
more significant anchoring and adjustment biases over institutional investors. This
chapter attributes such biases as being due to individual investors’ inexperience.
Using analysts’ earnings forecast revision ratio, the findings suggest that expe-
rienced institutional investors are more likely to incorporate momentum signals
and eventually translate their forecast revisions as news. Importantly, the analysis
suggests significant coefficients for institutional held portfolios. Individual held
portfolios, in contrast, do not yield similar results, demonstrating that individual
investors are inexperienced. Thus, their strategies have a destabilising effect on
the stock market efficiency.
Furthermore, momentum returns are mostly found to be significantly positive.
However, there are certain moments when momentum crashes. For example, this
study found significant momentum crash around 2007 when the global financial
crisis occurred. Since the author is able to distinguish between individual held
stocks and institutional held stocks, this study examined the difference between
these two groups of stock returns both before and after financial crisis. This
chapter found that momentum crash is caused not only by loser portfolios, but
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also by winner portfolios. The study also finds that institutional investors tend
to have cognitive biases that lead to momentum crash.
Following Lou and Polk (2013), this study further studied cognitive biases by
applying the unanchored JT momentum strategy. This chapter quantified the
momentum crowd in the UK market by sifting out the effect of other asset pric-
ing anomalies. The results suggest that UK institutional momentum investors
overreact when there are too many of them in momentum trading (i.e. when the
momentum crowd is high).
Overall, this study concludes that individual investors are inexperienced and man-
ifest anchoring and adjustment biases. Institutional investors, on the other hand,
are more experienced. Even though they are still subject to cognitive biases, caus-
ing stock prices to move away from fundamentals. Their experience means that
stock market is more efficient and stabilised.
Taken together, the findings of this study have a number of implications for practi-
tioners, policy-makers, regulators and portfolio managers whose decisions depend-
ing on movements of stock prices. For individual investors, they can maximise
their profits by holding portfolios at a short horizon. Compared to institutional
investors, individual investors have more significant anchoring and adjustment bi-
ases. Policy makers are implied to distinguish the differences in the trading by
institutions and individuals when making policies. It is generally argued that in-
stitutions are supposed to buy winners and sell losers in momentum trading. In
contrast, the results imply that individuals tend to sell winners and buy losers and
seem to engage in the contrarian behaviour even though the contrarian behaviour
is not profitable at these horizons.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
This chapter summarises the empirical findings of the thesis. It presents the
limitations of the outcomes and then followed by a discussion of future research
avenues.
5.2 Summary of the Main Findings
This thesis has three empirical dimensions including illiquidity premiums and
expected stock returns, semi-varying momentum payoffs and illiquidity, and the
52-week high momentum strategy and information uncertainty in the UK. The
main findings of each chapter is summarized in the next table.
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Table 5.1: Main Findings From the Empirical Studies
Research Question Methodology Findings
Empirical Chapter 2
1. Is there a single illiquidity proxy that can significantly Fama-MacBeth Regressions No individual ililquidity proxy
outperform other proxies in asset pricing models? and HJ tests outperforms the others.
2. Does liquidity commonality exist in the UK? Principal Component Analysis There is a common illiquidity component.
3. Which liquidity-adjusted asset pricing model Fama-MacBeth Regressions The inclusion of illiquidity with Fama-French
explains stock returns in the UK? and GMM model explains significant cross-sectional variations.
4. Do the results vary between parametric Fama-MacBeth Regressions Parametrically Fama-French model outperforms
and non-parametric tests? and HJ tests while CAPM model yields a smaller HJ distance.
Empirical Chapter 3
1. Why is there return continuation effect? Time-series Regressions Liquidity risk explains significant momentum effect.
2. Do UK data exhibit high heterogeneity? Varying Coefficient Models There is significant bounce in varying coefficients.
3. Does momentum persists at all times? Out-of-Sample Tests Momentum crashes during the financial crisis.
4. What happened when there is exogenous shock? Diff-in-Diffs High illiquid stocks are more sensitive to shocks.
Empirical Chapter 4
1. How long is momentum strategy horizon? Technical Analysis From 3 months to 5 years.
2. Do individual investors trade differently Diff-in-Diffs Yes. Individual investors significantly overreacted
from institutional investors? and Technical Analysis to economic shocks and destabilised efficient market.
3. How to explain momentum during times 52-Week High Anchor Individual investors are more likely to have
of greater information uncertainty? Diff-in-Diffs anchors, in particular from the sell-side.
4. Which type of investors help Panel Regressions and Institutional investors who have access to
facilitate market efficiency? Cross-sectional Regressions analysts’ earnings forecasts revisions do.
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5.3 Limitations of the Study
The results of this thesis are considered in the context of the following limitations.
Firstly, for the first empirical chapter, although the principal component analysis
is a good approach to represent liquidity, it only captures linear correlations among
liquidity measures. Therefore, the measure proposed in this chapter is subject to
limitations of linearity.
Secondly, for the second empirical chapter, it illustrates how illiquidity shocks
predict both momentum and value investment returns. Momentum anomaly is
rather a complex puzzle. There are other factors that may contribute to momen-
tum returns, for example volatility.
Thirdly, for the third empirical chapter, the way of distinguishing between individ-
ual and institutional investors assume individual to hold small numbers of stocks
whereas institutional investors to hold larger numbers of stocks. This assumption
may not be working in the real world.
Overall, liquidity and momentum puzzles are broad topics and may be market
specific issues. Therefore, the results reported in this thesis may only be limited
to similar developed markets and they may differ from developing countries.
5.4 Suggestions for Future Research
Despite filling some of the gaps in current asset pricing and stock return literature,
this study highlights a number of others for future research.
Firstly, this thesis attempts to investigate asset pricing anomalies in the context
of the UK stock market. Future research could be extended to investigate whether
expected returns are related to stocks’ sensitivities to fluctuations in other aspects
of liquidity and in other markets, for example, the emerging markets.
Another direction for future research is to explore whether liquidity risk and mo-
mentum play a role in various pricing anomalies in financial markets. It would
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also be useful to explore whether some form of systematic liquidity risk is priced
in other financial markets, such as fixed income markets.
Thirdly, with regard to return continuation anomaly, future research could focus
on studying the quality of governance that could be a potential explanation for
continuing profits.
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Appendix A
Unreported Results
A.1 Individual Parametric Illiquidity Results
Table A.1: Fama-MacBeth Estimates–CS
Note: λi is the mean of risk premium coefficients λi using Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. The monthly cross-
sectional regressions of ten equally-weighted portfolio return premiums are estimated using the risk factors of Fama
and MacBeth (1973). ILLIQ is CS factor of the pricing models. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The last
column reports the increase in R-squared coefficient due to the addition of the illiquidity factor.
λ0 λmkt λsmb λhml λmom λL R
2 ∆R2
Unrestricted Model
CAPMILLIQ -0.418 1.118 3.126 0.951 0.011
(-2.990) (3.008) (0.811)
FFILLIQ -0.172 0.773 -0.030 0.596 -6.315 0.956 0.020
(-1.009) (1.386) (-0.033) (0.992) (-1.714)
CARHARTILLIQ -0.227 0.642 0.360 0.912 -1.851 -4.055 0.958 0.014
(-1.413) (1.031) (0.371) (1.473) (-0.977) (-0.473)
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Table A.2: Fama-MacBeth Estimates–ET
Note: λi is the mean of risk premium coefficients λi using Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. The monthly cross-
sectional regressions of ten equally-weighted portfolio return premiums are estimated using the risk factors of Fama
and MacBeth (1973). ILLIQ is ET factor of the pricing models. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The last
column reports the increase in R-squared coefficient due to the addition of the illiquidity factor.
λ0 λmkt λsmb λhml λmom λL R
2 ∆R2
Unrestricted Model
CAPMILLIQ 2.711 -2.354 1.592 0.905 0.666
(2.832) (-2.435) (3.982)
FFILLIQ 1.297 -0.994 0.756 -1.455 1.190 0.923 -0.025
(0.875) (-0.677) (-3.363) (-1.592) (1.761)
CARHARTILLIQ 2.174 -2.025 0.808 -1.106 -1.434 1.279 0.926 -0.031
(1.641) (-1.508) (3.556) (-1.134) (-0.547) (2.277)
Table A.3: Fama-MacBeth Estimates–LM
Note: λi is the mean of risk premium coefficients λi using Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. The monthly cross-
sectional regressions of ten equally-weighted portfolio return premiums are estimated using the risk factors of Fama
and MacBeth (1973). ILLIQ is LM factor of the pricing models. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The last
column reports the increase in R-squared coefficient due to the addition of the illiquidity factor.
λ0 λmkt λsmb λhml λmom λL R
2 ∆R2
Unrestricted Model
CAPMILLIQ 0.959 -0.186 0.923 0.581 0.089
(1.316) (-0.257) (1.703)
FFILLIQ 0.906 -0.186 0.099 -0.747 0.334 0.834 0.013
(1.178) (-0.244) (0.379) (-1.219) (0.568)
CARHARTILLIQ 0.036 1.070 0.262 -0.282 3.999 -0.610 0.914 0.066
(0.033) (0.758) (0.917) (-0.399) (1.116) (-3.992)
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Table A.4: Fama-MacBeth Estimates–PS
Note: λi is the mean of risk premium coefficients λi using Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. The monthly cross-
sectional regressions of ten equally-weighted portfolio return premiums are estimated using the risk factors of Fama
and MacBeth (1973). ILLIQ is PS factor of the pricing models. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The last
column reports the increase in R-squared coefficient due to the addition of the illiquidity factor.
λ0 λmkt λsmb λhml λmom λL R
2 ∆R2
Unrestricted Model
CAPMILLIQ -0.221 0.926 0.783 0.869 0.048
(-1.576) (3.195) (1.574)
FFILLIQ -0.287 0.813 0.388 0.970 -0.184 0.909 -0.004
(-1.605) (2.588) (1.743) (0.704) (-0.263)
CARHARTILLIQ -0.089 0.772 0.547 3.694 -0.414 -1.341 0.957 0.027
(-0.479) (2.519) (2.559) (3.191) (-0.174) (-0.638)
Table A.5: Fama-MacBeth Estimates–RO
Note: λi is the mean of risk premium coefficients λi using Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. The monthly cross-
sectional regressions of ten equally-weighted portfolio return premiums are estimated using the risk factors of Fama
and MacBeth (1973). ILLIQ is RO factor of the pricing models. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The last
column reports the increase in R-squared coefficient due to the addition of the illiquidity factor.
λ0 λmkt λsmb λhml λmom λL R
2 ∆R2
Unrestricted Model
CAPMILLIQ 0.068 0.687 1.011 0.781 0.004
(0.095) (0.872) (1.263)
FFILLIQ 1.055 -0.183 -0.124 0.155 2.143 0.824 0.046
(1.061) (-0.193) (-0.470) (0.201) (1.710)
CARHARTILLIQ 2.066 -0.931 -0.566 -1.248 4.744 4.045 0.931 0.133
(1.823) (-0.896) (-1.855) (-1.418) (2.094) (2.968)
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Table A.6: Fama-MacBeth Estimates–RV
Note: λi is the mean of risk premium coefficients λi using Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. The monthly cross-
sectional regressions of ten equally-weighted portfolio return premiums are estimated using the risk factors of Fama
and MacBeth (1973). ILLIQ is RV factor of the pricing models. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The last
column reports the increase in R-squared coefficient due to the addition of the illiquidity factor.
λ0 λmkt λsmb λhml λmom λL R
2 ∆R2
Unrestricted Model
CAPMILLIQ 1.065 -0.514 0.738 0.900 0.698
(1.608) (-0.756) (2.381)
FFILLIQ 0.799 -0.230 0.290 -0.275 0.665 0.914 0.019
(1.120) (-0.309) (1.852) (-0.611) (2.077)
CARHARTILLIQ 0.761 -0.274 0.342 -0.089 -3.247 0.626 0.991 0.002
(0.990) (-0.340) (2.164) (-0.169) (-1.578) (10.116)
Table A.7: Fama-MacBeth Estimates–ZR
Note: λi is the mean of risk premium coefficients λi using Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. The monthly cross-
sectional regressions of ten equally-weighted portfolio return premiums are estimated using the risk factors of Fama
and MacBeth (1973). ILLIQ is ZR factor of the pricing models. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The last
column reports the increase in R-squared coefficient due to the addition of the illiquidity factor.
λ0 λmkt λsmb λhml λmom λL R
2 ∆R2
Unrestricted Model
CAPMILLIQ -0.478 0.626 -0.267 0.138 0.054
(-1.149) (0.522) (-0.757)
FFILLIQ -0.297 0.272 -0.195 0.470 -0.290 0.364 0.112
(-0.634) (0.215) (-0.227) (0.842) (-0.808)
CARHARTILLIQ -0.618 1.474 -0.390 0.622 -2.201 -0.157 0.594 0.114
(-1.039) (0.979) (-0.463) (1.147) (-1.027) (-6.168)
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Appendix B
Program Codes
This section provides with some of the MATLAB codes this thesis uses.
B.1 Portfolio formation
1. Find the market value at the beginning of the year.
MVF=zeros(totalyears,totalstocks);
MVF(1,:)=MV(1,:);
for i=1:totalstocks
for y=1:totalyears-1
for j=1:totaldays
if ta(j)-ta(1)+1==yta(j+1)-ta(1)+1==y+1
MVF(y+1,i)=MV(j,i);
end end end end
2. Form the portfolio.
[ ,id]=sort(MVF,2,’ascend’);
for y=1:totalyears
nstocks(y)=length(find(MVF(y,:) =0));
ncandidates(y)=floor(nstocks(y)*0.1);
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for i=1:10 for j=1:ncandidates(y)
PMV(y,i,j)=id(y,totalstocks+1-
ncandidates(y)*(10-i)-j);
end end end
NMV=ncandidates;
3. Equal-weighted illiquidity and other characteristics by
size portfolios.
PCAP=zeros(totalyears,10);
PMTBV=zeros(totalyears,10);
PRETURN=zeros(totalmonths,10);
PRV=zeros(totalmonths,10);
PPS=zeros(totalmonths,10);
PZR=zeros(totalmonths,10);
PLM=zeros(totalmonths,10);
PRO=zeros(totalmonths,10);
PCS=zeros(totalmonths,10);
PET=zeros(totalmonths,10);
for k=1:totalmonths
illiquidity average portfolio
for j=1:10 for i=1:NMV(ceil(k/12))
PRETURN(k,j)=
PRETURN(k,j)+RM(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))
/NMV(ceil(k/12)); PRV(k,j)=
PRV(k,j)+RV(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))/NMV(ceil(k/12));
PPS(k,j)=
PPS(k,j)+PS(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))/NMV(ceil(k/12));
PZR(k,j)=PZR(k,j)+ZR(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))/NMV(ceil(k/12));
PLM(k,j)=PLM(k,j)+LM(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))/NMV(ceil(k/12));
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PRO(k,j)=PRO(k,j)+RO(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))/NMV(ceil(k/12));
PCS(k,j)=PCS(k,j)+CS(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))/NMV(ceil(k/12));
PET(k,j)=PET(k,j)+ET(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))/NMV(ceil(k/12));
end end end
for k=1:totalyears
for j=1:10
for i=1:NMV(k)
PCAP(k,j)=PCAP(k,j)+MVF(k,PMV(k,j,i));
PMTBV(k,j)=PMTBV(k,j)+MTBV(k,PMV(k,j,i))/
NMV(k);
end end end
tabel1 equal weighted=[mean(PRETURN);
mean(PRV);mean(PPS);mean(PZR);
mean(PLM);mean(PRO);mean(PCS);mean(PET);
mean(PCAP);mean(PMTBV);std(PRETURN)]’;
4. Value-weighted illiquidity and other characteristics by size portfolios.
VPRETURN=zeros(totalmonths,10);
VPRV=zeros(totalmonths,10);
VPPS=zeros(totalmonths,10);
VPZR=zeros(totalmonths,10);
VPLM=zeros(totalmonths,10);
VPRO=zeros(totalmonths,10);
VPCS=zeros(totalmonths,10);
VPET=zeros(totalmonths,10);
SPRETURN=zeros(totalmonths,10);
SPRV=zeros(totalmonths,10);
SPPS=zeros(totalmonths,10);
SPZR=zeros(totalmonths,10);
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SPLM=zeros(totalmonths,10);
SPRO=zeros(totalmonths,10);
SPCS=zeros(totalmonths,10);
SPET=zeros(totalmonths,10);
for k=1:totalmonths
illiquidity average portfolio
MVsize=zeros(1,10);
for j=1:10 for i=1:NMV(ceil(k/12))
MVsize(1,j)=MVsize(1,j)+MVM(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i));
SPRETURN(k,j)=SPRETURN(k,j)
+RM(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))*MVM(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i));
SPRV(k,j)=SPRV(k,j)+RV(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))
*MVM(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i));
SPPS(k,j)=SPPS(k,j)+PS(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))
*MVM(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i));
SPZR(k,j)=SPZR(k,j)+ZR(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))
*MVM(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i));
SPLM(k,j)=SPLM(k,j)+LM(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))
*MVM(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i));
SPRO(k,j)=SPRO(k,j)+RO(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))
*MVM(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i));
SPCS(k,j)=SPCS(k,j)+CS(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))
*MVM(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i));
SPET(k,j)=SPET(k,j)+ET(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i))
*MVM(k,PMV(ceil(k/12),j,i));
end
VPRETURN(k,j)=SPRETURN(k,j)/MVsize(1,j);
VPRV(k,j)=SPRV(k,j)/MVsize(1,j);
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VPPS(k,j)=SPPS(k,j)/MVsize(1,j);
VPZR(k,j)=SPZR(k,j)/MVsize(1,j);
VPLM(k,j)=SPLM(k,j)/MVsize(1,j);
VPRO(k,j)=SPRO(k,j)/MVsize(1,j);
VPCS(k,j)=SPCS(k,j)/MVsize(1,j);
VPET(k,j)=SPET(k,j)/MVsize(1,j);
end end
tabel1 value weighted=[mean(VPRETURN);
mean(VPRV);mean(VPPS);mean(VPZR);
mean(VPLM);mean(VPRO);mean(VPCS);
mean(VPET);mean(PCAP);mean(PMTBV)
;std(VPRETURN)]’;
xlswrite(’. tabel1 value weighted.xlsx’,
tabel1 value weighted);
5. Momentum Crowd
clear;clc;
load secondchapterdata.mat;
for k=1:totalmonths n=1;
while (ty(n)-1986)*12+tm(n)¡k
n=n+1;
end
tmf(k)=n;
end
[B,id]=sort(mvdaily,2,’ascend’); sumR=0;
summvdaily=0;
SMB=zeros(totaldays,1);
nstockssmb=zeros(totaldays,1);
ncandidatessmb=zeros(totaldays,1);
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for i=1:totaldays
smallsum=0;
bigsum=0;
for j=1:(totalstocks*0.5)
smallsum=smallsum+R(i,id(i,j));
end
for j=(totalstocks*0.5+1):totalstocks
bigsum=bigsum+R(i,id(i,j));
end
SMB(i)=smallsum-bigsum;
end
[C,hmlid]=sort(btmv,2,’descend’); sumR=0;
sumbtmv=0;
HML=zeros(totaldays,1);
nstockshml=zeros(totaldays,1);
for i=1:totaldays
highsum=0;
lowsum=0;
for j=1:(floor(totalstocks*0.3))
highsum=highsum+R(i,hmlid(i,j));
end
for j=(floor(totalstocks*0.7)+1):totalstocks
lowsum=lowsum+R(i,hmlid(i,j));
end
HML(i)=highsum-lowsum;
end
MKT=Rmarket-RFD;
RMonthly=zeros(totalmonths,totalstocks);
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for i=1:totalstocks;
for j=1:totalmonths-1
RMonthly(j,i)=monthlyRI(j+1,i)/monthlyRI(j,i)-1;
end
end
RMonthly(isnan(RMonthly))=0;
RMonthly(isinf(RMonthly))=0;
Rmarketmonthly=zeros(totalmonths,1);
for i=1:totalmonths-1
Rmarketmonthly(i,1)=marketRImonthly(i+1,1)
/marketRImonthly(i,1)-1;
end
Rmarketmonthly(isnan(Rmarketmonthly))=0;
Rmarketmonthly(isinf(Rmarketmonthly))=0;
for m=13:totalmonths;
for i=1:totalstocks;
Rmom(m,i)=monthlyRI(m,i)/monthlyRI(m-12,i)-1;
end;
end;
Rmom(isnan(Rmom))=0;
Rmom(isinf(Rmom))=0;
[D,momid]=sort(Rmom,2,’descend’);
WML=zeros(totalmonths,1);
RPw=zeros(totalmonths,totalstocks);
RPl=zeros(totalmonths,totalstocks);
for i=13:totalmonths;
for j=1:(floor(totalstocks*0.1))
Pw(i,j)=momid(i,j);
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end
for j=1:(floor(totalstocks*0.1))
Pl(i,j)=momid(i,j+floor(totalstocks*0.9));
end
RPw(:,i)=RPw(:,i)+RMonthly(:,Pw(i,j));
RPl(:,i)=RPl(:,i)+RMonthly(:,Pl(i,j));
end
daytomonth=zeros(totaldays,totalstocks);
for i=13:totalmonths-1
for j=tmf(1,i):(tmf(1,i+1)-1)
for k=1:totalstocks
daytomonth(j,k)=RPw(i,k);
end
end
end
for i=13:totalmonths;
for j=1:(floor(totalstocks*0.1));
for tradingday=1:(tmf(i)-tmf(i-12));
X1(tradingday,1)=R(tradingday-1+tmf(i-12),Pw(i,j));
X1(tradingday,2)=(daytomonth(tradingday-1+tmf(i-12),Pw(i,j)))/63;
Z1(tradingday,1)=MKT(tradingday-1+tmf(i-12),1);
Z1(tradingday,2)=SMB(tradingday-1+tmf(i-12),1);
Z1(tradingday,3)=HML(tradingday-1+tmf(i-12),1);
end
partial(j)=nonzeros(tril(partialcorr(X1,Z1),-1));
clear X1 Z1;
end
partial(isnan(partial))=0;
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pcw(i)=mean(partial);
end
for i=13:totalmonths; for j=1:(floor(totalstocks*0.1));
Pl(i,j)=momid(i,j+floor(totalstocks*0.9));
for tradingday=1:(tmf(i)-tmf(i-12));
X1(tradingday,1)=R(tradingday-1+tmf(i-12),Pl(i,j));
X1(tradingday,2)=(daytomonth(tradingday-1+tmf(i-12),Pl(i,j)))/63;
Z1(tradingday,1)=MKT(tradingday-1+tmf(i-12),1);
Z1(tradingday,2)=SMB(tradingday-1+tmf(i-12),1);
Z1(tradingday,3)=HML(tradingday-1+tmf(i-12),1);
end
partiall(j)=nonzeros(tril(partialcorr(X1,Z1),-1));
clear X1 Z1;
end
partiall(isnan(partiall))=0;
pcl(i)=mean(partiall);
end
for t=37:totalmonths;
mkt36(t)=marketRImonthly(t)/marketRImonthly(t-36)-1;
mktvol36(t)=std(Rmarketmonthly(t-36:t,:));
end
panelA(1,1)=size(pcl(37:end),2);panelA(1,2)=mean(pcl(37:end));
panelA(1,3)=std(pcl(37:end));panelA(1,4)=min(nonzeros(pcl(37:end)));
panelA(1,5)=max(pcl(37:end));
panelA(2,1)=size(pcw(37:end),2);
panelA(2,2)=mean(pcw(37:end));
panelA(2,3)=std(pcw(37:end));panelA(2,4)=min(nonzeros(pcw(37:end)));
panelA(2,5)=max(pcw(37:end));
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panelA(3,1)=size(mkt36(37:end),2);
panelA(3,2)=mean(mkt36(37:end));panelA(3,3)=std(mkt36(37:end));
panelA(3,4)=min(mkt36(37:end));panelA(3,5)=max(mkt36(37:end));
panelA(4,1)=size(mktvol36(37:end),2);panelA(4,2)=mean(mktvol36(37:end));
panelA(4,3)=std(mktvol36(37:end));panelA(4,4)=min(mktvol36(37:end));
panelA(4,5)=max(mktvol36(37:end));
panelB=corrcoef([pcl(37:end)’ pcw(37:end)’
mkt36(37:end)’ mktvol36(37:end)’]);
panelC=corrcoef([pcl(37:end-1)’ pcw(37:end-1)’
pcl(38:end)’ pcw(38:end)’]);
6. Class the months in to five groups based on commoml.
[C,id]=sort(pcl(37:end-37),2,’ascend’);
for m=1:5
nmonths(m)=floor(size(C,2)*0.2);
for i=1:nmonths(m)
pd(m,i)=id(i+(m-1)*nmonths(m))+36;
X0(m,i)=MOM(pd(m,i),1);
X1(m,i)=MOM(pd(m,i),2);
X2(m,i)=MOM(pd(m,i),3);
X3(m,i)=MOM(pd(m,i),4);
end
end
7. Calculate portfolio in month k return in the following period.
for m=13:totalmonths-37
nstocks(m)=length(find(RMom(m,:) =-1));
ncandidates(m)=floor(nstocks(m)*0.1);
for k=1:49
for j=1:ncandidates(m)
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Ml(m,j,k)=RM(m+k-13,Pl(m,j));
weighted Ml(m,j,k)=monthlymv(m+k-13,Pl(m,j));
Mw(m,j,k)=RM(m+k-13,Pw(m,j));
weighted Mw(m,j,k)=monthlymv(m+k-13,Pw(m,j));
end
tempal=Ml(m,:,k);tempbl=weighted Ml(m,:,k);
tempaw=Mw(m,:,k);tempbw=weighted Mw(m,:,k);
Rpl(m,k)=tempal*tempbl’/sum(tempbl);
Rpw(m,k)=tempaw*tempbw’/sum(tempbw);
end
Rpmom=Rpw-Rpl;
end
8. regression
for m=13:totalmonths-37
Y=Rpmom(m,1:12)’-RF(m-12:m-1);
X1=RMARKETM(m-12:m-1)-RF(m-12:m-1);
X2=SMBM(m-12:m-1);
X3=HML(m-12:m-1);
X=[ones(12,1),X1,X2,X3];
beta=regress(Y,X);
FF0(m)=beta(1);
Y=Rpmom(m,14:25)’-RF(m+1:m+12);
X1=RMARKETM(m+1:m+12)-RF(m+1:m+12);
X2=SMBM(m+1:m+12);
X3=HML(m+1:m+12);
X=[ones(12,1),X1,X2,X3];
beta=regress(Y,X);
FF1(m)=beta(1);
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Y=Rpmom(m,26:37)’-RF(m+13:m+24);
X1=RMARKETM(m+13:m+24)-RF(m+13:m+24);
X2=SMBM(m+13:m+24);
X3=HML(m+13:m+24);
X=[ones(12,1),X1,X2,X3];
beta=regress(Y,X);
FF2(m)=beta(1);
Y=Rpmom(m,38:49)’-RF(m+25:m+36);
X1=RMARKETM(m+25:m+36)-RF(m+25:m+36);
X2=SMBM(m+25:m+36);
X3=HML(m+25:m+36);
X=[ones(12,1),X1,X2,X3];
beta=regress(Y,X);
FF3(m)=beta(1);
end
FF=[FF0’ FF1’ FF2’ FF3’];
[C,id]=sort(pcl(37:end-37),2,’ascend’); for m=1:5
nmonths(m)=floor(size(C,2)*0.2); for i=1:nmonths(m)
pd(m,i)=id(i+(m-1)*nmonths(m))+36;
X0(m,i)=FF(pd(m,i),1);
X1(m,i)=FF(pd(m,i),2);
X2(m,i)=FF(pd(m,i),3);
X3(m,i)=FF(pd(m,i),4);
for j=1:49
X4(m,i,j)=Rpmom(pd(m,i),j);
end
end
end
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Rpm=squeeze(mean(X4,2));
for i=1:5
panelb(i,1)=i;
panelb(i,2)=nmonths(i);
panelb(i,3)=mean(X0(i,:));
[ , , ,stat]=ttest(X0(i,:));
panelb(i,4)=stat.tstat;
panelb(i,5)=mean(X1(i,:));
[ , , ,stat]=ttest(X1(i,:));
panelb(i,6)=stat.tstat;
panelb(i,7)=mean(X2(i,:));
[ , , ,stat]=ttest(X2(i,:));
panelb(i,8)=stat.tstat;
panelb(i,9)=mean(X3(i,:));
[ , , ,stat]=ttest(X3(i,:));
panelb(i,10)=stat.tstat;
end
panelb(6,3)=panelb(5,3)-panelb(1,3);
panelb(6,5)=panelb(5,5)-panelb(1,5);
panelb(6,7)=panelb(5,7)-panelb(1,7);
panelb(6,9)=panelb(5,9)-panelb(1,9);
[ , , ,stat]=ttest(X0(5,:)-X0(1,:));
panelb(6,4)=stat.tstat;
[ , , ,stat]=ttest(X1(5,:)-X1(1,:));
panelb(6,6)=stat.tstat;
[ , , ,stat]=ttest(X2(5,:)-X2(1,:));
panelb(6,8)=stat.tstat;
[ , , ,stat]=ttest(X3(5,:)-X3(1,:));
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panelb(6,10)=stat.tstat;
whichstats = ’beta’,’tstat’;
stats = regstats(FF0(37:end)’,id’,’linear’,whichstats);
panelb(7,3)=stats.beta(2);
panelb(7,4)=stats.tstat.t(2);
stats1 = regstats(FF1(37:end)’,id’,’linear’,whichstats);
panelb(7,5)=stats1.beta(2);
panelb(7,6)=stats1.tstat.t(2);
stats2 = regstats(FF2(37:end)’,id’,’linear’,whichstats);
panelb(7,7)=stats2.beta(2);
panelb(7,8)=stats2.tstat.t(2);
stats3 = regstats(FF3(37:end)’,id’,’linear’,whichstats);
panelb(7,9)=stats3.beta(2);
panelb(7,10)=stats3.tstat.t(2);
B.2 Liquidity measures
load stockdata;
clear
clc;
load uk.mat;
load t.mat;
1.RV Days=0;
Sum=0;
RV=zeros(totalmonths,totalstocks);
D=zeros(totalmonths,totalstocks);
for i=1:totalstocks for k=1:totalmonths for j=1:length(t) if tm(j)+12*(ta(j)-ta(1))==
kR(j,i)VO(j,i)P(j,i)
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Days=Days+1;
Sum=Sum+1000*abs(R(j,i))/(VO(j,i)*P(j,i));
end
end
RV(k,i)=Sum/Days; D(k,i)=Days; Days=0;
Sum=0;
end end
RV(isnan(RV))=0;
RV(isinf(RV))=0;
2 PS
clear X1 X2 X3 Y;
for i=1:totalstocks
for k=1:totalmonths
if NTRADAY(k,i)¿1
for d=1:NTRADAY(k,i)-1
Y(d)=R(TRADAY(k,i,d+1),i)-RMARKET
(TRADAY(k,i,d+1));
X1(d)=1;
X2(d)=R(TRADAY(k,i,d),i);
X3(d)=sign(R(TRADAY(k,i,d),i)-RMARKET
(TRADAY(k,i,d)))*VA(TRADAY(k,i,d+1),i);
end
X=[X1’,X2’,X3’];
beta=regress(Y’,X);
PS(k,i)=-beta(3);
clear X1 X2 X3 Y;
else PS(k,i)=0;
end
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end
end
PS(isnan(PS))=0;
PS(isinf(PS))=0;
3. ZR
Days=0;
for i=1:totalstocks
for k=1:totalmonths
if NTRADAY(k,i)¿1
for d=1:NTRADAY(k,i)-1
if RI(TRADAY(k,i,d),i)==
RI(TRADAY(k,i,d+1),i)RI(TRADAY(k,i,d+1),i)
Days=Days+1;
end
end
end
ZERODAY(k,i)=Days;
Days=0;
end
end ZR=ZERODAY./repmat(GENNTRADAY’,1,totalstocks);
ZR=ZR.*100;
4. LM12 NZ=zeros(totalmonths,totalstocks);
for i=1:totalstocks
for k=13:totalmonths
for d=1:12
NZ(k,i)=NZ(k,i)+ZERODAY(k-d,i);
end
end end TVX=zeros(totalmonths,totalstocks);
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for i=1:totalstocks
for k=13:totalmonths
for d=1:12
for dd=1:NTRADAY(k-d,i)
TVX(k,i)=TVX(k,i)+TRN(TRADAY(k-d,i,dd),i);
end
end
end
end DF=11000;
NX=zeros(totalmonths,1);
for k=13:totalmonths
for d=1:12
NX(k)=NX(k)+GENNTRADAY(k-d);
end
end LM=zeros(totalmonths,totalstocks);
for i=1:totalstocks
for k=13:totalmonths
if TVX(k,i)
LM(k,i)=(NZ(k,i)+(1/TVX(k,i))/DF)*21*12/NX(k);
end
end
end
LM(isnan(LM))=0;
LM(isinf(LM))=0;
Days=1;
clear Y X;
for i=1:totalstocks
for j=1:totaldays
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if R(j,i)
Y(Days)=R(j,i);
X(Days,:)=[1,RMARKET(j)];
Days=Days+1;
end
end;
if Days¿1
[b, ,r, ,stats]=regress(Y’,X);
beta(i)=b(2);
theta(i)=std(r);
r2(i)=stats(1);
end
Days=1;
clear Y X;
end
6. RO clear TEMPRO;
R=R./100;
for i=1:totalstocks
for k=1:totalmonths
if NTRADAY(k,i)¿1
for d=1:NTRADAY(k,i)
TEMPRO(d)=R(TRADAY(k,i,d),i);
end
RO(k,i)=2*sqrt(abs(cov(TEMPRO)));
clear TEMPRO;
end
end end
R=R.*100;
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7. CS clear beta;
alpha=zeros(totaldays,totalstocks);
beta=zeros(totaldays,totalstocks);
gama=zeros(totaldays,totalstocks);
SCS=zeros(totaldays,totalstocks);
CS=zeros(totalmonths,totalstocks);
for i=1:totalstocks
for j=1:totaldays-1
if H(j,i)L(j,i)H(j+1,i)L(j+1,i)
beta(j,i)=1/2*((log(H(j+1,i)/L(j+1,i)))2
+(log(H(j,i)/L(j,i)))2);
gama(j,i)=(log((max(H(j+1,i),H(j,i)))/
(min(L(j+1,i),L(j,i)))))2;
alpha(j,i)=(((sqrt(2)-1)*(beta(j,i)))
/(3-2*sqrt(2)))-sqrt((gama(j,i))/(3-2*sqrt(2)));
SCS(j,i)=2*(exp(alpha(j,i))-1)/(1+exp(alpha(j,i)));
end end end
Days=0;
for i=1:totalstocks
for k=1:totalmonths
for j=1:totaldays
if tm(j)+12*(ta(j)-ta(1))==kSCS(j,i)
Days=Days+1;
CS(k,i)=CS(k,i)+SCS(j,i);
end
end
CS(k,i)=CS(k,i)/Days;
Days=0;
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end
end
CS(isnan(CS))=0;
CS(isinf(CS))=0;
8. ET Days=0;sumP=0;
for i=1:totalstocks
for k=1:totalmonths
for j=1:length(t)
if tm(j)+12*(ta(j)-ta(1))==kP(j,i)
Days=Days+1;
sumP=sumP+P(j,i);
PDAY(k,i,Days)=j;
end
end
AP(k,i)=sumP/Days;
NPDAY(k,i)=Days; Days=0;
sumP=0;
end
end
AP(isnan(AP))=0;
N=zeros(totalmonths,totalstocks,6);
for i=1:totalstocks
for k=1:totalmonths
if NPDAY(k,i)
for d=1:NPDAY(k,i)
x=P(PDAY(k,i,d),i);
if x==floor(x) N(k,i,1)=N(k,i,1)+1;
elseif x-floor(x)==0.5 N(k,i,2)=N(k,i,2)+1;
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elseif 5*x==floor(5*x) N(k,i,3)=N(k,i,3)+1;
elseif 5*x-floor(5*x)==0.5 N(k,i,4)=N(k,i,4)+1;
elseif 10*x-floor(10*x)==0.5 N(k,i,5)=N(k,i,5)+1;
else N(k,i,6)=N(k,i,6)+1; end
end
end
end
end
sumN=sum(N,3);
clear gamaET;
for i=1:totalstocks
for k=1:totalmonths
for n=1:6
F(n)=N(k,i,7-n)/sumN(k,i);
end
U(1)=2*F(1);
for n=2:5
U(n)=2*F(n)-F(n-1);
end
U(6)=F(6)-F(5);
gamaET(1)=min((max(U(1),0)),1);
for n=2:6
gamaET(n)=min((max(U(n),0)),1-sum(gamaET));
end
ET(k,i)=(gamaET(1)*0.01+gamaET(2)*0.05+
gamaET(3)*0.1+gamaET(4)*0.2+gamaET(5)*0.5+
gamaET(6))/AP(k,i);
clear gamaET;
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end
end
ET(isnan(ET))=0;
B.3 Forecasting
[totalmonths,totalstocks]=size(monthlymv);
R1=zeros(totalmonths,totalstocks);
for i=1:totalstocks
for j=1:totalmonths-2
R1(j,i)=monthlyRI(j+2,i)/monthlyRI(j,i)-1;
end
end
R2=zeros(totalmonths,totalstocks);
for i=1:totalstocks
for j=1:totalmonths-2
R2(j,i)=monthlyRI(j,i)/monthlyRI(j+2,i)-1;
end
end
Revision=zeros(totalmonths,totalstocks);
for i=1:totalstocks
for j=1:totalmonths-1
Revision(j,i)=(monthlyfeps(j+1,i)
-monthlyfeps(j,i))/monthlyp(j,i);
end
end
Revision(isnan(Revision))=0;
Revision(isinf(Revision))=0;
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Revision(find(Revision==0))=-1;
monthlymv(isnan(monthlymv))=0;
[B,id]=sort(Revision,2,’descend’);
MOM=zeros(totalmonths,1);
SumR=0;
SumMV=0;
MOM=zeros(totalmonths,1);
for m=1:totalmonths-1
nstocks(m)=length(find(Revision(m,:) =-1));
ncandidates(m)=floor(nstocks(m)*0.3);
for j=1:ncandidates(m)
Pl(m,j)=id(m,nstocks(m)+1-j);
SumR=SumR+R2(m,Pl(m,j));
end Rl(m)=SumR/ncandidates(m);
Rl(m)=Rl(m)+1;
Rl(m)=Rl(m)’;
Rl(m)=Rl(m).(1/2);
Rl(m)=Rl(m)-1;
SumR=0;
SumMV=0;
for j=1:ncandidates(m)
Pw(m,j)=id(m,j);
SumR=SumR+R1(m,Pw(m,j));
end
Rw(m)=SumR/ncandidates(m);
Rw(m)=Rw(m)’;
Rw(m)=Rw(m)+1;
Rw(m)=Rw(m).(1/2);
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Rw(m)=Rw(m)-1;
SumR=0;
SumMV=0;
MOM(m)=Rw(m)+Rl(m);
end
MOM(isnan(MOM))=0;
MOM(isinf(MOM))=0;
Rw(isnan(Rw))=0;
Rw(isinf(Rw))=0;
Rl(isnan(Rl))=0;
Rl(isinf(Rl))=0;
for n=1:335;
for m=1:640;
kl1(n,m)=ismember(m,Pl(n,:));
end
end
for n=1:335;
for m=1:640;
kw1(n,m)=ismember(m,Pw(n,:));
end
end
kl1=kl1(13:324,:);
kw1=kw1(13:324,:);
kw1=reshape(kw1,199680,1);
kl1=reshape(kl1,199680,1);
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B.4 Data Preparation
clear;clc;
[TEMPG, , ]=xlsread(’.DATA.xlsx’,2);
[TEMPV, , ]=xlsread(’.DATA.xlsx’,3);
[TEMPRF, , ]=xlsread(’.risk-free rate.xlsx’,2);
[TEMPMOM, , ]=xlsread(’.data.xlsx’,2);
[TEMP2, , ]=xlsread(’.second paper.xlsx’,2);
[TEMP4, , ]=xlsread(’.uk.xlsx’,2);
[TEMP3, , ]=xlsread(’.second paper.xlsx’,3);
[TEMP5, , ]=xlsread(’.return index monthly and yearly.xlsx’,2);
[TEMP6, , ]=xlsread(’.return index monthly and yearly.xlsx’,3);
TEMPMOM(isnan(TEMPMOM))=0;
TEMP2(isnan(TEMP2))=0;
TEMP3(isnan(TEMP3))=0;
TEMP4(isnan(TEMP4))=0;
TEMP5(isnan(TEMP5))=0;
TEMP6(isnan(TEMP6))=0;
TEMPG(isnan(TEMPG))=0;
TEMPV(isnan(TEMPV))=0;
TEMPRF(isnan(TEMPRF))=0;
TEMPMOM(isinf(TEMPMOM))=0;
TEMP2(isinf(TEMP2))=0;
TEMP3(isinf(TEMP3))=0;
TEMP4(isinf(TEMP4))=0;
TEMP5(isinf(TEMP5))=0;
TEMP6(isinf(TEMP6))=0;
TEMPG(isinf(TEMPG))=0;
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TEMPV(isinf(TEMPV))=0;
TEMPRF(isinf(TEMPRF))=0;
MV=TEMP2(:,1:3:end);
MTBV=TEMP2(:,2:3:end);
BTMV=1./MTBV;
BTMV(isnan(BTMV))=0;
BTMV(isinf(BTMV))=0;
VO=TEMP2(:,3:3:end);
P=TEMPMOM(:,1:3:end);
RI=TEMPMOM(:,2:3:end);
MAX52=TEMPMOM(:,3:3:end);
RIM=TEMP4;
RIMARKETM=TEMP5;
RIMARKETA=TEMP6;
load t.mat;
[totaldays,totalstocks]=size(RI);
ta=year(t);tm=month(t);td=day(t);
totalmonths=(ta(end)-ta(1)+1)*12;
totalyears=(ta(end)-ta(1)+1);
RF=((TEMPRF./100+1).(1/12)− 1);
RFD=(TEMPRF./100+1).(1/365)− 1;
VA=P.*VO/1000;
R=zeros(totaldays,totalstocks);
RM=zeros(totalmonths,totalstocks);
for i=1:totalstocks
for j=1:totaldays-1
R(j,i)=RI(j+1,i)/RI(j,i)-1;
end
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for j=1:totalmonths-1
RM(j,i)=RIM(j+1,i)/RIM(j,i)-1;
end
end RMARKET=zeros(totaldays,1);
RMARKETM=zeros(totalmonths,1);
for i=1:totaldays-1
RMARKET(i,1)=TEMP3(i+1,1)/TEMP3(i,1)-1;
end
for i=1:totalmonths-1
RMARKETM(i,1)=RIMARKETM(i+1,1)/RIMARKETM(i,1)-1;
end
R(isnan(R))=0;
RM(isnan(RM))=0;
RMARKET(isnan(RMARKET))=0;
RMARKETM(isnan(RMARKETM))=0;
R(isinf(R))=0;
RM(isinf(RM))=0;
RMARKET(isinf(RMARKET))=0;
RMARKETM(isinf(RMARKETM))=0;
RLOW=zeros(totalmonths,1);
RHIGH=zeros(totalmonths,1);
for i=1:totalmonths-1
RLOW(i,1)=TEMPG(i+1,1)/TEMPG(i,1)-1;
RHIGH(i,1)=TEMPV(i+1,1)/TEMPV(i,1)-1;
end
RLOW(isnan(RLOW))=0;
RHIGH(isinf(RHIGH))=0;
Days=0;
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for i=1:totalstocks
for k=1:totalmonths
for j=1:length(t)
if tm(j)+12*(ta(j)-ta(1))
==kR(j,i)VO(j,i)P(j,i)
Days=Days+1;
TRADAY(k,i,Days)=j;
end
end
NTRADAY(k,i)=Days;
Days=0;
end
end Days=0;
for k=1:totalmonths
for j=1:length(t)
if tm(j)+12*(ta(j)-ta(1))==k
Days=Days+1;
end end
GENNTRADAY(k)=Days;
Days=0;
end
save(’uk.mat’);
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Appendix C
Publications and Conference
Presentations
C.1 Publications and Working Papers
• Chen, J., Sherif, M., 2016. Illiquidity Premium and Expected Stock Returns
in the UK: A New Approach. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its
Applications. DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2016.03.035. (Published)
• Chen, J., Sherif, M., Yu, Y., Governance and Stock Return Continuations:
Evidence From G7 Countries. (Targeting Journal of Banking and Fi-
nance)
• Chen, J., Sherif, M., The 52-Week High Strategy and Information Uncer-
tainty: the Case of UK Institutional and Individual Investors. (Targeting
Journal of Financial Stability)
• Chen, J., Sherif, M., Semi-varying Momentum Payoffs and Illiquidity: Evi-
dence from the UK. (Targeting European Financial Management)
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C.2 International Conference Presentations
• 2013 SIRE Conference at the University of St. Andrews on Finance and
Commodities sponsored by Scottish Institute for Research in Economics.
• 2014 Recent Developments in Money, Macroeconomics & Finance Workshop
sponsored by Bank of England at the University of Warwick.
• 2014 British Accounting & Finance Association 50th Annual Conference at
London School of Economics.
• 7th International Finance & Banking Society 2015 China Conference at
Zhejiang University.
• Paper accepted by 2015 Midwest Finance Association Annual Conference in
Chicago.
• Paper accepted by IFABS 2016 in Barcelona.
• Asset Pricing and Corporate Finance Workshop 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016
at the University of Glasgow.
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